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I.

THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF TENNYSON'S "IN MEMORIAM."¹

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Lovers of music throughout the world are, to-day, celebrating the centenary of the birth of a great musician, the precocious, rarely-gifted, intensely patriotic Polander, Frederic Francois Chopin. Less than a month ago, on February 5, the centennial of another likewise precocious, divinely endowed artist in sounds, Jacob Ludwig Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy, was observed. This year of grace 1909 is, beyond many years of the recent past and more than for many years to come, a year of notable centenaries. The year 1809 was a truly wonderful year in that in it a more than ordinary number of children, who later served their generation most conspicuously, were born. Besides the great musicians who have been named, there were born in that year, just a century ago, at least seven other men, preeminent in various fields of human endeavor, who attained to high place in the esteem of their contemporaries and of posterity. Already we have celebrated the centenary of Edgar Allan Poe (January 19), of Charles Robert Darwin (February 12), of Abraham Lincoln (February 12), and of Cyrus Hall McCormick (February 15). Three more

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centenaries will be observed with more or less of national or of world-wide enthusiasm before the year shall end. The next is that of Alfred Lord Tennyson (August 5); following his will come that of the genial "Autocrat," Oliver Wendell Holmes (August 29), while, last of all, almost at the very end of the year (December 29) the hundredth birthday of "the Grand Old Man," William Ewart Gladstone, will demand and receive recognition from millions of the Anglo-Saxon race.

There is much in common in the life and work of these gifted men, especially of those who were really great. Concerning some of these nine there is, indeed, dispute as to their essential greatness, the rank of others is certain. Of one, a musician, it has been noted that his fame was greater half a century ago than it is now. The fiftieth anniversary of his birth was celebrated with greater enthusiasm than was his centenary. Another, a poet, though deemed by enthusiasts, especially by those beyond the seas, to have been the greatest man of letters as yet produced here in America, has so far, to the chagrin of his votaries, been unable to obtain a place in our Hall of Fame. We are as yet perhaps too near these men in point of time rightly to estimate their relative rank among their fellows, or properly to gauge the genuine value of their service to mankind. The fame of others of this remarkable group of gifted men has been steadily growing and their fame seems secure. Only the other day, all over this broad land, and even beyond ocean, honor was paid to one whose fame bids fair by another century to surpass, as even now it seems well nigh to equal, that of him who has been heretofore "first in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen."

Three of the nine great worthies of this centennial year were of our Anglo-Saxon kin in old England. What shall be the final estimate of "the Grand Old Man" who declined a peerage that he might remain one of the people it is too early to say. Of Darwin, first hated, then tolerated, then admired, given a resting place in Westminster Abbey, named by Churchmen "the doorkeeper of the universe," now almost

reverenced by all who are acquainted with his work and the methods thereof, with his life and the manner of the same, it seems safe to prophesy. His theories may be criticized, may be amended, may, in large measure, be superseded, but because he, more than all others of his century, whether right or wrong as to his honest conclusions, did more to make men think and think on lines which concern the deepest interests of mankind, his place is established, the priority of his rank is conceded, his fame is growing, and will grow.

And that other one, the author of the poem we are to discuss to-day—what of him? His fame grows too. He was one of the greatest men of his age. Of the really great poets of the Victorian Age there were but two: Browning and Tennyson. And most men hold, and hold rightly, that of these Tennyson was the greater, for reasons that may perhaps appear. Possibly by and by men shall speak of the Age of Tennyson instead of the Victorian Age, so greatly does this poet surpass his contemporaries. Distance lends enchantment to the view, and we are yet too near to Tennyson to see his life and work in proper temporal perspective. What is his rank among the greatest poets of the Anglo-Saxon race, or of the world? There are three great English poets: Shakspeare and Milton and Tennyson. Possibly "the bard of Avon" shall always rank the chief. None other is so myriad-minded. But of Christian poets who is to be, or shall be, accounted greatest? By most students, without doubt, Milton has been deemed the greatest Christian poet of our English tongue. Whether this estimate shall hold in the centuries to come seems questionable. Near the close of the last year the tercentenary of Milton's birth was celebrated. There was regrettable, though perhaps justifiable, lack of interest and of enthusiasm. Was this an indication that men are not estimating the great Puritan poet so highly as they were wont to do? Some one has said that every one concedes "*Paradise Lost*" to be our great English epic, one of the greatest poems of the ages, but most of those who grant this meed of praise have never read it

through, or, having once read it, do not return to it. That this religious poem has profoundly affected the thought of Englishmen, especially of Protestant Englishmen, there can be no doubt at all. As David dominated the religious thought of the Hebrews by his psalms, as Dante gave direction to Papist theology for centuries, so Milton has been, frequently more than the Bible itself, too much and too often, the inspiration for the thought of Protestant divines. Much of English Protestant theology has been Miltonic rather than Scriptural, just as much popular knowledge of sacred history has been derived through his great poem indirectly from the Bible rather than, as should be the case, directly from the sacred Scriptures themselves, as was finely illustrated by the case of a Bible class student who, when asked "Who was the father of Moses?" replied by quoting, not from the Pentateuch, but from "*Paradise Lost*," "the potent rod of Amram's son." Undoubtedly, as Simonds remarks: "The scope of its [*Paradise Lost's*] plan is the most ambitious that a poet could conceive." Nevertheless, there is much in the great epic that is unscriptural, extra-biblical, much that is mythological. Theologically it is out of touch with the thought of the present age. It deals so largely with themes which are beyond and away from our present, personal, social, religious interests, foreign to what we regard as the problems of humanity and of Christianity. It is coldly, wonderfully great. This is not the case, as we shall see, with the great masterpiece of the late British poet laureate.

It is worthy of note that critical estimates of Tennyson, of the art of his verse, of the nature and value of his service to humanity, and of his rank in comparison with other poets of our Anglo-Saxon speech have changed very materially as the years have past. At first fiercely assailed, then ridiculed, later damned with faint praise, before he died he was freely admitted by most critics to be the foremost poet of his age. Now that he is gone and the centenary of his birth approaches we find that careful students are more and more coming to laud

him greatly, to ascribe to him increasingly the highest rank not only in his own age but in all ages of English verse. It seems not unlikely, from the present trend of criticism, that when a greater stretch of time shall separate the critic from the subject of his criticism, when a truer perspective of the ages shall allow a more exact comparison, it will be seen and allowed on all sides that Tennyson was, if not the greatest English poet, nevertheless, the greatest Christian poet of English-speaking lands. Somehow already it seems that he ranks with the greatest religious poets, not only of the Anglo-Saxon race, but of all races and all the ages, with Job the ancient, and with David the sweet singer of Israel. The comparison with these masters of religious verse may appear further on in our study.

Of the deep and reverent religiosity and essential Christianity of Tennyson's verse as well as of his life there is no question among those who are conversant with both. Tennyson, more than other poets, lived the ideal which he sang in his poems and his poetry is the mirror of his life. Of his purity of life and absolute honesty of his purpose a recent writer (Robert F. Horton, in "*Alfred Tennyson, A Sainly Life*") says: "It is necessary to state succinctly yet distinctly, that Englishmen have had among them in the nineteenth century, one who, according to the fine Miltonic ideal, being set on the composition of poetry, found it essential himself to be a true poem. . . . Here was a piece of living which for its heroism, its singleness of aim, its human tenderness, its Divine outlook, passes forever into the treasure house of humanity. . . . Not only is there nothing base in the large volume of his verse, not only is he delicate as a girl in handling the dark problems of sin, but a burden of lofty teaching, a teaching which grew clearer with the years, gives a continuity to all his work. It is a burden of the same kind, though not of the same content, as that which came to the old Hebrew prophets. It is essentially the burden of the valley of vision. . . . He was like Chaucer's parson:

For first he wrought, and afterward he taught.

And he deserves the gratitude of men . . . for having given to the truths (which he stated) the peculiar weight which comes only from living them afresh in the special conditions of a man's own time."

Horton points out that the burden of Tennyson's religious message to his age was a threefold one. His three dogmas were: (1) the sanctity of marriage, (2) the supreme greatness of love, and (3) the certainty or assurance of immortality. Our present purpose does not permit digression to show how the first two great truths are exemplified in his life and are forcefully set forth in his poetry. Study of his poems will reveal that, especially if these are read by the aid of Horton's illuminating comments. It is with his greatest poem, a poem that more than all other poems of all ages deals with this third dogma of certainty or assurance of immortality, the sum and substance of the conclusion of which is the same as the utterance of Job, "I know that my Redeemer liveth," that we are now concerned.

I have called "In Memoriam" Tennyson's greatest poem, his masterpiece. Such I believe it to be. It is fair to say that respecting this there is difference of opinion. Some think that "The Idylls of the King" are greater. Hillis (in "Great Books as Life Teachers," p. 162) says: "From one view-point Tennyson's 'In Memoriam' is the most important religious poem of the century, but from another 'The Idylls of the King' forms a poem of equal value and importance. Because they represent the maturity of his art, his deepest convictions, and his highest wisdom, the 'Idylls' would seem to form the poem upon which his fame must ultimately rest. The works of Tennyson include more than three hundred quotations from the Bible, and are pervaded with a spirit so deeply devout that men have come to feel that he is our essentially religious poet, and that it is in the realm of religious thought that his genius has found its highest expression. If the 'Paradise Lost' looks backward and shows how one sin sent one man into the wilderness; if the 'Divine Comedy' looks forward

and shows how sin may be punished and purged away; the 'Idylls of the King' forms a study of the present and offers an outlook upon the great epochs and teachers of the soul."

Possibly "The Idylls" is Tennyson's greatest work: I am inclined to think, however, that the supreme place will finally be given by common consent to "*In Memoriam*." When the poem first appeared it was greeted with contemptuous criticism, even with derision. The critics very generally failed to see both beauty and purpose. One missed all so badly as to write: "These touching lines seem to come from the full heart of the widow of a military man," mistaking his cue because of the fact that the poem was first published anonymously. "But," as Mrs. Oliphant says, "criticism has died away into almost sacred respect for this unique poem. . . . These outcries . . . soon hushed in the universal adoption of this wonderful poem into the very heart of hearts of the English-speaking world." Morton Luce (in "*Handbook to Tennyson's Works*," p. 282) says: "Among the greater poems of Tennyson '*In Memoriam*' . . . is best known and best loved: the wisest, the most spiritual, often the most beautiful. It is one of the greatest poems of the nineteenth century."

Henry Van Dyke (in "*The Poetry of Tennyson*," p. 131) remarks: "Many beautiful poems, and some so noble that they are forever illustrious, have blossomed in the valley of the shadow of death. But among them all none is more rich in significance, more perfect in beauty or form and spirit, or more luminous with the triumph of light and love over darkness and mortality, than '*In Memoriam*,' the greatest of English elegies." It is worthy of study as an elegy, of comparison with the great elegies of all ages and of all lands, with David's lament for Jonathan, with Bion's elegy on the death of Adonis, with "the hopeless words of Catullus over his brother's tomb," with Milton's "*Lycidas*," or Gray's "*Elegy in a Country Churchyard*," or Shelley's "*Elegy on the Death of John Keats*," or, to come to our own time, with the verses of Swinburne occasioned by the death of Charles Baudelaire.

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But it is not as an elegy that we are studying the poem. It is an elegy, the greatest of elegies, but it is more. Van Dyke himself, a little further on remarks: "It has . . . a twofold character; it is a glorious monument to the memory of a friend, and it is the great English classic on the love of immortality and the immortality of love. And so, as we prize, of David's verse, the beautiful, comforting, gloriously optimistic twenty-third psalm above his mournful lament for Jonathan, so do we value "In Memoriam" not so much because it is the greatest of elegies, but because though it "is a dead march, it is a dead march into immortality," as our last quoted author aptly phrases the thought.

Awhile ago it was hinted that there is a resemblance between "In Memoriam" and the book of Job. This resemblance struck me forcibly long ago. I had not known that others had noted the resemblance. Yet I was not surprised, a few days ago, to find that this similarity has been commented on. William J. Dawson, in "Quest and Vision," written in 1892, though I did not come upon the observation till so recently, says: "The 'In Memoriam' is the nineteenth century's book of Job, and is inseparably inwoven with the history of the century because it is woven out of the sentiment of the century." It seems to me that we may profitably carry the comparison further than does the brief allusion of Dawson. Closely studied the two great poems have much in common, and what has made Job a Biblical classic of the Hebrews may well make "In Memoriam" the modern secular Christian classic. Both are poems of splendid faith in the midst of difficulty, of sorrow, and of extreme trial. Both are philosophizing about things as they are and as they ought to be, a struggle against doubt, and through doubt, to a radiant optimism and to a triumphant faith. Job suffered, Tennyson suffered. There was difference, of course, in their afflictions. But Job's sorest trouble was not his boils: neither was Tennyson's deepest grief his regret for his dead friend. Both had trials greater than these. When Job's afflictions came the

greatest affliction of them all was the temptation to question the goodness and wisdom of Jehovah. His wife said to him: "Curse God, and die." Then came his companions to comfort him. But instead of comfort they brought him greater distress. They were the "Wisdom" philosophers. But their philosophy brought him no comfort; indeed, when it was applied to his case, his trouble was increased, for according to it he was suffering justly for some wrong doing which he was unwilling to confess or for some sin of ignorance such as those for which the Israelite was to make an offering after he had offered for all the errors of which he had knowledge. There was every reason, apparently, for unfaith, for doubt, but Job wrestled with all the objections and with all the doubts and finally triumphed in a glorious faith. Just so it was with Tennyson.

The son of an orthodox churchman, grandson of a clergyman on his mother's side, carefully nurtured in a godly home, he grew up a professed Christian. He was familiar with the teaching of the Church, he was not unlearned in the Holy Scriptures, as is indicated by the number of allusions to the Bible found in poems written and published before the appearance of "*In Memoriam*." He had what is sometimes called faith, what often passes for faith, but what he later learned, and what we all should learn, was not true faith but merely credulity, the acceptance of asserted truth on untested authority. When this so-called faith of his was first shaken we do not certainly know. Andrew Lang (in "*Alfred Tennyson*," p. 68) speaks of "doubts and hopes and fears, which had been with Tennyson from his boyhood, as is proved by the volume of 1830." Possibly, while at Cambridge, he came under the influence of, as he certainly came into contact with, the growing agnosticism and infidelity of the time. Probably his interest in the philosophical discussions indulged in by the students were, at the time, little more than academic, as is often the case with young men in our colleges to-day. There may have been or may not have been anything of strong per-

sonal conviction in the positions which he took. But in 1831 when he was called home from Cambridge to the rectory at Somersby, and when a few days afterwards his father died, this question which the agnostics had declared to be an unanswerable one, "When a man dies shall he live again?" became a personal one for the young poet. This was his first coming face to face with eternal problems. Then his confidence was shaken. Doubts came or, if he had them before, increased. It is, however, in the nature of things for the old, for fathers well advanced in years, to die and, dear though they be, the shock of their death is not always so great as is the sudden taking away of an intimate friend with whom one has planned long years of active companionship and of mutual labor and helpfulness. Within two years and a half came the greater shock. Arthur Henry Hallam, the bosom companion of Tennyson,

Dear as the mother to the son,
More than my brothers are to me,

as he expresses the intimacy of the relation, was suddenly and fatefully struck down in the prime of life, in the budding promise of a brilliant future. Then doubts came in earnest. Then the things of which he and his fellows had disputed at the university began to trouble his soul. The significance of the scientific studies which he had made perplexed him in real earnest. His personal loss made these questions very real to him. He doubted, and doubted seriously but honestly. The philosophy of the day gave him no help. Like the wisdom philosophy of the time of Job, it served only to perplex him the more. He could not hold to his old confidence and he did not wish to let it go. He could not bring himself to accept the conclusions of the skeptical philosophers and, at the time, could not repose placidly in his early "faith." Nevertheless, he would not blatantly, as some now do, parade his doubts, his lack of belief, to the discomfiture of others. This, it seems to me, was his mood when he wrote the beautifully unselfish canto XXXIII :

O thou that after toil and storm
May'st seem to have reached a purer air,
Whose faith has center everywhere,
Nor cares' to fix itself to form,

Leave thou thy sister when she prays,
Her early Heaven, her happy views;
Nor thou with shadow'd hint confuse
A life that leads melodious days.

Her faith thro' form is pure as thine,
Her hands are quicker unto good:
O, sacred be the flesh and blood
To which she links a truth divine!

See thou, that countest reason ripe
In holding by the law within,
Thou fail not in a world of sin,
And even for want of such a type.

But such a faith, "of such a type," though pure, was not for him. Bible and dogma did not satisfy his mind. He doubted, and boldly but honestly faced his doubts. Yet he loved, and his love held him true in spite of his doubts. Nor did he regard his doubt as sinful any more than did Job of old. Tennyson saw that his doubting was the means of solving the questions that harassed him. This attitude is evidenced in Canto XCVI:

You say, but with no touch of scorn,
Sweet-hearted, you, whose light-blue eyes
Are tender over drowning flies,
You tell me, doubt is Devil-born.

I know not: one indeed I knew
In many a subtle question versed,
Who touch'd a jarring lyre at first,
But ever strove to make it true:

Perplex in faith, but pure in deeds,
At last he beat his music out.
There lives more faith in honest doubt,
Believe me, than in half the creeds.

The Religious Significance

He fought his doubts and gather'd strength,
 He would not make his judgment blind,
 He faced the spectres of the mind
 And laid them: thus he came at length

To find a stronger faith his own;
 And Power was with him in the night,
 Which makes the darkness and the light,
 And dwells not in the light alone,

But in the darkness and the cloud,
 As over Sinai's peaks of old,
 While Israel made their gods of gold,
 Altho' the trumpet blew so loud.

This canto tells the story, this gives us the key to the religious significance of "In Memoriam." The poem is a life history. It is the autobiography of one who, through doubt, found the "stronger faith," the genuinely true faith, so greatly in contrast with the early "faith," which was only acceptance of authority. And so the prologue which, first in the poem as we have it now, was written last, gives the conclusion to which, after wandering through the maze of doubt, the poet arrived:

Strong Son of God, Immortal Love,
 Whom we, that have not seen thy face,
 By faith, and faith alone, embrace,
 Believing where we cannot prove;

Thine are these orbs of light and shade;¹
 Thou madest Life in man and brute;
 Thou madest Death; and lo, thy foot
 Is on the skull which thou hast made!²

Thou wilt not leave us in the dust:
 Thou madest man, he knows not why,
 He thinks he was not made to die;
 And thou has made him; thou art just.

¹ Reference is made to the planets.

² There is here, doubtless, an allusion to certain old paintings which represented a skull at the foot of the cross, and, possibly a reference also to a legend which says that Adam was buried at Golgotha (the place of a skull) where Christ was crucified.

Thou seemest human and divine,
The highest, holiest manhood, thou:
Our wills are ours, we know not how;
Our wills are ours, to make them thine.

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We have but faith: we cannot know;
For knowledge is of things we see;
And yet we trust it comes from thee,
A beam in darkness: let it grow.

Let knowledge grow from more to more,
But more of reverence in us dwell;
That mind and soul, according well,
May make one music as before,

But vaster.

Thus Tennyson wrought his way through doubt to reverent, absolute trust in God and Christ, to cheerful and complete submission of his will to God's will. And that is what true faith is, and that is the chief religious significance of "*In Memoriam*."

"*In Memoriam*" teaches us better than any other human composition in what true faith really consists. When, while yet a boy, I studied the "*Heidelberg Catechism*," I was greatly concerned as to the nature of true faith, and I never could understand satisfactorily the theological phrasing of that honored standard. But I have learned what it is from "*In Memoriam*." There is no true faith save that which comes after one has doubted. Faith is much misunderstood by even those who should know better. There are four stages in the process of attaining to faith. These are: (1) credulity—or incredulity, (2) doubt or injury, (3) belief, (4) faith. There can be no real belief without doubt. A man may say "I believe," may subscribe to a creed and assert that to be his belief, may even lay his hand upon the Holy Scriptures and declare that he accepts them, but unless his mind has wrestled with doubts and laid the doubts, there is nothing volitional, moral, personal, in his asseverations or professions.

Such a one is not believing, he is merely credulous. Nor is belief enough. We read that "the devils believe and tremble." Faith is necessary, not that "pure faith" of the sister, not mere assent to authority, however exalted, but the more noble faith, the faith that comes through doubt and is greater and more efficacious than mere belief.

Men use the words belief and faith carelessly and inexactly, often as though they were synonymous. But the terms are not synonyms. We should distinguish between them. The distinction is that faith is belief plus trust. Love makes the difference. He that believes and trusts has the higher, nobler faith, the genuine faith. It is the absence of loving trust from the devils' belief that keeps the devils from being saints, for the devils hate and do not love and so cannot trust. Consequently devils have no faith.

Whatever other significance "In Memoriam" may have, it has this for the thoughtful student in these days of wonderful scientific discoveries; it traces the progress of a professed Christian through doubts, accentuated if not originated by the discoveries which, as an intelligent man, he can not ignore or avoid if he would, to the exultant, optimistic faith that characterizes the saint, the faith that results in trustful, absolute surrender of the individual will to God's will and consequent devotion of the personality with all its powers to the service of

That God, which ever lives and loves,
One God, one law, one element,
And one far-off divine event,
To which the whole creation moves.

The Christian world will, I confidently expect, come more and more to value this great poem even as it treasures certain of the psalms of David to which it is so closely akin in more ways than one. It might be interesting and profitable to trace this kinship. Suffice it to remark that in no other production of modern times do we have a human heart in time of storm and stress speaking so directly to other sorely tried human hearts. Above all other secular compositions it is, for-

sooth, the "epic of the inner life" or, perhaps, to be more accurate, these "swallow-flights of song" are truly lyrics of the soul.

Time fails to attempt an estimate of what has been accomplished by "In Memoriam" as "a real *apologia pro Christiana fide*,"³ for such it is. One sentence from Horton (p. 126) may serve as a brief summary. He says: "Partly of set purpose and acting, as we may well believe, under the breath of the spirit, he had struck a blow, the deftest blow that could be struck, in the cause of faith."

Two characteristics of Tennyson, his absolute honesty and his unerring accuracy, have won the respect and confidence both of religionists and of scientists, and so his poem has accomplished in some quarters what the most fervid exhortations of preachers have failed to accomplish. "In Memoriam" surpasses all other attempts to reconcile science and religion, and its excellency rests largely in these two characteristics of its author. Tennyson knew science and he knew his Bible. In this respect this great poet stands forth in vivid and commendable contrast with many other writers, both scientists and theologians, on such themes.

Preachers often err when dealing with scientific problems, and such as are inclined to discuss questions involving scientific knowledge may well take Tennyson as their model. Much harm is not infrequently done by inaccuracy in illustrations or in exposition of scientific theories. As President Faunce remarks in his recent volume, "The Educational Idea in the Ministry": "Young men trained by scientific methods in college are not to be attracted by unscientific and inaccurate thinking in the pulpit." And this remark is not unwarranted, as a few well authenticated instances clearly indicate. One clergyman, preaching the presidential sermon at the opening of classis, taking as his text "science falsely so-called," made a violent attack on certain eminent scientists and their teachings. The preacher was entertained by one of his auditors.

³ Horton, "Alfred Tennyson, A Saintly Life," p. 122.

Seated in the library the host said to his guest, "that was a vigorous sermon you gave us to-night." "Thank you," said the preacher. "And it was all right except for one thing," continued his entertainer. "Ah! and what was wrong?" "It was not true. You misrepresented entirely the authors whose opinions you attempted to condemn." The host, aware that the preacher had not a single standard scientific book in his library and having drawn out the admission that he had not read the authors he condemned, went to his own bookshelves and taking down a masterpiece of science, read aloud the last paragraph of the book, asking his friend his opinion of that. Confession was made that no exception could be taken to that utterance. Yet that book was the standard one on the subject of which it treated and was written by the immediate pupil and most intimate friend of one of the scientists whom the preacher had pilloried by name in his sermon. Another clergyman, in a neighboring state, discussed evolution in a sermon which, whether the theory of evolution be true or false, was so blatant and passionate, so grossly inaccurate in its statements, displaying so extended ignorance of what advocates of the theory assailed really do maintain, that the discourse disgusted all intelligent hearers and by its palpable partisanship and dishonesty drove out of the church a scholarly and devout college professor who could not condone the sham.

Scientific illustrations and allusions are frequent pitfalls to unwary preachers who delight in such embellishments. Some years ago a most worthy divine, preaching to a congregation composed in large part of students of a preparatory school, attempted to appeal to this portion of his audience by enforcing a potent truth by an illustration from geography. But the point taken would have been far more emphatic without the illustration because not a student present but knew that the illustration was faulty, since the assumed geographical fact had long been recognized as an error by competent geographers the world over. The preacher took as his authority

the text-book he studied when a boy. Yet another pastor blundered pitifully in addressing children at a Christmas service declaring that "Christ is like the sun which shines by its own light while Christians are like stars *which shine by light reflected from the sun.*" The harm done by such sermons, such illustrations, such allusions can hardly be estimated. Assumption of scientific knowledge which is not possessed must be avoided by the Christian preacher if he would hope to hold the confidence of intelligent auditors or to win to faith doubters and those not already believers in the Christian revelation.

Inquiry into the phenomena, the processes, the laws of nature, which is one form of divine revelation is, however, neither uninteresting nor unprofitable. Such inquiry on the part of a Christian minister is entirely proper and nature sermons have their place and may accomplish great good. But in his study and his preaching, in his effort "to justify the ways of God to man," to solve convincingly the problems which in this age will rise, will hold the attention of his most thoughtful and earnest hearers, the preacher, if he is to profit himself and them that hear him, if he is to maintain his rightful eminence as an authority on spiritual things, must be honest and accurate, must shun inaccuracy and superficiality. He must not commit the error of the average preacher who, essaying such themes, succeeds, too often, only in disgusting intelligent hearers who, knowing more about these things than the preacher does, and recognizing the superficiality of his pronouncements on matters scientific, not illogically rate his religious utterances at the same value as they must rate his scientific ones. It is of sermons by preachers of this sort that Dr. Henry Van Dyke, in his "Gospel for an Age of Doubt," makes the discerning observation that "as a rule nothing could be of less value than the scientific sermons of preachers who have only a bowing acquaintance with science."

Illustrations like those given above might be multiplied to prove the assumption of the genial Van Dyke, but the reverse

should be true, and it may be true if only the minister in this "age of doubt" will be like the author of "In Memoriam," if he will be but painstaking and patient, reverent, accurate and honest in his study of problems such as these. It is imperative that he take the attitude taken by our poet in his search for truth. The phenomena of the natural world richly reward such study. To one maintaining such an attitude they are deeply suggestive and confirm faith instead of destroying it. Plucking a flower from the wall and reverently regarding it, Tennyson wrote:

Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies,
I hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.

It is the privilege and the duty of the minister to study the creation, the unwritten Word of God, as Tennyson did. Then, discovering the truth in nature and the relationship between the two words and declaring that truth clearly to his people, he may in his discourse really illumine their understanding, bringing them to realize in fuller measure than otherwise the wisdom and goodness of their Father, confirming the devout in their confidence, convincing scientists who hear him that his messages are authoritative and true, and winning even doubters of revelation to faith in the Master in whom he believes, in whom he trusts, and whom he serves.

KUTZTOWN, PA.

II.

THE RIGHTS AND LIMITS OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM.¹

BY PROF. WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER, D.D.

As will be readily seen, the subject which the committee has assigned to me is very comprehensive. It is too large to be disposed of within the limits of this paper. Hence I deem it prudent at the outstart to limit its scope to much narrower bounds, and, instead of speaking of Biblical criticism as a whole, to speak only of that of the New Testament. Even here it may be expedient to confine ourselves to a consideration of one aspect of the subject, that namely which has to do with the Gospels. It is here especially that we meet with the crucial problems, which at the present day confront the Biblical student. The time was when Old Testament criticism occupied the field; at least, it had attracted to itself almost the entire attention of the public. That time is past. If we can not say that the problems in Old Testament criticism are in the main settled, it is not too much to say that Old Testament students are approaching common ground and beginning to arrive at more nearly unanimous conclusions. And in any event, the problems of the Old Testament are not so vital for our faith as those of the New; for it is only when we come to the problems which criticism has started with reference to the New Testament, and especially the Gospels, that we come to the heart of our most holy faith. I deem it, therefore, expedient to confine my remarks exclusively to the criticism of the New Testament, and almost entirely to that of the Gospels.

¹ Read at the Nineteenth Annual Assembly for Spiritual Conference of Ministers and Laymen of the Reformed Church, at Lancaster, Pa., July 27, 1909.

I need not remind you that Biblical criticism falls into two distinct branches: the lower, or textual criticism; and the higher, or literary and historical criticism. Though the main interest, as well as the principal issues, lie within the scope of the latter, a few things should be said with reference to the former; for all true criticism, as well as all thorough study of the Biblical books, must begin with the determination of the text. No matter how thorough and painstaking the literary critic may be, his results can have comparatively little value so long as he is dealing with a corrupt text.

As every student of the New Testament knows, our *textus receptus* has back of it very slender manuscript authority. It is based almost exclusively on late manuscripts, and those of inferior value. The Elzevir publishers were no doubt thoroughly honest, when, in publishing the second edition of their Greek New Testament in 1633, they said in their preface, "Textum ergo habes, nunc ab omnibus receptum: in quo nihil immutatum aut corruptum damus." "Therefore thou hast the text now received by all: in which we give nothing altered or corrupt." They did the best they could. They made use of the editions of Alcalá, of Erasmus, of Beza, and of Estienne; and these were the best known in their day; but they knew nothing of the great uncials, nor of the age of the manuscripts which had been employed in the determination of their text. The unfortunate sentence, above quoted, helped to foist their edition on the public; and for a period of about two hundred years it held despotic sway over Christian scholarship.

The story of how the *textus receptus* was finally revised by the patient and painstaking labors of men like Carl Lachman, Tischendorf, Tregelles, Westcott and Hort is a long and interesting one; but it must be passed by here with a single reference to the results which have been attained. Most of the results have been embodied in our Revised and Standard versions; and all of us are hence more or less familiar with them. They consist mostly in improved readings; but in several cases the critics have used the knife, and cut out passages which

before had been received. It is true, that, considering the great amount of labor expended, and the large number of readings which have been emended, the number of passages which have been eliminated is very small. After an entire century of textual criticism there are only three passages which critics affirm have no place in the New Testament, and only three others which probably should be excluded. The former are 1 John 5: 7, 8, the passage on the heavenly witnesses; Mark 16: 9-20, the conclusion to the second Gospel; and John 7: 53-8: 11, the account of the woman taken in adultery. The latter are Luke 22: 43, 44, the reference to the angel in Gethsemane; Matthew 16: 2, 3, the saying of Jesus with reference to the signs in the sky both evening and morning; and John 5: 3, 4, the reference to the angel troubling the waters at the pool of Bethesda.

With reference to the former passages, these observations may be made: the disputed words in 1 John 5: 7, 8 are omitted in both the Revised and the Standard versions, without so much as a reference to them in the margin; Mark 16: 9-20 is printed in both the revisions, but with a space separating it from the main body of the Gospel, and with the marginal statement, "The two oldest manuscripts, and some other authorities, omit from verse 9 to the end"; John 7: 53-8: 11 is printed in both the revised versions, but separated from the main body of the Gospel both by spaces and by brackets, and in the margin the statement is made, "Most of the ancient authorities omit John 7: 53-8: 11." With reference to the second triplet both revisions add in the margin, in each case, the statement that the passages are omitted in many of the ancient manuscripts.

The question of the rights and the limits of textual critics in making these excisions, and in casting doubt upon the authority of the other passages, has probably already suggested itself to some of you. Have the critics the right to cut out from First John the words, "And there are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost,"

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and in the following verse the words "in earth"? Any one who has studied the history of the passage, and who has any realizing sense of the way the words were foisted into the text, will no doubt answer in the affirmative; for they have no authority in the ancient manuscripts; and they owe their origin apparently to a heretic of the fourth century, to Priscillian, a Spanish bishop, who, strange to say, did not accept the doctrine of the Trinity, though the passage is sometimes quoted as if it were a very bulwark of said doctrine. Has the critic the right to cut off the last twelve verses of the Gospel according to St. Mark? Undoubtedly the authority of the oldest manuscripts is against the passage, as a part of the Gospel; and a few years ago Frederick Cornwallis Conybeare found an old Armenian manuscript which ascribes these verses to the Presbyter Aristion. Very much the same state of affairs holds with reference to the story of the adulteress in John 7: 53-8: 11. Most of the ancient authorities omit the passage; and those which contain it vary very much from each other.

We are constrained, therefore, to say that the critics have the right to cut out these three passages from the text; for the evidence is almost entirely against them. But are there not also limits which must be imposed on the critics at this point? Undoubtedly; for all that the textual critic can say is that, on the strength of the best evidence obtainable, these passages did not belong to the respective books, as originally written. But they can not on the same ground affirm any thing as to the truthfulness of the statements themselves. Take the concluding verses in Mark. They are a summary of the resurrection story, giving us the main facts stated in the other Gospels, and possibly on the authority of a man who personally stood as near to Jesus as Mark himself. At any rate, we must admit the correctness of the report which the passage gives; for it clearly comes to us from a very early time, and it is corroborated by the other evangelists. As to the story of the adulteress in the Fourth Gospel, it is safe to say, that there is so much intrinsic probability in it that most persons would be inclined to admit

its truthfulness on that ground alone. It is probably one of those fragmentary narratives which, as Luke tells us, floated about in the Apostolic church; and it may be that, to preserve the beautiful story, some scribe copied it into the margin of John's Gospel, from which a subsequent scribe transferred it to the text.

With reference to the textual critic we should hence say that his rights are as full as the evidence of his manuscripts goes. If new manuscripts should be discovered, which should clearly antedate our great uncials, and if they should change any important readings, we should clearly have to follow any further emendations of the text, which the critics, after careful investigation, should feel it necessary to make. But the textual critic is just as clearly limited by the evidence of his manuscript authorities. He has no right to change the text at any point merely to suit his own subjective feeling, or to make it agree with any preconceived notions. And he is limited to the determination of the text. When that is accomplished, his mission is at an end. When it comes to the determination of the historic and religious value of any portions which his evidence compels him to exclude from the true text, he must give way to the literary and historical critic—to what, for want of a better term, we call the higher criticism.

And this brings us to what is really the more interesting and the more important part of my theme, and to what your committee probably had more particularly in mind, when they assigned to me this topic. What are the rights and limits of the higher critics? And we raise the question more especially with reference to the New Testament.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding, it may be well to pause here for a moment to define our terms; for, though the higher criticism has been defined so often that there ought to be no reason for repeating the definition, yet there is still so much confusion and misunderstanding on the subject that a few words in passing may be pardoned.

To quote here the *Century Dictionary*, "Criticism is the art

of judging of and defining the qualities or merits of a thing, especially of a literary production." "In a restricted sense," it is, "inquiry into the origin, history, authenticity, character, etc., of literary documents." It applies to the Classics as well as to the Scriptures, to Shakespeare as well as to the Bible; and the canons which regulate the process are substantially the same, whether the document under investigation is a sacred or a merely literary composition. The higher criticism is simply a method of study; its aim is to ascertain all that can be known with reference to the origin, the history, the authenticity, the character, and the original meaning of a writing. It employs the lexicon, the grammar, rhetoric, history, philology, and all kinds of contemporary literature to reach its conclusion. It has accomplished its task only when it has subjected the book to all possible tests for the ascertainment of the facts.

Turning now to our Gospels, and especially the Synoptic Gospels, it will be seen how exceedingly important the process is. If the Gospels are a part of the Word of God, if they contain the only authentic account of the life, the work, and the teaching of our Lord, we want to know all about them that human wisdom and learning can teach us. We can not afford to allow any serious misconceptions with reference to their origin, their history, their authenticity, or their character, to stand between us and a full understanding of their precious contents. As Marcus Dods has said, if God had not raised up critics to do this work for us, we should undoubtedly be under the necessity of appointing men for the task.

Now, the rights of the higher critics with reference to our Gospels is determined by the very nature of their work. They have a right to a full and impartial hearing on all points involved in the literary and historical study of the Gospels. It is they who discovered the intricacies and the difficulties of the Synoptic problem; and it is they who will have to work their way through the labyrinth of questions which naturally come up as to the literary and other relationships between Matthew,

Mark and Luke. And any of us, who may inadvertently enter upon that interesting and inviting field of investigation, will simply become, for the time being, a higher critic, though perchance he may not know it. It is the province of the higher critics to study the language of the Gospels, without being fettered by any preconceived notions about a sacred dialect; and when they find, as they have found, that the language used is simply the *κοινή*, the common language of the people, spoken not simply in Palestine, but in Egypt, in Asia Minor, and at Rome, it is their privilege to study it alongside of any other documents written in the same speech, to compare its words with the same words used elsewhere, and thus to get at their true meaning. They are likewise within the strict limits of their work, when they compare the Gospels with each other, with the view of pointing out their similarities and differences; when on the basis of these similarities and differences, they try to determine their literary and other interdependence; when they employ all the light given by the Fathers on the question of authorship and date; when they carefully weigh each peculiarity of style and diction, and employ it in assigning to each its proper place, its true purpose, and its intended readers; and when they study all the historical circumstances, which lie back of any of the Gospels, and which have shaped their forms of expression, their selection of material, and their manner of presentation. In a word, the higher critics are strictly within their rights so long as they confine themselves to the literary and historical study of the Gospels, without prejudices or prepossessions which may warp their conclusions.

And it may be well for us to pause here just long enough to note a few of the gains which have come to us from just this kind of Gospel criticism. Without going into detail, it may be enough to remind ourselves of the great gain which has come from the literary analysis of the Synoptic Gospels. While it has become clear that all three belong to a considerably earlier period than was once claimed by many critics, so

that there are very few scholars left who would assign any of them to the second century; it has also become evident that they rest upon sources, some of which at least belong to the first quarter of a century after the death of Jesus.² And not only have these sources been thus traced to within a comparatively short period after the events, but they have been traced to men who had a personal knowledge of the facts of which they testify. Thus it is now generally accepted that back of our present Matthew and Luke lie the Gospel according to Mark and the Logia of Matthew; and it is an equally well established fact that back of Mark's Gospel is the preaching of Peter, while the Logia are accepted as the records of that publican apostle whom Jesus called at the very beginning of the Galilean ministry. And this literary study has yielded also another result. Our critics have gone into the manner in which the gospel story was at first transmitted from mouth to mouth, how the "teaching" of which so much is said in the early chapters of the Acts resembled the synagogue instruction, in which it was the business of the teacher to repeat a portion of the sacred text over and over, again and again, until the pupils, who were seated around him, had committed it to memory. If the higher criticism of the Gospels had yielded no other results than this bringing of the narratives into almost immediate touch with the facts, there would be an inestimable gain; and we may hence well be jealous for the

²In speaking of the higher valuation, which is now being placed on our Gospel sources, Professor George Dewitt Castor, in the August number of the *Biblical World*, p. 116, says: "Such men as Wellhausen, Dahlman, and Nestle have definitely established that most of the material of the Synoptic Gospels comes directly from the Aramaic, the language of Palestine. This means, as Jülicher says, that 'the gospel was essentially completed in the home of Jesus before his generation had passed away, and believing Jews wrote it down then in their own language. This sentence has more weight than a hundred questions against gospel verses.'" This is a confirmation of Dr. A. Wright's contention that Mark's gospel is essentially the teaching of Peter at Jerusalem during the years immediately following the Ascension. But if this position can be maintained, as we believe it can, where is the room for the growth of legend in the gospel story?

rights of Gospel criticism. While it has been abused, and while the enemy has found in it weapons with which he has done and is still doing great harm, it has also furnished the weapons with which the attacks of the enemy have been and may be warded off. And our refuge from the dangers of the higher criticism, as applied especially to the Gospels, and which some have feared so much, is to be found, not in decrying the higher critics; for, as before said, the higher criticism is only a method of study; but in a more thorough and careful application of that method to the study of all the problems which it has raised. But to obtain these results the method must be rightfully and judiciously employed; and the method has its limitations, as well as its rights, which must be recognized.

What are these limitations? It is evident that these must be carefully observed, if we would obtain proper and reliable results.

It must be apparent that the higher criticism has its limitations in the very task which it seeks to accomplish. To command our respect and confidence, the higher critic must be content to be a critic and to use legitimate methods of literary and historical investigation. He must not attempt to play the rôle of the dogmatist; nor dare he come to his task with such dogmatic possessions as will make an unprejudiced investigation impossible. Of course, it will be impossible for him to free himself from all prepossessions; for we all have our conceptions of God and the universe. They are part of our intellectual life; and it is as impossible for us to free ourselves from them as it is to rid ourselves of our minds. But these preconceptions must not be held in such a way as to allow them to become prejudices. We must have the ability to hold ourselves open to the truth wherever that may lead. And in as far as we shall not be able to do that, the results of our investigations will depend on the validity of the judgments which we bring to our task.

What I mean may perhaps be best illustrated by several con-

crete examples; for we have an abundance of cases where men have come to the Gospels with such dogmatic and philosophical prepossessions that their conclusions have been totally different from what they would otherwise have been.

As is well known, there are many men who find it difficult to accept the miraculous. They point us to the fact that stories of miracles have been told of all the great heroes of history, of Buddha, of Mohamet, of Thomas Becket, of St. Francis of Assissi, and of many others. They likewise tell us that, in view of our modern conception of natural law, miracles are an impossibility. God is a God of law and order; he has accomplished his ends in the creation through the slow processes of evolution, where effect is so closely bound to antecedent cause that an irruption of new creative energy is impossible. Hence when such persons come to the Gospels they must find some expedient for disposing of these miraculous narratives. Miracles are incompatible with their philosophical view of the world; they have dogmatically determined beforehand that all such narratives can not be taken in the sense in which the evangelists intended them. They come to the narrative with the fixed opinion that they are historically incredible. Oscar Holtzmann is a good illustration. When he comes to the narrative of Jesus walking on the sea, he starts out by saying, "*Geschichtlich kann diese Erzählung nicht sein*"; and then he goes on to give an explanation of how such a story might have originated. Now, while Holtzmann is solely responsible for his view on the subject of miracles, the view modifies the validity of his critical conclusions; and his conclusions can have no more validity than his preconceptions. If his view of the miracle is wrong, then all that he has built upon it must fall. In estimating his results, it is important to keep in mind this distinction between his preconceived notion of the miracle and his critical processes. The latter may be genuine and correct so far as they go; but they rest upon a dogmatic assumption which I, at least, believe to be mistaken.

Probably ^{the} high water mark in this kind of criticism was reached by Professor Schmiedel in his article on the Gospels in the "*Encyclopædia Biblica*." As he afterwards explained in his preface to Neumann's "*Jesus*," he finds three distinct classes of passages in the Gospels. The one he calls "plainly incredible"; the second he characterizes as "plainly credible"; and to the third he assigns "an intermediate position as bearing on their face no certain mark either of incredibility or of credibility." And the mark of credibility or incredibility which he thinks he can find on the very face of many passages is their reflection of the worshipful regard of the followers of Jesus. All the Gospels were written by worshippers of Jesus. And passages which reflect their worshipful regard for Jesus he calls "plainly incredible"; while the few (he finds only nine such), which can not be conceived as proceeding from such regard, and which can not be conceived as invented by the worshippers of Jesus, he designates as "plainly credible." That is, all that the Gospels contain that betrays that their authors looked upon Jesus as divine and hence as worthy of worship is put down as incredible; and, unless I have greatly mistaken Professor Schmiedel's whole argument, he looks upon them as incredible, because for him Jesus was no more than a man, and can hence not have done or said the things on which such worshipful regard is based.³ Now, Pro-

³ We are not concerned here with the few passages, which Professor Schmiedel calls "plainly credible." As over against the denial of the historicity of Jesus, we freely grant that there is force and validity in the argument based on these "foundation pillars." Our concern is with those which he styles as "plainly incredible," and with his reasons for calling them incredible. What these reasons are he himself has told us, thus: "What are the portions of the Gospels which are so persistently objected to? We find that they are, to say all in a word, those in which Jesus appears as a Divine Being whether in virtue of what he says or in virtue of what he does. And the reason why exception is taken to these passages may be stated thus: the Gospels are, all of them, the work of worshippers of Jesus, and their contents have been handed down through the channel of tradition in like manner by his worshippers; the portions to which exception is taken are open to the suspicion that they are the outcome of these feelings of devotion, and not purely objective renderings of the facts as they actually occurred."

fessor Schmiedel has a perfect right to his own view as to the divinity of Christ, and he has a right to teach it to others; but when he brings that dogmatic preconception to his critical work on the Gospels, and then asks us to accept his conclusions as those of an impartial investigator, we have a right to demur. His critical conclusions are worth no more than his dogmatic preconceptions which he has undertaken to inject into his work.

We might cite other illustrations; but enough has been said on this point to bring out a principle. *The higher criticism of the Gospels is limited by the dogmatic and the philosophical*

An illustration of how this principle works out may be found in Neumann's "Jesus"; for he was a pupil of Schmiedel's and has avowedly used his method. Luke 2: 52 is freely used as a "foundation pillar"; and of the entire section, Luke 2: 41-52, Neumann says, "Its authenticity is guaranteed by this, that it contains no trace of the doctrine of a supernatural birth. It still speaks of both the parents of Jesus in quite a natural way (see vs. 41, 43, 48); and, moreover, they have no suspicion of his greatness. The story further supplies another of the foundation pillars on which to build the story of Jesus' life—the saying about his growth (see v. 52). Such sayings could never have been invented by the worshippers of Jesus, nurtured in a later dogma regarding his person. They must have been taken over from some source as an historical inheritance." But with reference to the words in v. 49, "Wist ye not that I must be in the things of my Father," his estimate is totally different. Of these he says, "We must simply concede that this answer was formulated by a later writer. Who was there who could have made permanent record of it in that first hour in Jerusalem?" It is one of the passages which show Jesus to have been something more than a man; and hence it is waved aside as "incredible," though there is not the slightest evidence in the text or elsewhere that it is not genuine.

Now, this, we maintain, is not criticism, either literary or historical, but dogmatism, pure and simple. The question at issue is not one of criticism at all, but of faith. If Jesus was simply a man, then of course all these statements of the Gospels, which represent him as more than a man, must be put down as incredible; and, like Neumann and Bousset, we may set aside whole passages as untrustworthy because incredible. But if Jesus was what the Gospels, and in fact the whole New Testament, represents him to have been, then we must follow a totally different method. And the question what he was must be decided on the basis of the entire record, as that has come down to us in the New Testament, and not on a preconceived notion, derived from our view of the world, nor on what may be left of the record after we have trimmed it down to suit our preconceived notions of what is credible or incredible.

conceptions of the higher critics. And inasmuch as a man's dogmatic and philosophical conceptions are dependent on his moral and spiritual insight, we may go a step further and say, *the higher criticism of the Gospels is limited by the moral and spiritual insight of the higher critics.* If a man's moral life is warped by prejudice or by pride of intellect, if for any reason he has refused to give to the truth as it is in Jesus that humble and heartfelt obedience which is the prerequisite to a knowledge of all truth (John 7: 17), he is to that extent unfitted to be a safe guide in the critical solution of the problems presented by our Gospels.

Another limitation of the higher criticism of the Gospels, as indeed of all higher criticism, is found in the intellectual equipment of the critic. Probably the chief reason why the higher criticism has become such an imperative discipline of modern times is found in the fact that we live in a practically new world. Our horizon has become very much enlarged over that of our fathers. We know more of the universe and of its laws than men of former times did. History and archæology have opened to us the whole past history of the race in a way that would have been wholly inconceivable to men several hundred years ago. This enlarged vision has given us the means of studying our sacred books in a way which was possible at no previous period. We can determine many things concerning them, which men of former times had to accept on the testimony of tradition. If, for example, a wholly unknown book should fall into our hands, of whose author we know absolutely nothing, of the time of whose composition we are absolutely ignorant; if we should find its author speaking of automobiles, of the telephone, and of aeroplanes; and if we should yet be told that the book had come down to us from the Middle Ages, we should at once detect the fraud. We have other information, which enables us to see through the deception. So with reference to any of our New Testament books. If any of them should claim to be from the hand of an apostle, and should yet contain unmistakable evidences of second century conditions, the higher critic who knows enough to detect

that evidence would be justified in rejecting the claim, and in placing it within the second century. But before he is justified in so doing, he must have sufficient knowledge both of the book in all its details, and of the history and life of the second century to enable him to pronounce a just verdict. No mere guess will do. The critic, who would pronounce the judgment, must have *full and adequate* knowledge. Hence we add that *the higher criticism of the Gospels is limited by the erudition, the knowledge and the general intellectual equipment of the higher critic.*

As a corollary flowing from this, we may mention still another limitation. *The critic must have undoubted facts on which to base his conclusions.* And facts are not always obtainable. As the critic goes on with his investigations, questions will arise, and difficulties will present themselves, which will challenge his best endeavor to find a solution. But the solution may be impossible, because the facts, on which it depends, have been lost. For example, there are evidences of disturbances in the seventh chapter of the Fourth Gospel. Taken as it stands, the reference to a sabbath cure in verse 23 is utterly vague. We do not know to what cure Jesus refers. But read in connection with the narrative in chapter five, the reference seems to become clear; and the inference lies near at hand that at some time in the history of the Gospel, there must have been a dislocation of some of its parts; and with it comes the temptation to readjust the order so as to bring the several sections into harmony. But the facts for such readjustment are lacking. The original order, granting that we do not possess it, has been lost; and any attempted restoration must be conjectural. Now, in such a case the validity of the conclusions must depend on the number and the character of the facts with which the critic starts. If his results are to command our respect, he must not substitute hypotheses for facts. At least, where he begins with a hypothesis, he owes it to his readers plainly to tell them that such is the case; and he must not expect us to accept his conclusions until his hypothesis has been verified by indubitable facts. So that we

add as a third limitation of the higher criticism of the Gospels this *that it is dependent on the number, the character, and the certainty of the facts on which the process is made to rest.*

Time allows me to mention only one more limitation. That is the ability of the critic to judge. Judgment, as we know, is a rare quality. Few men possess it in the highest degree. We may know many things; yet our knowledge may be disorganized. Unless we have the ability to link together our information by valid judgments, it will do us little good as a guide of life. So with the erudition of the critic. His very work is that of judging of the qualities and merits of a literary composition. But if his judgment is poor, so that he is constantly in danger of mistaking one thing for another, his work must be defective. He may have ever so much information, but if he lacks the judgment rightly to value the different items of the information, his work must be unreliable. So that we are justified in adding that *the higher criticism of the Gospels is limited by the judgment and the good sense of the higher critic.*

Our conclusion, therefore, is that in Biblical criticism, as in very many other things, the great desideratum is the man. As a method of study, it is invaluable; but its worth in any particular instance is dependent on the person who uses it. If he is devout, God-fearing, honest, with sufficient erudition, with sound judgment, and with a clear moral and spiritual insight, he is bound to give us results which are valuable. But it all depends on the man, on his character, his equipment, and his judgment. Give me an ideal critic, and I will give you critical results which all good and true men will accept. But unfortunately, persons engaged in the work of the higher criticism are no nearer ideal than men in other callings; and hence our results have been, and, at least for a long time, will continue to be, defective. With the good that is being accomplished, we must expect to meet much that is of a different character; and we should never make the mistake of ascribing to the higher critic the infallibility which was once ascribed to the sacred text.

III.

CHRISTIAN LIFE IN ITS RELATION TO CHRISTIAN CULTUS.

BY PROF. JOHN I. SWANDER, PH.D., D.D.

Christianity, in its concrete form, as the absolute and only true religion, is the organic union of the Divine and the human, the Infinite and the finite. Such union is possible because God and man are in mutual relation to each other. However much the latter is limited, inferior to and dependent upon the former, they belong together in the constitution of the moral universe, as answerable to the eternal and ontologic idea existing in the mind of the Creator, and projecting into creation under the category of time and space. Under this view, as related to each other in one essential and comprehensive whole, man needs God, and God needs man. They are bound together by the common yet distinct ligaments of life and love, "uniting all below to all above"; all are serving, all are served, nothing stands alone; the bond runs on and up, encircling the eternal throne.

In the foregoing and introductory paragraph it is stated that God needs man. The truth of the statement stands in its proper qualification. God is in Himself the Self-sufficient and Absolute One. Self-grounded, He needs nothing outside of Himself; yet he may so move in an act of self-determination as to call a necessity into being. In such action he moves in the freedom of eternal necessity and the necessity of absolute freedom. God does not need man as something foreign to Himself, but as included in that which he "purposed in Himself," and the most important factor in the plan of the ages.

As God is absolute and self sufficient, he is also in his very nature self-communicating. This he is of eternal and internal

necessity and freedom. He is free to communicate himself *ad intra*, as the object of which he is the subject, as well as the subject of which he is the object. He is also free *ad extra* to communicate himself to any receptive form of being which in the exercise of his creative freedom he may chose to bring into receptive and mutual relation with himself. Such receptive form of being must be like himself, *personal*. This personal being is man. God's communicative relation to man is one of *life, light and love*. Hence God needs man in order to such a free communication of these essential properties of his being.

These elements of life, light and love are not only essential properties of God's being; in a finite sense they belong to man as well. According to the Holy Scriptures, as well as the teachings of a sound psychology they are indispensably interwoven with all rational and ethical being whether infinite or finite—whether absolute or dependent—whether in the original archetype or in the image thereof. Though differing as much as God differs from man, and though the one order is as high above the other as heaven is above the earth, they belong in common to the creator and the personal creature. By virtue of these fundamental elements of being, God and man are interrelated for time and for eternity. "God is love and he that loveth is of God." Man sees light in God's light. Men arise and shine because their light is thus come. This can be only as their *phos* is the light of *life*. Such blessed fellowship is possible only in union with Him whom the Scriptures set forth as the "Living God." The living God is also love. In him life and love their mystic powers combine and in the realm of light forever shine.

It seems that the absolute or unlimited God, as prompted by the infinitude of his wisdom, goodness and power, had not room in Himself for a full display of his beneficence. The living God, who has everywhere and in every revelation which he has made and is making of himself as love, desired something other than himself with whom to communicate and

commune. That *ad extra* object of his love we repeat must be personal. This form of being is realized only in man and reaches its full realization in the Son of Man, the God-man who is the brightness of the Father's glory and the express image of his person. Through his mediation also it is made possible for all like human personalities to become partakers of his nature and thus become "like him." There is no evidence that any such possibility belongs to the angels. "Unto which of the angels said he at any time, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee." As the Father hath life in himself, so has he given to the Son to have life in himself. Indeed all men so stand reciprocally related to their Maker as to have potential life in themselves. "And man became a living soul." No human person, though he may plunge himself into an abnormal condition, can commit actual suicide as to the entirety of his being. Though alienated from the life of God in an ethical sense, he must endure forever. This destiny of everlasting endurance is the more inherent because of each human person's organic relation to the Lord from heaven—the Son of man—the second Adam.

Our type of orthodoxy takes but little stock in the theory of "the eternal humanity of Christ." Yet we do not regard it as heresy to hold that an eternal idea of humanity was eternally present in the mind of the Eternal God, and that that idea became realized in the "fullness of the times." Hence a creation culminating in man. Hence man as the organic head of the finite moral universe. As a personal being, he shares in his Maker's life, sees light in his Maker's light and is the only finite being able to reciprocate that infinite love, which, to be true to itself, was, under the freedom of necessity, to go beyond itself.

There does not seem to be any evidence in the Bible that God can love inanimate and irrational forms of being. If in the sense of John 3: 16 He loves the whole world, it is because the whole world has its culmination in man. Every thing which He had made He pronounced good, but there is no

proof at hand that he has real affection for the fishes of the sea, the beasts of the field, the birds of the air or the stars in the cerulean vaults of the sky. Why? Because love implies the possibility of love in return. God, doubtless, admires all his creatures, and looks upon them with divine complacency in the proportion that they answer to their true idea in the divine mind, but he can love only those which can reciprocate his love. No creature except man was made with power to reciprocate its Creator's affection. Man only was endowed with this possibility because he was made in the divine image.

What a tremendous meaning the divine impress therefore involves! When the Infinite One in three said "Let us make man in our own likeness" he was about to project a problem into the moral universe whose solution was to solve all other problems in time and space. That project was the union of man with his Maker through the incarnation of His Eternal Son. This doubtless is what the inspired apostle meant when in writing to the Ephesians he spoke of "the mystery of God's will which he purposed in himself" that in the dispensation of the fullness of times he might gather all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on earth, even in him. Not the projection of "the eternal humanity of Christ" into the plan of the ages, but the realization of the eternal idea of humanity, as God's image and reciprocal, in his fundamental purpose in the cosmos. Time and space have no higher meaning and mission than to make room for such display of Jehovah's unlimited freedom of eternal necessity, to the intent that God the Creator and man the creature might exist in the mutual union and communion of life and love. For this the years of time roll by until time shall be swallowed up in eternity; for this the lines of terrestrial space extend from the rivers to the ends of the earth until there shall be new heavens and a new earth.

But how, if at all, has sin modified God's eternal purpose? God moves manward none the less since man's alienation from his Maker. Sin, and death by sin, having entered as a dis-

turbing element into God's working out of His purpose. His infinite affinity, while it remains essentially the same, becomes *compassionate yearning* for the erring creature of his power and love. God still desires that his tabernacle shall be with men and his abode with his people, even as a father with his family. To the extent that man is by sin alienated from the life of God, this divine movement is modified into a remedial revelation of life and love that in the full solution of the divine-human problem projected into time and space, the union and communion between the Infinite Father and the finite family may be so restored and established in ethical righteousness as to be placed upon the highest possible plane and beyond the range of all further contingency—an everlasting fellowship, not only between heaven and earth, but also between reciprocal personalities.

This consummation having been nominated in the bond of the eternal purpose, God longs for man, and man's heart yearns after God. Out of the depths of eternity God reaches toward the creature of his love, and wheresoever man is found, he, consciously or otherwise, seeks and sighs for that normal relation to his Maker which alone can redress the miseries of his abnormal state and give reality to his mystic dreams.

Hence, whether the unfolding of God's eternal purpose in time and space proceeds with or without involving abnormal facts and forces in the solution of the great problem of the ages, the key to its full solution is in the person of Immanuel—"God with us." The history of the human race when read in the light of Messianic truth shows nothing more clearly than the meaning of Christ's mission. "In the scroll of the Book it is written of me: Lo, I come to do Thy will, oh God!" And the same scroll of the Book teaches in conformity with the true interpretation of all historic records that it is the will of God not only that all things shall be gathered together in Christ, but also that it is the will of the Heavenly Father that not one of his children should perish by everlasting banishment from his presence. This implies also that only in

his presence and communion of his life and light and love is there fullness of joy.

For such fellowship, and the fruit of such fellowship with its Maker, as mediated through man's reconciliation and full communion with God, the whole creation, rising to a sub or semi-consciousness of its condition, because made "subject to vanity," groaneth and travaileth together in pain while looking for the redemption of the sons of God. Awaiting such restoration, the mountains and the hills already break forth into singing, and all the trees clap their hands. All cattle and beasts of the fields, creeping things and flying fowl speak from the depth of creation's sub-consciousness with a confused longing for nature's restoration to its normal relation with the divine source of its being. The untaught heathen have always waited to welcome the dawn of their deliverance from the bondage of human corruption. The more intelligent and gifted sons of mythology stood on the tiptoe of their partially developed desire to pierce the veil that dimmed their vision of the Hesperides. For this elysian state and abode Hesiod harped and Sappho sang. For this dreamed-of consummation of redemption and bliss philosophers speculated, prophets predicted and patriarchs waited.

While the ancient world was general, if not universal, in its desires and dreams for union with God or the gods, it was nevertheless divided in its notions and methods of striving to attain to such religious fellowship. One form of mythology sought to bring the gods down to earth and incarnate them in human heroes; the other encouraged and acted upon the belief that men could and should elevate themselves to the dignity of deities. Some reckless poet represents Virgil as claiming that

The wealth of truth can never reach us
Until the gods come down and teach us.

The more cultivated Greeks apotheosized their heroes and enrolled their names among their more excellent and immortal gods on Mount Olympus.

Notwithstanding the light of inspiration in Israel, the same confusion of ideas prevailed to some extent among the Old Testament prophets, who also saw through a glass darkly. David longed for the wings of a dove, and wondered who should ascend into the hill of the Lord. Jeremiah exclaimed "Oh that Thou wouldst rend the heavens and come down!" Only to the extent that the patriarchs and prophets either laid their philosophy and poetry aside or kept them in subordinate relation to the knowledge gendered in faith, and devoted themselves more to the cultivation of the consciousness of the ethical relation constitutionally existing between themselves and the living and loving and personal God were they able to rise above the confusion of uncertainty and fog of skepticism. It was only as David *thus* kept the "Lord always before his face" that he could find religious certitude in answer to his devout soul as his heart and his flesh cried out for the living God. It was in this faith, rather than in poetry, that "Jacob, when he was dying," not only blessed his sons, but also consigned his spirit: "I have waited for thy salvation, oh God." So also with Job the philosopher of Uz. It was because of his faith in God and his own consequent ethical righteousness, that this "perfect and upright one who feared God, and eschewed evil," was able to say "*I know that my Redeemer liveth.*"

Mark the depth and clearness of that conviction in the otherwise troubled breast of that illustrious monument of patience in affliction. Few if any of the prophets in the covenant had a clearer view than Job of the coming of Him who was to "stand at the latter day upon the earth," "a light to lighten the gentiles and the glory of his people Israel."

How remarkably Job and Jesus Christ complemented each other in the evolution of the one purpose of God and the completion of the one divine plan of the ages! Job, looking down the aisle of the future, exclaimed "My Redeemer liveth!" and Jesus looking back through fifteen centuries to Job, and forward through all the years of the future, responds to all the yearning

hearts in the family of man (John 14: 19) "*Because I live ye shall live also.*"

The above quoted language of Christ to his almost disconsolate disciples was not only the medium of communicating consolation to their sorrowing hearts, but may be regarded also as responsive to Job's confession of faith in his living Redeemer or vindicator, as well as to all the reasonable hopes and expectations of Adam's sons and daughters from the closing of the garden gates of Eden to the opening of the portals of the New Jerusalem. The language does not express the categorical imperative of a German philosopher, but the hearts desire, purpose and promise of Him who came to bring restoration and give completion to the human race. It means more than a promise of life in heaven. It is to be partially realized on earth. Ye shall live also—in his fellowship, in his church—in his cause, as coworkers together with him in the communion of a common life. It is equivalent to our Lord's enunciation elsewhere: "I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly." St. John repeats the same in substance in his fine distinction between a cardinal fact and the record of its revelation. "This is the record that God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in His Son," I. John 5: 11. Paul takes up the same fundamental truth and echoes it back from a more philosophic and soteriological standpoint: "*I live, yet not I but Christ liveth in me.*"

From the foregoing and essentially similar sayings of Christ and scriptural records, as well as from all right religious reasoning in the matter, the conclusion is logically reached that Christianity as to its essential substance in the concrete, is *the religion of life*. Of course there are other essential elements in its constitution. Light, love and law, *et cætera*, as inseparable and distinct from life, are as essential to Christianity as life itself. These should all be viewed, however, as grounding themselves in that primordial vital principle which by virtue of the incarnation became, and still becomes "that true light which lighteth every man that cometh

into the world," and manifests itself according to "the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus." Observe the divinely ordained order of Christological evolution. This order is from life to that which is involved therein and evolved therefrom. The light does not become the life of men, however important to the full manifestation of the latter. The Romish Church has laid undue stress upon law and ecclesiastical legislation. Hence the necessity for the Reformation. Religious sentimentalism accentuates the syllable of affection in the great word of salvation, and lays undue stress upon affected or perverted or disjointed love until it makes feeling the test of orthodoxy and activity the source of Christian character. Rationalism unduly emphasizes its own apprehension of truth as over against that life which is fontally in Christ, the Lord from heaven, the quickening spirit, who so imparts himself to recipient men as to produce their regeneration. Rationalism overlooks the fact that regeneration is deeper and more objective than mere conversion through the light of abstract truth, and without which there can be no real and genuine conversion in the sense of mortifying the old man and the quickening of the new, as taught in the Heidelberg Confession, question 88.

Christianity is a new creation distinct from and as real as that which includes the visible and material heavens and the earth. Its objective, concrete and entitive existence holds in the organic union of the substance of the Son of God with the essential substance of humanity, in the sense that the word was made (assumed) flesh. This new creation is therefore headed in Christ, "the last Adam," even as the old creation heads or rather culminates in the first Adam (I. Cor. 15). It is a kingdom in organic unity, as well as in expansive and progressive evolution. Christ, the true witness, "the beginning of the (new) creation of God" is the parent (Is. 9: 6) of the peculiar progeny or people born of Him, of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named (Eph. 3: 15). Having such an objective existence, it is not dependent upon

subjective repentance, faith or experience, however important these conditions on the part of the individuals who would become citizens of this royal realm, and consequent recipients of its assimilative virtue and power. In a word, it may be repeated, that Christianity is life—not a mere attenuated human life, but a distinct effluence of the life of God which was not in the world in the same sense, and to the same extent before the incarnation.

It follows therefore that this absolute religion, the highest form of humanity, as to its essential elements, is not primarily molded from without, or made dependent upon its form, as materialism teaches concerning the dependence of the soul upon the body, and as some acousticians still affirm in the alleged dependence of "sound" upon the medium of its conduction and manner of its travel. Like all other orders of life, Christianity, in bending its energies toward externalization, is free under the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus, to take or change its own form, or rather to conform to the model or type involved in its constitution.

Of course Christian life, like all other orders of vital force, is susceptible of modification by its environments, or the conditions under which it may unfold itself. These conditions may be classified as follows: Those that belong to the world as constituted, and such as are produced by the evolution of the world's life-force. Christianity as to its essential substance, while it remains, like its great Author, the same yesterday, to-day, forever and everywhere, subjects itself to ethnic, climatic and cultural influences. The Ethiopian, though brought with the Caucasian under the transforming power of the Gospel, is not expected to undergo an immediate change of his skin. Christian society in India is necessarily different from the social constitution of London. The Torrid and the Frigid Zones, though under the plastic power of the same Christian truth, do not produce types of Christian manhood equal to that in the Temperate Zones; neither is it reasonable for us to expect full strength and beauty of sym-

metrical character among the uncultured Christians in heathen lands, any more than we would look for tropic flowers and fruits on Greenland's frosty face. So, too, have the epochal movements of the world started influences that tend to differentiate the forms under which Christianity continues to unfold its power in leavening the whole lump of humanity. Among these epochs may be mentioned the birth of Magna Charta at Runnymede, the discovery of America, the invention of the printing press and the Reformation of the sixteenth century. These beginnings of new periods in history, though they have not changed the essential substance of the absolute religion, have, nevertheless, opened the way for the production of a higher type of Christian manhood, elevated Christian society to a higher plane of religious excellence and cleared the highway of Christian progress toward time's last stage for time's last play.

As Christian life is above all other orders of finite vital energy, and gives to all others their cosmic meaning and end in the wisely arranged economy of sublunary things, it is also capable of the highest form of manifestation. This higher life in its very nature, and according to its mission in the plan of the ages, is capable of manifesting itself in the conscious activity of Christian work, and that divine worship which is capable of culminating in the most lofty adoration of the Absolute One, as well as the most intimate fellowship of the finite human personality with the personal, Infinite Source of its being.

The most normal development of Christian life and the most healthy growth of organized Christianity in the form of the Church is made when the latter unfolds her heavenly power and fills her heaven-given mission with the least possible undue influence from without. While she is to admit and incorporate sincere proselytes from the outer court, she is to "beware of the leaven of the Pharisees." It is her mission to give birth to her own children—children which she has been commissioned to nurse in her own bosom, and bring up in

"the nurture and admonition" of her Lord—rather than to adopt foundlings already incubated in some questionable way by the bond-woman in the wilderness of Arabia. The tree of life in the midst of the paradise of God is *endogenous* rather than *exogenous*, and should be permitted to make its growth according to the law of its inner life.

Neglect of the aforementioned requirement and a gradual departure from this primary law of normal growth has caused the abomination of desolation to stand in the holy place of the Church's past, and even in this day of better, broader things, is the most fruitful source of painful solicitude concerning her future, in the minds of discerning watchmen on the walls of Zion. What seems true of the Church as a whole is more or less true of each branch thereof. Perhaps the most alarming departure from the line of normal growth is in some of the more historic churches of our general Christendom. Let charity and self-examination begin at home. Of unkind criticism we have none. We would rather weep between the porch and the altar than to publicly blow the trumpet of alarm in Zion. Our tears might not be regarded at this time with proper charitable consideration, neither can we hope with the Psalmist that the Lord would put them into his bottle.

The danger of departure from the faith once delivered to the saints is not so much in false doctrine as in vain works and worship. The Church can counteract the evil influence of heresy much easier than she can guard against unconscious apostasy in cultus. According to our limited reading of church history, her work and worship have always been measurably exponential of her spiritual and sanitary condition. The records made before the Reformation may be called to the witness stand to testify as to the causes that greatly helped to mature the crisis which may yet be repeated in that great protestant hereafter seemingly near at hand.

Where is Martin Luther? Where is the Lord God of—rather where is the Elijah of the same Lord God, for a somewhat similar state of things in the New Testament and evan-

gelical Israel in the twentieth century of the Christian era? Sixty-five years ago certain or uncertain portions of Protestantism were threatened with what was known as the anxious bench or New Measure type of religion. Then, as now, there was a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge. The Heidelberg Catechism was denounced with the system of cultus in which it stands, and of which it had been for three hundred years the symbolical representative. Anxiety was written in the faces of the church's best men and women. There was a call for some one to sound the alarm and rise in defense of the old principles of the Gospel interwoven with the tried and true traditions of the Fathers. That man came from the Presbyterian church. The Rev. John Williamson Nevin wrote the "Anxious Bench" in merited exposure of pretentious innovations, and tore the false system into tatters, while he raised the old banner of educational religion in the advocacy of sound Christian cultus. The result was that in less than a score of years that foreign epidemic was driven out of the church. During that time Dr. Nevin was cannonaded. At the close of that period he was canonized. In 1876 he passed into the skies. Since then other new elements and influences have crept into our protestant faith, the combination and confusion of which now constitute a religious nondescript which no sane man would undertake to either analyze or denominate.

Ever since the occurrence of the seeming discrepancy between the teachings of two of the evangelists respecting the relative value of Christian works in the matter of justification before God, there has been no question more continuously under discussion than the relation of works and worship to the life which animates and gives character to everything of virtue and value in the Christian system. This question was very properly considered and fully discussed by the Reformers in their defence of the cause and promotion of the principles of Protestantism. During the last score of years protestant America has very properly emphasized the importance

of church-work. There seems, however, to be a general want of serious reflection, if not confusion as to whether such work is primarily the root or the fruit of Christian life and justification by faith. And what is true of church-work is equally true of so-called Christian worship. Is there not, to some extent at least, a reversal of God's ordained order in the logical process of human salvation? Is there not also an unconscious attempt to work salvation *into* the soul and *into* the congregation by boastful personal and organized powers and paroxisms rather than to work it "out" with "fear and trembling," from a supernatural life-principle, assumed to be implanted by the Holy Ghost in the body of Christ and the real members thereof? As endeavorers to *do* something *for* Christ, instead of submitting ourselves to *be* something more and better *in* Christ, we work to live rather than live to work. We worship almost exclusively to get nearer to God rather than because He has graciously taken us into covenant nearness with himself. The nineteenth century will pass into history for its great religious exhibitions of exceedingly small Christian potencies. Inconsiderate efforts on the part of the church to arouse herself from spiritual apathy too often lead her into false progress and paroxysmal enthusiasm. And are not these paroxisms of so-called evangelistic piety too frequently mixed with unconscious carnal ambition, dreams of self-sufficiency and indulgences in the way of gratifying either the mind, the humor or the appetite? Thus

We serve the Lord by fits and starts,
And shout the Gospel to the nations,
While warming our own frozen hearts
With frequent ice-cream applications.

That the Reformed Church has been in need of some restorative remedy is evidenced by her past manifest apathy, especially in sections and among portions of her laity. This, however, is nothing unusual in the general history of Christianity. Zion has had her seasons of drouth and decadency in all the periods of her history and under all the various

forms of her development; upon the other hand the church has always been right in her self-resuscitative efforts when she sought and found and applied the required remedy in accordance with the law of her own peculiar life. Her mistake has always been her willing submission to and cooperation with foreign powers and adventitious influences. Such foreign invasion for the present may not seem grievous but joyous; nevertheless, afterward it yieldeth the unrighteous fruit of ecclesiastical mongrelism. If there be any astonishment in the case, it is in the fact that such foreign influences should be permitted to enter into and encroach upon the peculiar spirit and genius of the Reformed Church whose very birth was involved in a mighty protest against the incorporation of foreign elements into the kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.

What is the condition and the consequent cultus in the Reformed Church to-day in many sections of the territory which she occupies and under the conflicting schools of thought which afford charity such good opportunities to exercise her most excellent gifts. Proceeding in this spirit of charity, no accusation is made of conscious infidelity to principle; no criticisms are offered; and therefore none are expected in answer to these inquiries into the cause, the nature and the modern trend of our church-life, work and cultus. Let brotherly love continue, and in love let us reason together. Why should our "mother's children" be angry with us? In our partially commendable zeal to Christianize Japan and to emancipate China from the chronic servitude of Confucianism, are we not in danger of a relapse into something that incorporates too much of our Western-world-element? "They made me the keeper of the vineyards, but mine own vineyard have I not kept." Songs of Sol. 1: 6.

Are we justified in admitting, tolerating and employing all of the many measures, methods and customs that now dominate much of our work and worship? Are we not, in so doing, in danger of a foolish departure from the old paths in which

our sainted fathers walked, and from the old principles for which they were willing to join the noble army of martyrs? Are we not indeed losing that true and apostolic conception of the church as a supernatural constitution of grace and truth in the world, extending with unbroken succession from the day of Pentecost onward to the end of time? Our true cultus grounds itself in that objective and sacramental life and power of the heavenly world at hand in the bosom of the Church as the very embodiment of God's kingdom which we so devoutly and earnestly pray may come with rising, spreading and prevailing glory. Are the sacraments, instituted and placed in her keeping and use by her Great Head, now generally held, administered and used as means of grace? Where used at all, are they not regarded by many as being under that category and conception of meritorious works which are supposed to give us right to the tree of life and a passport through the gate into the heavenly city? Are ordained men now, as formerly, accounted as ministers of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God? Are they not too generally looked upon as mere authorized individuals, preachers, commissioned by other clergymen, instead of divinely authorized functionaries of that supernatural order of heavenly life and power proceeding from the great head of the church, and which by the Holy Ghost is to be of force always for the salvation of men? Are not ministerial acts too generally viewed, not as official, but as merely personal acts, actions and transactions, rather than administrations? Does not the minister become of value to the congregation according to his dignified appearance, magnetism and other elements of ability to attract a large audience, tickle their fancy and gratify their morbid tastes by rendering on each succeeding Sunday some new program of pulpit acrobatics?

Hence it is that the old catechetical system of educational religion, in many sections of the Reformed Church, is now being gradually placed, with the old preachers, upon the retired list or tolerated with a sort of a step-motherly affection.

Another Pharaoh, who knows not Joseph, is ascending the throne. Modern innovations call for modern methods. An effort is made to build the temple of God with untempered mud. The swelling multiplicity and multiformity of half-breed leagues, fraternities, orders and societies leave but little for some churches and some clergymen to do. Preachers, therefore, have plenty of time to study up new sensations for the coming Sunday. Mothers have plenty of time to prepare their children for dress-parade, while thoughtful and considerate Christians reflect upon the fact that no amount of religious zeal can reanimate a lifeless church with a churchless life.

TIFFIN, OHIO.

IV.

THE ETHICS OF THE GOSPELS.

BY REV. E. E. KRESGE.

In the treatment of this subject I shall limit myself to the ethics of the Synoptic Gospels, because it is here where we find the teachings of Jesus in their purest form.

And first of all what do we mean by ethics? and what are its peculiar problems? Ethics is defined as a study of what ought to be, or of what is right for human beings to do through voluntary action. The history of philosophic ethics reveals two types, which should be, though often are not, distinguished from each other. The one type is individualistic and the other is social. Ancient ethics was individualistic. It dealt with the individual as an isolated entity. The ancient Greeks, the first teachers of ethics, asked: what ought the individual to be or do? The followers of Zeno said: he ought to be virtuous, and the followers of Epicurus said: he ought to be happy. In modern history we also find two types of individualistic ethics; Intuitionism and Egoistic Hedonism. Each considers the individual as an end in himself. Intuitionism says: man ought to be morally perfect, moral perfection being defined as voluntary obedience to the moral law within, or conscience. Ends and consequences are not considered. Right must be done merely for right's sake. Egoistic Hedonism says: man ought to be happy, happiness being defined as the greatest amount of pleasure over pain for the individual. But the form of modern ethics is social rather than individualistic. The question is not what ought the individual to do as an end in himself, but rather what ought the individual to do for other individuals? Materialistic ethics says: we ought to aim at man's general well-being: improve his conditions: feed and

clothe him well. Idealistic ethics would set up some ideal human relationship or some ideal object such as justice or freedom. While Utilitarianism, another type of Hedonism, says we ought to make all men happy. The history of philosophic ethics reveals a tendency in individualistic ethics to pass over into socialistic ethics. Those who said the individual ought to be virtuous soon discovered that a man cannot be virtuous by himself, but only as he lives among men, and then only as he lives in the right kind of society. Hence they dream of an ideal society where virtue can be realized. Egoistic Hedonism, the most clear-cut, but also the most selfish system of ethics in history, saw clearly that the individual cannot be happy in the highest sense save as he lives in the right relationship with his fellow men, and in the right kind of society from the hedonistic standpoint. Hence the hedonistic schemes of society. But no matter what the method or form of philosophic ethics has been, its history, from the Greeks on down, shows that this science has busied itself with an inquiry into desirable human life, whether for the individual or for groups of individuals.

Now has the ethics of our Bible as it is summed up in the life and teachings of Jesus anything to say on these vital questions? Has it anything to offer for the solution of these problems with which philosophic ethics has wrestled? and if so, what? These, in my judgment, are the questions that must be met in a paper like this.

There are not a few men at the present time who would answer these questions in the negative. They say Christianity is an ascetic religion without an ethics. It withdraws itself from this real world and contemplates another world which is not real. It substitutes pious meditation for life and ethical activity. Its object is not to redeem human society, but rather to increase the census of heaven.

We all admit that Apostolic Christianity showed some dangerous ascetic symptoms. These grew out of a mistaken idea of Christ's speedy return to the earth when the present

order of things would pass away and the hoped-for Kingdom of Heaven would be set up. These mistaken ideas, drawn from certain veiled sayings of Jesus, made the early Christians for a time wholly indifferent to the things of this life. In certain quarters they quit work because of this delusion. The thought of Christ's speedy return effected even St. Paul's teaching on certain ethical and social questions such as marriage and slavery.

But whatever may be true of certain abnormal aspects of Apostolic Christianity, it is not true that the Gospels contain a religion without an ethics. Jesus was no ascetic like John the Baptist. He "came eating and drinking." He mingled freely with men in the city and in the country, and he wanted His disciples to do the same. In His last prayer for them He prayed: "Not that thou shouldest take them out of the world, but that thou shouldest keep them from the evil." They are to be "the salt of the earth," and "the light of the world." This they could not be in cloisters and in deserts. They are to be in the world though not of the world. The religion of Jesus is good for the life that now is as well as for the life that is to come. His teachings contain an ethics as well as a religion. The difficulty, however, is to cull the ethics of the Gospels from the religion of the Gospels, for Jesus did not teach ethics but religion. Christ's ethics we find in His doctrine of the Kingdom of Heaven.

THE ETHICS OF THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN.

Of this one thing we are certain to begin with: that the Kingdom of Heaven in the teaching of Jesus is not only future but also present. It is not only the future abode of that blessed company in whom the divine rule is perfectly realized, and where the blessings of the kingdom are enjoyed in their fullest degree; but it is also here on the solid earth, leavening human hearts and human society. In His opening ministry Jesus said: "The Kingdom of Heaven is at hand." It came to earth in the person of Jesus. It was present in the

fullest and most perfect form in Him. And it is here on the earth now to the extent and in the degree that human hearts and wills accept Jesus.

The most important term in Christ's doctrine of the Kingdom of Heaven is the word righteousness. It contains both a religion and an ethics. As it unfolds itself God-ward it is religion, and as it unfolds itself man-ward it is ethics. It is the latter phase of the term that we wish to follow in this paper. And first of all righteousness is primarily an individual matter. Jesus addressed Himself first to the individual: to his will and conscience. Jesus had no idea of redeeming the world by beginning with groups of individuals. We cannot have good society unless the individuals who compose it are good. Nor did He think any more of saving a man by first giving him bread and a coat. You cannot save a man by beginning on the surface. In both of these things Jesus differs from a great deal of our present day reform-agitation. We cannot save society by legislating for groups of men, nor can we save the individual by appealing to his stomach or his back. Jesus began by planting the Kingdom of Heaven in the form of a regenerative life-germ in the heart of the individual. Righteousness is an inner spirituality. It is a good disposition of the heart. In philosophic ethics we would say it has to do with the motive and the intention. The law said: "Thou shalt not kill," and "Thou shalt not commit adultery." But Jesus forbade the angry feeling and the lustful look. In the religion of the kingdom nothing counts but that which comes from the heart. The good deeds which the Father sees are those which are done in secret. The prayers which He hears are those which come from the inner chamber. And the fast that is acceptable to Him is that which men do not see. The left hand shall not know what the right hand doeth. Thus the ethics of Jesus is individualistic in its foundation, beginning with a right disposition of the heart whence issues righteous conduct. Jesus would first make good men, then He will have good society.

The righteous individual of the kingdom is humble, he is pure, he is just (*i. e.*, merciful), he is peaceful, he is tolerant, he is forgiving; St. John's Gospel adds that he is also truthful and sincere. These are qualifications for our every-day life: for Monday as well as Sunday. These things are good for the life that now is as well as for the life that is to come. The righteous individual of the kingdom stands armed with all the cardinal virtues that are recognized in any individualistic system of philosophic ethics. The ancient systems of ethics which made virtue the end of life laid great stress on wisdom. By some it was made the primal virtue; not wisdom as scientific knowledge of things, but wisdom as a regulative principle of human conduct. In the Synoptic Gospels nothing is said about knowledge. But in St. John's Gospel the thought is very prominent. Knowledge of the truth is essential to righteousness. In fact truth in the Fourth Gospel takes the place of righteousness in the Synoptics. And to do the truth means more than merely to have a right inclination; it also means to have a right sight for good and evil. This knowledge of the truth, this keen insight into good and evil is good not only for our life before God but also for our life with man. Between the knowledge of the truth in St. John, and the wisdom of the Greek ethicists (and the wisdom of the wisdom literature of the Old Testament) there is not as much difference as we may think. As to the ethical content of the term (the practical import for life) I see scarcely any difference at all.

But while there is a striking similarity between the individualistic ethics of the Gospels and individualistic philosophic ethics, there is still a great difference. Philosophic ethics never goes further back than the individual conscience or social custom in its inquiry into the moral ought. There is no other authority than the moral law within, or social custom without. The sanctions of philosophic ethics are twofold; internal or conscience, and external, either in the form of public opinion or civil law. Back of these sanctions philosophic ethics has never gone. But Christian ethics rests on

religion. Apart from religion it knows no ethics. The author of the moral ought is God. I just said that I can see little difference as to ethical content between the wisdom of the Greek ethics and the knowledge of the truth in the Fourth Gospel. But as to the supposed origin of this wisdom there is all the difference in the world. St. John's wisdom comes from above, while the other comes from within. This is no place to discuss the respective claims of authority for the ethical ought. It is enough to say that the finest specimens of ethical character have been produced in the religious school of Jesus. The moral ought that is supposed to have its origin in God comes with more binding motive power, at any rate for the average man, than the moral ought that comes only from within the individual himself or from public opinion. Belief in a Supreme Judge before whom all, the great and the small, must give an account of their stewardship, is still the strongest incentive to right living. Arraignment before the bar of conscience or public opinion cannot take its place.

Another difference that deserves notice is the fact that philosophic ethics takes little account of sin. It looks away from this night side of our life, while Christian ethics deals with it seriously. Philosophic ethics begins with the non-moral, while Christian ethics begins with the contra-moral. And this recognition of sin adds a further impetus to the bindingness of the moral ought. Jesus gives no theory of the origin of sin. He simply deals with it as a fact, endeavoring to bring light into the darkness.

And finally, in the individualistic ethics of Jesus we find a solution of the philosophic dilemma between the individual's perfection and his happiness. Few ethical systems, ancient or modern, have been able to dismiss the idea that happiness is an end in life: that we ought to be happy and that we ought to make other people happy. The Stoic idea that we ought to be insensible to all feelings of pleasure and pain has always seemed a horrid doctrine. The Epicurean idea that virtue

is valuable only as it produces happiness for the individual has always been obnoxious to the moral consciousness. While the Platonic and Aristotelian idea that happiness is a logical concomitant of virtue: that the more virtuous a man is the happier he will be is not true to fact. Ancient ethics therefore ended in a dilemma on this particular question. Nor can I see that modern ethics has fared any better. There seems to be a contradiction between the individual's moral perfection and his happiness. At any rate this question marks the point of cleavage between the leading ethical systems: between Zeno, Aristotle and Epicurus in ancient times, and between Intuitionism and Hedonism in modern times. I said Christian ethics offers a solution. The moral perfection of the individual is the aim of Christ's individualism; and in the growth in righteousness the cross rather than the crown is the prominent idea. The disciple must deny himself. He must be willing to sacrifice all things for the sake of his righteousness. In this life the disciple may be obliged to leave house, and father, and mother, and wife, and children for the sake of the Gospel. But that Christianity stoically courts the cross is false. That it makes much of happiness is certainly true. Even in this life happiness is promised. He who leaves house, and father, and mother and children, etc., for the sake of righteousness shall in this life receive an hundred fold: not in material houses, etc., but in blessedness, in happiness. Jesus was kind; and the virtue of kindness lies in its happiness-producing power. Jesus did many little things just to make people happy. I know of nothing that He said or did that would make any one unhappy. It is true, however, that in this life happiness is kept in the background, and righteousness in the foreground. But in the kingdom as future perfect happiness is promised as the end of righteousness. Blessedness! thrice blessedness! is the ultimate end of individual life in the kingdom as future. Christian ethics solves the philosophic difficulty with reference to perfection and happiness by transferring the full realization of both to

a future world. I said above that this is a solution. I refrained from saying *the* solution because I am well aware that this will not satisfy a scientific ethicist, especially not if he is of the hedonistic type. He will not be satisfied by the promise of happiness in a world that must be accepted on faith. He wants his happiness right here in this real world and right now as he is travelling along the rough stretches of life's road. But this promise of future perfect happiness in future perfect righteousness will satisfy the child of faith, who sees that life is a training-school rather than a playground, and who has foretaste, right here in this life, in rational sacrifice and loving service, of the future perfect happiness in perfect righteousness. There is no contradiction between the individual's moral perfection and his happiness when happiness is defined in terms of quality instead of in terms of quantity. The Benthamite hedonists define happiness in terms of quantity: "Push-pin is as good as poetry." Between mere quantitative happiness and moral perfection there is a rational contradiction, neither can the contradiction be bridged over by any dialectical subtlety.

Jesus then begins with the individual, with his will and conscience, and by a process of moral growth from within out aims at righteous perfection. A perfect individual is the end and aim of His individualism. But we may not stop here. Too many interpreters of Jesus have stopped with His individualism, and have thus failed to give us the whole truth. In my judgment no merely individualistic ethics is a complete ethics. There is something very essential lacking in modern Intuitionism which says: right must be done for right's sake: ends and consequences must not be considered. According to this way of thinking a man can be just as good in a great wilderness as in a great city. This is not true. Unconsciously feeling its weakness, Intuitionism constantly supplements itself by Utilitarian principles. Individual goodness apart from social relations is no longer conceivable. In the ethics of the Gospels we have individualism and socialism

woven together into one fabric. Righteousness begins in the individual will, but it becomes complete as the individual will is related to other wills. Christ's righteous man lives in society. He is the salt of the earth and the light of the world. All the individual virtues for which he is offered the blessings of the kingdom are ultimately possible only in his relation to other men. We cannot conceive of a humble, pure, just, peaceful, forgiving and truthful man by and for himself. If he were the only man in the world he could be none of these things. Surely a man can be just, peaceful and forgiving only in his dealings with other men. The same is true also of humility, purity and truthfulness. A man might be willing and able to be all these things in a cloister, but the proof lies in the test, and that is possible only in his relation to real flesh and blood men and women. After all to be righteous means to stand in a benevolent relation to other men.

That this is the scope of the ethics of the kingdom becomes clearer when we consider the two fundamental laws of the kingdom. These are love and service. Neither of these laws mean anything that can be made intelligible apart from man's relation to his fellow-man. We can think of a man loving God because we Christians think of Him as a person. A man may spend his time in solitary meditation and communion with God. He may even rise into ecstasy through such practises. But such a thing does not exhaust the idea of love as taught by Jesus. Love to God with all the heart, soul, mind, and strength is one half of the supreme law of the kingdom, but an equally intense love to man is the other half. And while we love men because we love God we also love God because we love men. In fact we love God most when we love men. This is what Christ taught. He asked Peter: "Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me?" and when Peter said: "Lord, Thou knowest that I love Thee," Christ said: "then feed my sheep." Feeding sheep, not confession, is the final test of love. St. John, the apostle of love, says a man cannot love God if he does not love man. Love to God without love to man may be good mysticism but it is poor ethics.

The social and benevolent aspects of Christ's ethics can be seen still more plainly in the other fundamental law of the kingdom. If the righteous man were alone in the world he could love God but I cannot see that he could serve Him. I cannot conceive of anything that he could do for God. Paul says you cannot serve God with your hands "as though He needed anything." The only way to serve God that I can think of is to help Him lift this poor, sinful, suffering world up into the blessedness of the kingdom. We can serve God only through His needy children. This is plainly the Christian idea of service. If you love me Simon feed my sheep. "In as much as ye did it unto the least of these my brethren ye did it unto me." Saying Lord, Lord, and doing wonderful works in Christ's name cannot take the place of humble service rendered unto the needy. No amount of ritualism can atone for a lack of service. Josiah Strong says: "The attempt to serve God without serving man is the explanation of ritualism, which serves neither, and which is hateful to the one, and hurtful to the other. Forgetting that service, if real, is social, we by a misnomer call divine worship divine service. Thus our services are held instead of being rendered." Worship is a matter between the righteous individual and God, but service is a matter between him and man.

In all non-Christian religions sacrifice has always been an element of worship; in fact it has been the most prominent element of worship. The blood of man and beast has been shed as a sacrifice to the gods. Countless numbers of poor beasts have been slain as a sacrifice to Jehovah. Men have tortured themselves, even in Christian lands, as a sacrifice to God. Jehovah told Israel long ago that He does not want the fat of rams because He does not need it. We must not fail to recognize the very significant fact that in the Kingdom of God as presented by Jesus sacrifice has ceased to be an element of worship and has become wholly a matter of life, of ethics. Sacrifice apart from service for man receives no recognition from Christ. Sacrifice is not a separate law of

the kingdom; it is only a part of the supreme laws of love and service. The only sacrifice that we can make to God is that which we make in a devoted effort to serve man. Even the sacrifice on the cross was made in behalf of man.

It is evident from all this that the righteous man's ethics does not become complete in any mere "other-world" goodness, in mere pious dispositions and good intentions, but in a benevolent relation between him and his brother-man. Now the question arises: who is my brother? Is the term a universal one, or does it describe a particular relation like the Jewish term neighbor? In the majority of cases where the term occurs Jesus identifies brotherhood and discipleship. The righteous man's brother is his fellow disciple. But this does not exhaust the Christian idea of brotherhood. There are other passages where the term brother does not mean the fellow disciple. The Christian idea of brotherhood is determined by the Christian idea of fatherhood. God is the Father of the whole human family, of Jews and Gentiles, of circumcised and uncircumcised. Every member of the human family is by virtue of his birth as a human being a child of God. Some are good children and some are bad children, but all are children. The righteous man is therefore a brother to every child of God. All the human beings whom he meets day by day in the street, in the field, in the shop, in the palace and in the hovel, are the children of his Father. To all of them the righteous man must be a brother even as God is their Father.

And as a brother, he owes the children of his Father love. He must love them like he loves himself. He must love them like Jesus loved them. He must be willing to sacrifice, to suffer, and even if occasion should demand it, to die for them; not necessarily for any particular one of them, but for the family of brothers. Those who will be born in the far distant future will be the children of his Father, and he must be willing to work for the future as well as for the present. As a righteous man he must love them all; not only the good,

but also the bad. The righteous man must love his enemy. He must bless them that curse him, and pray for those who treat him ill. Jesus said if an enemy smite thee on the one cheek turn him the other also; if he take your coat give him your cloak also; and if he force you to go with him a mile go with him two miles.

This extreme of forgiving love and meekness the world has not always understood. Christians have sometimes misunderstood this to mean that love dare not respect and defend itself, and consequently have sacrificed their rights and even their lives in a lack of rational self-defense. The world has said: this is the teaching of an extremist, a fanatic: such love can exist in precept only and never in practice. It is important that we should understand this. The trouble is that we have taken these sayings too literally. We must learn to distinguish between the spirit and the letter of Christ, between His plain speech that is to be understood literally, and His figures of speech which are to be understood in spirit only. There is a limit to the righteous man's tolerance and endurance. Righteousness will stand on its own feet. The righteous man loves himself as well as his neighbor, and he will maintain his rights and his self-respect. We must not allow swine to trample upon the pearls of righteousness. When the ruffian struck Jesus in the face on the night of His arrest He rebuked him instead of turning him the other cheek. When the disciples were refused entrance into a city they were to shake the dust of that city from their feet. If a man offend you, Jesus said, go to him personally and try to adjust matters. If he will not hear you, then take with you one or two witnesses, men who know you both and who can give you disinterested advice. If your enemy will not hear them, then bring the matter before the Ecclesia. If he will not hear the Ecclesia, then treat him like a publican and a sinner: i. e., have nothing more to do with him. In the Kingdom of Heaven there is no contradiction between rational self-love and rational benevolence, and one is as necessary as the other. But while there

is a limit to the righteous man's tolerance, we must note very carefully that righteous love may never turn into unrighteous hate. The righteous man may never return curses for curses, nor meanness for meanness. In brief, the righteous man may never become unbrotherly.

And as the righteous man is to love his brothers as Jesus loved them, so also is he to serve them as Jesus served them. This means that we serve men, not things; that we serve men, not their conditions. Jesus paid little or no attention to things. Not that He despised things, but because there were greater things to serve. He never told men how to raise more sheep or better sheep. He healed a few sick bodies and fed a few hungry people, but otherwise He said nothing about man's physical, social, or political conditions. The chief thing in the Kingdom of Heaven is men. The basis of relationship is fraternal and moral, and the object of service is men.

In this respect the Kingdom of Heaven is diametrically different from the kingdom of the world. Some time ago I read an article which says that the foundation of society is economic. I think that is correct. The history of the evolution of society shows that men band themselves together primarily for economic and industrial reasons. Our chief interest is in things, not in men. Men form themselves into groups, into cities and towns, not in the interest of the mind and the heart, but primarily in the interest of their several pocket-books. Society is useful to a man in the degree that it enables him to get more of this world's goods. He gets moral and social benefits from society, but the chief interest is in things of commercial value. All this means that the foundation of society is not moral. This matter is treated in a masterful way by Maurice in his "Social Morality." Between a man and a thing there can be no moral relationship. A man can owe no duty to a loaf of bread, nor can a row of houses have any obligation to a man. Maurice says: "The relation between a man and the earth, or the things of the

earth, is dominion. He asserts his will over them; they are his property. He does what he pleases with them, and they are not able to call his right into question. The great first thing about a man is society then, according to this theory, is that he exercises dominion. He realizes himself when he asserts his will, when he brings his environment into subjection." Now the assumption of this principle in society will have its results. If a man's chief interest is in things, it is to be expected that his relation to things, which is that of ownership, will become his nature and he will live out his nature in society. He will try to have dominion over persons as he has over things. This is what they do in the Gentile world, says Jesus. "The princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them." Some are owners and others are only things. In our own society we see this principle asserting itself in many ways. We see it in the misunderstandings between capital and labor, where there is often no moral and fraternal relation at all; where the one sells his labor and the other buys it, and this ends the relationship. Brothers they are not. The only attachment between them is things. It is seen in every trust and monopoly, in every swollen fortune, and in every political and social ring that exists for selfish purposes. We see it wherever a few are lords and owners and the rest are slaves and things. In the Kingdom of Heaven, or the society of Jesus, this may not be. Here the association between man and man must be fraternal and moral; and the object of the righteous man's service must be men, not things. Jesus placed man, the individual man, upon a pedestal stripped bare of all that dazzles and glows, and served him. Whether the poverty of Jesus was a matter of voluntary choice or of circumstance I do not know, but I do know that through His poverty He enthroned His glorious personality above all the perishable things that the world hungers and thirsts after.

If now the object of our service is men, not things, the question still remains: What shall we do for men? What shall

our service consist of? And this is after all the crucial question of social ethics. This is the question which every social system of ethics has attempted to answer. The school of Hobbes and Spencer says: Help men to realize themselves. The school of Bentham and Sidgwick says: Make all men happy. And Christianity says: Make men righteous. This answer is just as clear and just as capable of realization as any that has been given. Hedonism objects that we cannot make men righteous against their wills. This is true, but neither can you make men happy if they will to be miserable. But this will not hinder us from trying to make men happy. Hedonism objects that righteousness is a complex thing; that no two men will agree as to what it means and that we can, therefore, not aim at it as the goal of our service for men. But the same is true of happiness. The Hedonists define it clearly for themselves, but if we will ask one hundred men to define what they mean by happiness we will get a diversity of answers. Especially will they disagree as to the means of happiness. Some will want "push-pin" and others will want "poetry." How then can we aim at the happiness of these one hundred men? We can no more do it than we can aim at the righteousness of one hundred men. Still we keep on trying to make men happy. And so likewise we keep on trying to make men righteous. We know what we mean by our *summum bonum*. By making men righteous we mean making men children of God and brothers of men. And when men become righteous better physical, social and political conditions will follow as a logical consequence. The righteous leaven will leaven the whole lump, soul and body.

Still a question remains in my own mind: in this service for men, are we to have no regard for man's conditions? Are we to save souls regardless of men's bodies? Are souls, as separate entities, the only objects of our service? It did well enough to say so in an individualistic and unscientific age, but it will not do to say so in our age. We have learned to know the close interrelation between soul and body, and

between man and his conditions. We know that we cannot save the one without regard for the other. And it is not Christian to say that we should. In the mature types of prophetism the Kingdom of God fully come to earth was that of an ideal world redeemed in soul and body. It was a kingdom of physical and spiritual well being. It included all that attaches to manhood. Jesus came not to destroy the law and the prophets but to fulfill them. His kingdom fully come surely does not mean less than it did for Isaiah and Micah. Christ's kingdom fully come to earth will mean a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness: an ideal world redeemed both in body and soul. Our service in this kingdom shall be for men, but not only for a part of man, but for the whole man, a service for body and soul. And since man cannot be redeemed apart from his conditions, our service for man must also include man's conditions. I feel very keenly, though I am slow to express it, that the Church is loosing her hold on our age because she has been neglectful of this fact. Our business is to preach righteousness, and righteousness in a man or in society will change external conditions, but we must not forget that the reception of righteousness and growth in righteousness can be helped or hindered by external conditions. A loaf of bread, soap and water, the physical ministry of genuine sympathy will prove a good preparatory service for a sermon on righteousness. This was the object of nearly all of Christ's miracles. They removed some external obstacle and opened the poor individual's heart to Christ. And note that there is all the difference in the world between a service that uses men for the sake of things, and the service that uses things for the sake of men. The one is industrial and the other is Christian.

This service for man must be rendered in the spirit of humility. Our only ambition shall be to become the best servants. We must not shrink from this service even if it becomes menial. Christ did not hesitate to wash His disciple's feet, thereby giving them an example of the spirit of a true

servant. It must be rendered in the spirit of tolerance. If the Samaritans will not admit us into their city we may not call fire from heaven to burn them up. If our enemies persecute us we must pray for their forgiveness and continue to serve them. The big brother must always be tolerant toward the little brother no matter how unappreciative or unreceptive the little brother may be.

Upon specific ethical and social questions Jesus spoke only incidentally. The state of Caesar and the Kingdom of God may coexist and the righteous man owes a duty to both. The family rests upon a divine order which can be dissolved only for one grave moral reason. Jesus referred to the perplexing problem of wealth in the same incidental way. Wealth is no evil in and of itself. A man's attachment to his wealth may make it hard for him to enter the kingdom, as in the case of Zaccheus; or it may keep him out of the kingdom altogether, as in the case of the rich young ruler. It may make a man insensible to the claims of human suffering and misery, as in the case of Dives; or it may make selfish ease and pleasure the end of life as in the case of the rich fool. There is nothing connected with any of these institutions or problems that will not find its solution in any age and under any conditions in the spirit of the righteous man's filial relation to his Father God and in his fraternal relation to his brother man.

The abiding advantage of the method of Jesus is the fact that He gave us only general principles, leaving each age to apply them to their own peculiar problems. Local and particular problems, no matter how interesting and absorbing for the time, will pass away. The most burning question in the day of Jesus was the relation of the theocratic kingdom to the Roman state. The Jews would have been glad for a word of authority on the subject. All that Jesus said was: Do your duty to both. Both the Jewish and the Roman nation have passed away long since and have ceased to be of interest to all but the students of history. We would be glad for a word of authority to-day as to the rights between capital and labor.

But this question will likewise pass away soon and another one will take its place. All that Jesus said on the subject is: Be brothers, children of your Father in heaven. Particular problems will have their day and will cease to be, but Jesus says: "My words will not pass away." And they will not, for they are on principles as broad as life and as eternal as life. Love and the service of love men will need and want as long as they live. Men will need and want love just as much when they will fly from city to city as they did when they walked. In each age and among the different peoples of the earth these living principles of Jesus will adapt themselves to their environment, appropriating that which is essential to their growth and discarding that which is foreign and useless. The ethical teaching of Jesus will adapt itself to any form of government, and to any society above barbarism. Thus Christ's words will continue to leaven individual hearts until the whole of human society will be leavened, not only in soul but in body as well; until there will be a "New heaven and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness."

ALLENTOWN, PA.

V.

THE SPIRITUAL SELF-CULTURE OF THE MINISTER.

BY C. B. SCHNEIDER, D.D.

Hugh Black concludes his very excellent book, "Culture and Restraint," in the following beautiful language:

"When the sons of Greece are not against but for the sons of Zion: when all the ideals of culture find their inspiration and nourishment in the divine ideals of Jesus, and take their place in the great loving world purpose of the world's Saviour; when thought, and art and literature, and knowledge and life are brought into subjection to the obedience of Christ, that is the true victory."

These words place before our minds a beautifully comprehensive ideal. Only that which tends toward its realization is real progress. And its full realization implies the effacement of thought distinctions which it has been found convenient to make. Then secular and sacred will coincide because all of life will be sacred. Then all culture will be spiritual culture because the physical being, the mental faculties, and the moral character will unfold normally, rising "in a crescendo from sense to mind, from mind to the moral, from the moral to the spiritual," and thus each will find its fuller glory in glorifying that to which it rises, and all, their *chief* glory, in the perfection of the spiritual. This ideal is that of the perfect man and has been realized but once during all the ages. That realization is Jesus, the ideal man. Among all the rest of human kind, even the very best product of the ages of culture and civilization is but an approximation to the standard and true symmetry of the ideal man. So long as this is true we shall find it convenient to hold in mind the distinctions to

which we are accustomed, and to study the laws of physical culture, mental culture, moral culture and spiritual culture, remembering, however, that the culture of the body, mind and conscience have real significance only as they reach up to, and enter into something beyond themselves, and that is the realization of the perfect ideal, in other words, the realization of the life of God in the soul in ever increasing fulness.

From the foregoing the importance of spiritual culture becomes at once apparent. It reaches down into the all of life and utilizes its forces unto the highest possible ends and purposes. It presents to view the only worthy motive for culture and life and should therefore enlist and hold the attention of all who would make the best of the life which now is, as the proper preparation for that which is to be.

Culture implies life. The results of culture are found in terms of increase by development commonly called growth. Spiritual culture implies spiritual life. Spiritual culture cannot be applied to unspiritual life any more than animal culture can be applied to vegetable, or other forms of life, not animal. Life results from birth. Spiritual life results from spiritual birth—the birth of which Jesus spoke to Nicodemus. His “That which is born of the flesh is flesh” is a truth which is unfailing. His “That which is born of the Spirit is spirit” is likewise an unfailing truth. One of the laws of all life is that of growth. Given life, with proper supply of food, air and exercise, and growth follows providing the life is in a condition of health. This is true of all life so far as known and consequently true of spiritual life. Supply it with spiritual food for sustenance, with a spiritual atmosphere for breathing, and with exercise along spiritual lines of activity, and the result will be growth.

But life and growth imply health. Health in spiritual life is holiness. Holiness is a state of separation to, or of being set apart unto God. Rev. G. Campbell Morgan speaks of it as being, while the subject is in this life, perfection of condition as over against perfection of consummation in the life

which is to come. Therefore in order to spiritual growth, which is the object of spiritual culture, there must be spiritual life in a state of spiritual health. Here is the point where culture can begin.

How can he who is born again, who has the new life resulting from the new birth, hasten, encourage, increase the growth of a holy life unto the perfect imageship of the Lord Jesus? Is there anything that he can do to promote growth? If so, what is it, and where does it lie? Can growth be brought about by force of will, or by emotion, or through the affections? These are proper questions. But in seeking correct answers to them it must be borne in mind that growth is primarily dependent upon life and health and that it is possible to do that which is conducive to larger, better and fuller growth only as we know and obey the laws of life. In garden, field and orchard this is in evidence as everywhere else in life. The means of culture are well known because the laws of the life whose growth is to be accelerated are known—scientifically known. Is it not vastly more important that in relation to the spiritual life the laws of growth should be so thoroughly known and so diligently obeyed as to be conducive to the very fullest possible results?

To the work of acquiring a knowledge of these laws, the Christian minister stands sacredly pledged. Faithfully must he study and observe and investigate in order that he may know these laws not only in a general way, but also as applying to individual men and women. And he must begin with himself, applying in his own inner self that culture which he would prescribe for others. He must know the fountain before he can lead others to its living waters. He must know the possibilities of spiritual self-culture as actual experience before he can properly direct others. If those over whom God has placed the minister as under-shepherd, are to be spiritual, the under-shepherd himself must be spiritual.

The spiritual self-culture of the minister does not differ as to means from that of any child of God. It is the same life,

and growth is by the same law. But there is reason to believe that the minister is in danger of overlooking this fact and that there is a possibility of handling the means of grace and failing to profit by them; of urging others to become more spiritual without being spiritual himself; of warning others against neglect while he himself is guilty of it. St. Paul seems to have foreseen this possibility. His letters to Timothy abound in earnest, urgent warning and exhortation. "Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery. Be diligent in these things: give thyself wholly to them: that thy progress may be manifest unto all. Take heed to thyself and thy teaching. Continue in these things; for in doing this thou shalt save both thyself and them that hear thee." It is the minister's great privilege to lead his flock. In this leadership precept alone is not sufficient. He dare not say to men, "Do as I tell you, and not as I do." Above all other men ministers are to be "living epistles" because they *are known and read* of all men.

If, therefore, the minister would lead his flock in green pastures and beside the still waters, he himself must know by actual experience where spiritual sustenance, atmosphere, and exercise are to be found. In other words, the minister must know and use for his own spiritual development the positive means of growth. What are these means of growth? Where shall the minister find sustenance for the life of God in his soul? Does it not lie in a constantly increasing knowledge of God by the power of a living faith? "This is life eternal, to know God." Is not the fuller, clearer knowledge of God a chief result to be attained in our daily living? How shall we come to that fuller knowledge of God? Spiritual things are spiritually discerned. God is spirit and he who would know Him must know Him spiritually. And such knowledge is by the written word which sets forth the living word—the revelation of God. This being so, the spiritual study of the word of God is a constant necessity. What is needed in the minis-

ter's life for his spiritual self-culture, therefore first of all, is daily, devotional study of the Bible. No other study of the Bible can take the place of such devotional study. Critical, homiletical, doctrinal, literary study of the sacred volume cannot be substituted for it. He must study the Bible in the preparation of sermons and addresses, and for teaching in the Sunday-school and in the catechetical class. He ought to study the Bible critically and exegetically at all times. But apart from all such study there must be study in which the minister can say, "I will now study the precious Word of God to meet my own spiritual needs. I will study it that I may grow stronger and richer spiritually; that I may have loftier ideals; and that I may enjoy the larger freedom of the higher life." The minister must study his Bible in such a way that in it God veritably communicates Himself to him; that the period devoted to this study is real fellowship with his heavenly Father. Of the importance of this there can be no doubt. All other forms of Bible study should culminate in this form. "If ye abide in My Word, then are ye my disciples." According to these words the real test of discipleship consists in abiding in God's word. To abide means to dwell—to stay, in a place. To abide in God's word means to live in it. Abiding in God's word implies such study of it as will cause the minister to be at home in the Word under all the circumstances of life. It is Bible study upon our knees, study whose sweet influence follows throughout the trials and toils of the day and accompanies us through the wakeful hours of the night. In his picture of the blessed man the Psalmist is careful to say that "His delight is in the law of the Lord, and in his law does he meditate day and night." Such a study of the Word awakens to a sense of spiritual need. It opens up to a consciousness of the depths of the hidden recesses of sin and misery. It helps a man to see himself as God sees him, and to see God as his loving, faithful Father.

Upon such a study of the Word every minister, if he would be true to himself, and true to his calling, must insist. There

must be time for it. The morning hours seem most generally approved as being best adapted for devotional study of the Bible. But the particular time of day is not a matter of great importance to the earnest soul with whom Bible study has come to be, not a duty, nor a privilege, but a passion. The importance lies in the doing of it regularly, consistently, deliberately, devotionally. We have reason to believe that Jesus studied the Scriptures after this manner. Spirit-filled men cannot be found anywhere apart from such devotional study of the Sacred Volume. That the minister may be spirit-filled, keep spirit-filled and attain constantly increasing capacity for the spirit's indwelling, he must become possessed of a passion for Bible study.

But sustenance, to be in the highest degree helpful must be taken while life is lived in a wholesome atmosphere. That spiritual food may be in the highest degree helpful the spiritual life must draw its breath in a wholesome spiritual atmosphere. Prayer is that atmosphere. No man will study the Bible long, and love it, who does not approach such study in the spirit of earnest prayer. Other books we can study and understand in the power of the intellect alone. But the Word must be spiritually discerned and spiritual discernment comes by prayer only. "Men catch its deep, real meaning only as they cast their helplessness on God's might, and as they sink their ignorance in God's wisdom." To grow spiritually the minister must live the life of fellowship with God which is the life of prayer. Time must be found morning, noon and night to "Lift up mine eyes unto the mountains," and to lift up the heart unto God who is our "Strength and our Redeemer." And through the day, in any need, the minister must be conscious of God's nearness, and he must trust implicitly in His power to help. Thus it comes to pass that his life is elevated to the plane of a holy fellowship with the divine Father, encouraging him to tell Him all his woes, to thank Him for all his joys, to breathe out to Him the deep agonies of the heart, and to realize that every place may serve as an altar and all

the world as a temple. Thus, cultivating the habit of prayer until it becomes one of the principal joys of life to tell Him everything just as a little child delights to tell its mother everything, there is created an atmosphere in which the spiritual life can freely breathe and grow stronger, fuller, richer and more fruitful. In such an atmosphere of prayer, Jesus lived. Just how much of his time he spent upon His knees we cannot know. But we do know that he spent whole nights on the mountain side in prayer and that frequently as he went about doing good He was in the spirit of prayer. Since Jesus found it helpful to live in a prayer atmosphere, and it is inconceivable that he could have lived in any other, how much more important that the minister's constant desire should be to live in a spirit of prayer.

Given spiritual life, health, sustenance of the Word, the atmosphere of prayer, the result is growth. Growth is increasing capacity for work. Work is not ordinarily regarded as having any spiritual significance. Hamilton Wright Mabie in his oration before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Franklin and Marshall College presented strong reasons for regarding work as having a large spiritual influence. The same idea is somewhat differently stated by Ruskin when he says, "Ascending from the lowest to highest, through every scale of human industry, that industry worthily followed, gives peace. Ask the laborer in the field, at the forge, or in the mine; ask the patient, delicate-fingered artisan, or the strong-armed, fiery-hearted worker in bronze, and in marble, and with the colors of light; and none of these, who are true workmen, will ever tell you that they have found the law of heaven an unkind one—that in the sweat of their face they should eat bread, till they return to the ground; nor that they ever found it an unrewarded obedience, if, indeed it was rendered faithfully to the command—'Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might.'" We believe this, though the day may be far distant when it will be generally accepted. But how true this general statement is when applied to the work of the

Christian ministry. Standing on the watch-tower of Zion, delivering his message, testifying for the Master, breaking the bread of life, commending holiness, exalting righteousness, rebuking sin, pleading with the sinner, wrestling in prayer for the triumph of good and the overthrow of evil, encouraging the dying, comforting the sorrowing, pointing all men continually to Christ, instructing youth, sustaining old age, cheering the sick, helping the helpless, caring for the orphan, magnifying the Christ as Lord and Saviour—this is the work of the minister and if this does not serve as a means to spiritual self-culture there is something very seriously wrong within. Either the spiritual life is not there or its growth is being sadly hindered in some way.

So we see that work has a large place in the minister's life and under God's grace and blessing it should stimulate mightily his spiritual growth. In all his work the minister is a "worker together with God." How sacred his work! How exalted his calling! How graciously influential this work must be upon his spiritual life if he is faithful and conscientious in all that he does! Preciousness is added to the thought when it is remembered that the work of the minister is unselfish, consecrated, service. That is the great Christian thought growing ever more brilliantly beautiful and effective as civilization advances toward the fuller freedom and glory of God.

Sustenance by the Word of God, the atmosphere of prayer, the activity of Christian service; these three are presented as the means of spiritual self-culture for the minister, the ultimate object of which must ever be to grow into the likeness of Jesus.

It may be asked, What of self-denial, what of cross-bearing, what of self-discipline? These have their proper place, according to the teaching of Jesus. They are not a negligible quantity by any means. But until a man possesses the divine life and nurtures it in the food of the Word, the atmosphere of prayer, and activity in Christian service, self-denial, cross-

bearing, and self-discipline, will not account for much, just as it does not account for much when a gardener is ever so diligent in destroying weeds and fails to plant and cultivate good seed. It is only in cultivating the good that the rooting up of evil attains significance. "When a heart is motived by the love of God, and a life is inspired by the consciousness of God's presence, the necessary self-denial, self-sacrifice becomes easy."

That the minister should diligently and earnestly devote himself to his own spiritual culture, no one will deny. The importance of it is implied in all that has been said. Scripture emphasizes it in many passages. Reason and common sense demand it. Only thus can the minister hope to become Christ-like, and only as he grows in the Christ-likeness can he hope to grow stronger in influence and power with men for the glory of God.

SHAMOKIN, PA.

VI.

AUTHORITY IN RELIGION.

BY A. C. SHUMAN, D.D.

Our mental nature prompts us to ask many questions. And these questions usually affect all that we hold precious for this life and that to come. Even the non-scientific mind is impressed everywhere with the intention and benevolence and control and careful adjustment of the universe, but it is not satisfied until some practical account of how all things came to be, is furnished. In undertaking to account for the universe at least four great and fundamental questions or problems are faced. In the answer and attempted solutions the various sciences have been developed, and speculative philosophical systems constructed. These problems may be stated in their order: (1) What is the origin of matter. (2) What is the origin of force. (3) How account for the formation and orderly arrangement of the universe. (4) What is the origin of life. Evolution has tried to account for all these things but has failed. Only one satisfactory account has ever been found, and that is the Bible account. Without a Divine revelation we should not have any light upon the solution of the problem of the first great cause of the origin of the heavens and the earth, and life, because the origin of all creation lies beyond the sphere of reason and experience. Why is the Bible account satisfactory? Simply because the Bible narrative and doctrine deals with, and rests upon facts, and therefore speaks with authority. So the mental nature is not satisfied until it is supplied with the facts. The facts in any given case form the ultimate authority in matters of education.

Our moral nature also prompts us to ask many questions, and makes us impatient until they are answered. Certain facts

and truths constitute the moral and spiritual realm, man's most natural sphere. For man is a created spirit in vital union with a material organized body. He is a spirit and has a body. Man was created to hold communion with God and to devote his life and powers to His worship and service. Consciousness of God, then, is the basis of all religion. True religion, must, and does rest upon undisputed facts. From these facts doctrines are derived and from doctrines come experiences, which give rise to conduct and that ends in suitable prospects. All education is important, but religion is our chief concern. This is evident from the many questions that naturally arise and prompt a satisfactory answer. How does it come that sin is universal? What is the character of the being to whom we are responsible? May we trust him or must we be in terror? How are we to know what is right or what is wrong since judgments of men differ and frequently conflict? Are we immortal and is it a happy hereafter which awaits us? Does it depend on anything we do? If so what must we do? Where shall we go for a satisfactory answer to these and many more related inquiries, for we cannot rest till we find some standard of truth which we can regard as infallible. Where are we to find it? "In your reason" says one, "In the Church" says another, "In the Bible" says a third, and the decisions we reach determine whether we shall be rationalists, Romanists or Protestants.

But even back of all these there must be, and is an ultimate standard of right, and ultimate source of rights. The very use of the term authority implies the existence of a final ethical standard, either *original* or *delegated*, but both are nevertheless real. Christ says, "All Authority has been given unto me in heaven and earth." From these words and other similar passages of Scripture we can trace Authority, as delegated, back to its original source whence it is derived. We might expect our Lord to define religion, but he does not do so in so many words. From His teachings, however, we learn that religion is the bond of union which unites—reunites—God and

man: that man is the subject of religious feelings and experiences, and God the sole object of religious worship and adoration. Taking religion as a term of relation, God and man as the two chief factors, Christ shows what are the essentials of right relations between them. He came not to reveal anything new, but to fulfill all law defining man's duty and right relations with God.

In the consideration of the relations existing between God and man, our Lord duly recognises the unity of the soul: (1) *The Understanding*: "And this is life eternal, that they should *know* thee the only true God, and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ" (John. 17: 3). (2) *The emotions*: "Thou shalt *love* the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind; thou shalt *love* one another even as I have *loved* you." (3) *The will*: "Not everyone that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that *doeth the will* of my Father who is in heaven." The will must control the conduct. Christ then finds the ultimate standard of right in God's nature as expressed through God's will. The will of God is the standard of right and authority to which everything is to be referred. So God's will is the fountain and source of all particular rights. Man may as a free creature be an original source of power, but never of rights. His rights are *derived*, but nevertheless real.

Authority is of three kinds, *legislative*, *judicial* and *executive*.

Legislative authority is concerned with *duty* either as required or forbidden. To know what is true shall we go to Church councils, creeds or catechisms? To know what is right shall we consult human reason, private opinions or public sentiment? If so, then what council, creed or catechism; whose reason or what private opinion; who is to define duty and rights and tell what is true? Who is best fitted to prescribe for the conscience? Certainly, He alone who is the author of it. God is in the absolute sense Lord of the

conscience. To him it belongs to say, "Thou shalt" and "Thou shalt not." He alone can determine the relations between himself and his creature. He must define duties. Hence the preceptive portions of the Old Testament. And "every Scripture inspired of God is also profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for instruction, which is in righteousness that the man of God may be complete, furnished completely unto every good work. The Scriptures mediated by Moses and the prophets was the law and authority for Christ. Notice the reply of Christ when tempted by the devil. Quoting from Deuteronomy 8: 3, He says: "Man doth not live by bread only, but by everything that proceedeth out of the mouth of Jehovah doth man live." "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, if one rise from the dead" (Luke 16: 31). The Bible then is the book of duty and character for Christ and for every man. All questions both of creed and conduct are to be determined by it.

The Bible is an Organism.—It is a Divine-human book in which man does all and God does all. Forty different writers, sixty-six different books, sixteen hundred years of writing and yet the several books stand in designed relation to one body of truth, and the whole body is *animated by one Spirit*. The Old Testament is the record of the revelation of redemption in its earlier, typical form, or as the law, pointing toward a coming Redeemer. The New Testament opens with the realization of this hope in the person of Jesus, and continues as the Gospel setting forth Christ, the Redeemer, already come, in fulfillment of the law. The whole Bible is God's message. Through it there is one increasing progressive purpose. The Gospel could not have been without the law, which was a preparation for it, and law would have been a failure without the Gospel. The two Testaments make up one complete revelation of the divine religion of salvation through Christ, and are designed to be an official and authentic communication to make known the way of Salvation. The Bible is a uni-

versal book containing all and the only known legislative precepts in the moral world. As an offspring of the divine mind and an expression of the divine will the Bible has sole legislative authority, and is infallible.

Judicial Authority.—Judicial authority has to do with the truth, interpretation, or what one is to believe comes in here. Legislative authority has to do with the *conscience*. Judicial with the *understanding*. The authority Christ uses in the Gospels is judicial and not legislative, and yet He prescribes laws and commandments to the conscience. The exercise of authority by Jesus on earth was practical. He claimed other men for himself. They were, however, such as the Father had given him (Jno. 17: 9, 24). It was that authority then which only the morally right and the perfectly good have to exercise over all moral beings. The moral and practical authority of Jesus is never legal. We cannot take the letter in which it was expressed and regard it as a statute. In the case of the rich young man (Mark 10: 17, 22), Jesus said: "Go, sell whatsoever thou hast, and give to the poor: . . . and come, follow me." We know that this is not intended to be of general application. Jesus is our authority, but his words are not our statutes. We are not under law, but under grace. Conduct must be determined by no other motive than that of love.

Jesus Christ has authority as teacher, revealer, and life-giver. At this point some of the greatest controversies and keenest discussions have been involved. The controversy turns on the deity of Christ. Does he have authority as God? Recent writers claim to find four reasons for the alleged religious decline. They say that it is due to the same reason which brought on the financial panic: viz., a lack of confidence. (1) A lack of faith in the Bible as the inspired word of God. (2) A lack of faith in the Sabbath as a divinely appointed day of spiritual rest and communion with God. (3) A lack of faith in the Church as a divine institution. (4) A lack of faith in the deity and authority of Jesus Christ.

For a satisfactory answer to this last statement we must turn to Jesus himself as he is presented to us in the Gospel. The authority of Jesus is vested not in external credentials but in what he is in himself. In the first place the Bible unmistakably declares Christ to be the Son of God. And the Bible is true. (Luke 1: 35.) "And the Angel answered and said unto Mary. The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee; wherefore also the holy thing which is begotten shall be called the Son of God." In the next place Jesus fulfilled the prophecy and thus is the Messiah of the Old Testament. (Matt. 2: 15, Luke 4: 17, 2.) But the interesting thing for us to know is that Jesus claimed to be equal with God. And not only so but framed an argument to prove it and brought witnesses to substantiate it. All this found, for instance, in the fifth chapter of John. Again and again Jesus had been asked to show a sign from Heaven. He was also asked to tell "by what authority doest thou these things? or Who is he that gave thee this authority? In Matt. 11: 27, Jesus says, "All things have been delivered unto me of my Father. . . . Neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him."

But Jesus "Called God his *own* Father, making himself equal with God." (1) *On the grounds of divine knowledge.* John 5: 19. Christ has the will to do nothing of himself but what he seeth the Father doing. Jesus and the Father are one indivisible essence, and their acts are absolutely inseparable. He that doeth the things that the Father doeth in like manner cannot himself be less than God. (2) *Jesus has divine power.* John 5: 21. "For as the Father raiseth the dead and giveth them life, even so the Son also giveth life to whom he will." Either Physical or Spiritual quickening is the prerogative of God alone. If the Son can give life to whom he will can he be less than God? (3) *Jesus proves his deity by divine authority.* John 5: 22. The Father hath given all judgment unto the Son. Judgment is the preroga-

gative of God alone and if all judgment hath been given unto the Son can he be less than God? The important inference and distinct application is there made in the twenty-third verse. "That all may honor the Son, even as they honor the Father. He that honoreth not the Son, honoreth not the Father that sent him." Now the world acknowledges that Christ's name is above every human name; that his life is the model life; his worth overshadows the world's wealth. The world together with the Unitarian, the Christian Scientist, the Theosophist, the educated Pagan and even the so-called New Theology will acknowledge Christ's divinity. But by his divinity they will mean only that which is meant when your divinity and mine is spoken of. But we are to honor the Son as God. "All authority has been given unto him in heaven and in earth. Not to honor the Son is to be an idolater since he is not worshipping the God who hath revealed himself in the Bible.

Apparently there are four Christs known to men, but there is only one living Christ, who has created Christianity, and who is the object of the faith of the Christian Church. (1) There is the man who was born at the beginning of this era in Palestine, and gathered a body of disciples, and produced a profound impression on the people, and was credited with the various miracles; and left behind him certain marvelous sayings and was at last crucified. It is necessary that an intelligent person should have these facts in his mind, for without an actual basis of facts the life and Christ dissolves into a dream. But the knowledge of this Christ has no more authority and spiritual effect upon the human race than a biography of Alexander, or of Socrates, or of Washington. This is the historical Christ.

(2) The second Christ has touched the imagination of the finest minds of the race and has floated before them as a very lovely and attractive ideal. He looks down upon us from the transfiguration of Raphael. He is the King Authur of Tennyson's Idylls. He lives in the beautiful deeds and

sacrifices of St. Francis. He has done more for the most insensible and unromantic of us than we are aware. But this Christ one knows only as he might admire a piece of art. This Christ has no authority over us. This is the poetical Christ.

(3) Another Christ came to fulfill the covenant of Grace, and render perfect obedience to the eternal law, and expiated the penalty of our sins, and rose again for our justification, and has entered into heaven to be the High Priest of God's House, and shall come again to judge the world. In the progress of time this Christ comes to be little less than a frame on which the embroidered garments of doctrine are laid while beneath their voluminous folds the Nazarene himself is obscured and forgotten. No one can love and honor this lay figure any more than an abstraction of the study. This is the Theological Christ.

(4) But thanks be unto God. There is still a fourth Christ who lies in no grave, who needs no picture or crucifix, who is secluded in no heaven, who revealed himself to the disciples on the way to Emmaus; who rose from his throne to receive the martyr Stephen; who calls upon him to leave all and follow him; who suffers with every Christian that overcomes; who still welcomes Magdalene, and teaches Thomas, and guides Peter and admonishes James and John, and is betrayed by Judas; who still divides human opinion; is adored or misunderstood; is still called Master, or sent to the cross afresh. This is the living, ever-present, effectual, eternal Authoritative Christ.

In this connection the place of the Church with reference to authority comes up for consideration. The authority vested in the Church and exercised by her is a purely judicial authority. The Lord is head and lawgiver. His laws bind the consciences of men. Her sole functions are to declare and to apply the teachings and commandments of Christ. To make new laws or any laws for her own members or for others is beyond her prerogative, which is declarative and unfolding:

declarative to those without. "Go and teach all nations." "Ye shall be my witnesses." Unfolding to those within; "Teach them to observe all things." "Ye are my friends, if ye do the things which I command you."

Here the extreme position and views of the Roman Church present themselves. Romanists regard the church as infallible, and her teachings as authoritative. This cannot be true. For proof of infallibility in any case must be made either to Scripture or tradition. Various sects spring up through different interpretations of Scripture, and claim to be authoritative. No protestant church has an infallible interpretation of Scripture and neither has the Church of Rome. An opinion is one thing. A fact is quite another. The Christian religion rests on facts and the facts are revealed to us in the Bible. We may assent to an opinion or not as we please. But if we neglect a fact we only advertise our stupidity. This difference may be illustrated.

The Bible teaches that only God can forgive sins. Rome says the priest can. The Bible says worship God only. Rome says worship the virgin Mary too. The Bible teaches there is one mediator. Rome says every priest is a mediator. The Bible says Christ offered himself once for all. Rome pretends to repeat the eucharist. The Bible says we are justified by faith. Rome says we are justified by baptism. If the Church is infallible and her teachings authoritative and the Bible is infallible and authoritative we have two contradictions. But the incarnate word sets his seal on the written word. The incarnate word is God. Therefore the Bible is authenticated by God himself. The Church and the individual does not always arrive at a knowledge of truth and right. Hence the final standard is the teachings of prophets, apostles, and Christ.

The supreme norm for every man is within himself. Christ gave the fullest recognition to the right of private judgment. He set up his claims before the bar of individual reason and conscience, so that every man might verify for himself the

truth of a proposition before assenting to it. Conclusions reached in the exercise of this prerogative cannot be dictated by any form of external compulsion. Men are left free with his claims. When Pilate asked, "Art thou the King of the Jews?" Jesus answered, "My kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight." Christ's kingdom is not of this world. If it were then force would be used.

So Christ disapproved the compulsion of a tyrannical public or ecclesiastical opinion. A man may say he needs no other revelation than the light of his own intellect. In this case he makes reason the source of knowledge. Or he may say that conceding the Bible contains divine revelations he will receive nothing which he cannot comprehend or which conflicts with his sense of right. Thus reason again is made the criterion of truth. But in the case at his baptism Christ denies to human reason the prerogative to annul or declare or set aside or to pass judgment upon the propriety or expediency of divine prescriptions. Jesus came to fulfill law. The reason is not intended to sit in judgment on the contents of Scripture, but must be allowed to weigh the evidence and come to a conclusion. This takes into account that men may, and will arrive at correct judgments. One thing is sure a man must abide by the decisions he has reached. (John 8: 24.) "Except ye believe that I am he, ye shall die in your sins."

Finally, there is *executive authority* in Religion. As the exalted head of the Church Christ exercises executive authority in the Church. The Book of Acts is the record of the personal action of the ascended Savior. The action and authority of the Lord is manifest in each event and advance of the Church. His action appears in the scenes on the Day of Pentecost. "If I go away I will send the Comforter unto you." The only vicar of the Lord Jesus Christ on earth is the Holy Spirit. "For he shall take of mine and shall declare it unto you. He shall glorify me." He convicts of

sin, of righteousness, and of judgment, and guides into all truth. The Church, then, is commissioned with judicial and executive authority. And the one great executive of the Godhead is the Holy Spirit.

The ultimate authority for every man is God's nature as expressed in his revealed will. Men are not saved by bare intellectual assent to a creed, doctrine, or proposition. Faith must terminate on a person. "He that hath the Son hath the life." "Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of God." The truth which has been lodged in our hearts is to become a living force. Each individual, being a repository of judicial authority, so also he is to be an executive agent of the Godhead. Men exist for the doing of the will of God whether as creatures or as Christians. The end of Christ's whole teaching function was to set men doing, and to guide them in doing, the will of God. The ultimate standard of right for every man is in God's nature as expressed in his revealed will. God's will is the most desirable thing in the universe. He wishes it done in himself. Not only in himself but everywhere and in every person and thing. God's best friend in the world is the man who will put his life in touch with God, and quietly, day by day claim in Jesus' name, that God's will shall be done. Yielding to, and doing the will of God is the end of life.

TIFFIN, OHIO.

VII.

A NEW DEFENSE OF THEISM.

1 BY S. S. HEBBERD.

I.

True theism has always had a hard struggle for existence. But just now certain well-known conditions are rendering that struggle unusually severe. In many churches a "new theology," plainly pantheistic, is preached. In most others any kind of theology is evidently an unwelcome visitor hovering timidly in the dim background. In common, everyday life, the thought of God seems to be slowly but surely passing into oblivion.

Such a state of affairs certainly suggests the need of new defenses for theistic belief. Hence I venture to offer such a defense, one not only new but impregnable. It must have, of course, a metaphysical basis; but one that I hope to make plain enough to be readily comprehended by any average mind. That basis is as follows:

The specific function of all thinking, as distinct from mere feeling is to discriminate between cause and effect.

Substance and Attribute.—I have to prove the above thesis concerning the nature of thought in all its three grand divisions, perception, conception and reason or inference. But first a word concerning those feelings of resemblance and its opposite—automatically associated by some mechanism within—which are given to man and brute alike. Indeed the brutes even surpass us in their power of detecting these similarities; witness for instance a dog tracking the footprints of his prey. Now the great stumbling-block of modern philosophy has been the tendency to fall back from the perplexities of the causal

problem upon these mere feelings of resemblance as a sure resting-place. We see that even in the case of Descartes; he founds his "problematic idealism" upon the fact that "often effects are not like their causes." And in Berkeley's system still more obtrusively everything hinges upon this fallacy of resemblance. Again and again he pleads that "an idea can be like nothing but an idea."¹ Once indeed he has a glimpse of the real truth that qualities are related to the things as effects to their cause or partial cause. But he rejects that curtly, on the ground that things are inert and therefore cannot be causes.

Then Hume came with his famous problem of causality, one which, according to Höffding, "Kant was unable to solve and which indeed is insoluble." Hence Kant was forced to altogether discard causation in any proper sense of the term. Instead thereof he substitutes a series of mere effects—motions, events, qualities and other appearances—conjoined only by an illusory and subjective necessity of thinking them conjoined. This Kantian substitution of a series of effects for true causation must be remembered; for it ever since has formed the basis and essence of all anti-theistic argument.

Kant's successors, equally unable to answer Hume, also discarded causation; with Hegel it is naught but one of those self-contradictory categories through which thought is doomed to pass on its way upward to "the Idea." The causal conviction thus paralyzed, free play was given to the fallacy of resemblance, the feeling of likeness and unlikeness. Especially among the Hegelians, new or old, the formula of identity and difference is the key to all the mysteries of the universe. Now it is the very essence of these pseudo-relations that they should be vague, incoherent and self-contradictory; it is equally true that anything is *like* everything else and that it is *not like it*. No real thinking emerges until we specify upon what the likeness or unlikeness *depends*; in other words until you convert the mere feeling of resemblance into a causal relation. But confine yourself to the vague formula of identity

¹ "Principles of Human Knowledge," § 8, also 9, 18, 33, etc.

and difference, then it is easy enough to reduce the universe to a mirage of phantoms and self-contradictions.

Apply this now to the relation of the thing and its attributes. The two terms of this relation are given by sense, together, undiscriminated; thought separates and re-unites them as cause and effect. Is it objected that the thing is not the complete cause of any attribute? That is granted; no finite thing is a complete and sufficient cause; but it is a permanent factor in each and all the various causal processes by which its attributes are severally produced. Do you object, with Berkeley and the rest, that when the attributes are taken away nothing remains? The answer is that likewise when you take away the thing the attributes perish; either a cause without effects or an effect without a cause is but a half-thought, a snare and a delusion. Do you still insist that isolated attributes, a patch of color for instance, are given by sense? The answer must be a flat denial. The patch of color is never given except as automatically associated with a colored object by that mechanism of sense which belongs to man and brute alike.

My view then seems to fully satisfy all the conditions of the problem. It is further confirmed by the glare of light which it throws upon those theories which conceive the thing as naught but the sum of its attributes. Idealists are prone to regard themselves as having risen above the "naïve realism" of common minds. But in fact they have *descended* from thought to feeling. Having discarded causality they have had no resource but to fall back upon mere feelings of resemblance—pseudo-relations of "identity and difference," the very essence of which is vagueness, incoherence and self-contradiction.

Concepts.—Here we are at once confronted by that futile dispute between the Nominalists and the Conceptualists, the one insisting that a universal means only an imaginary collection of resembling things, the other of resembling attributes. Here again we have only that old fallacy of resemb-

lance which makes philosophic progress impossible. Thrusting it aside we turn to that most splendid triumph of Greek thought—Plato's insight that the essence of a concept consists in its being at once *invariable* and a *cause*. In those pre-scientific times he could not fully unify his thought; but that task is made for us an easy one by the revelations of modern science concerning the causal processes of nature. We can see that a concept means something more than a heap of vague similarities, that its deepest meaning points straight to the *invariable process of causation* whereby these similarities are produced.

Take, for example, one of the most universal of concepts, weight. The fall of a stone, although an infinitely varying motion changing its velocity and its real direction in every infinitesimal instant of time, is yet the product of an absolutely invariable process of causation. So with the infinite variety of color; so everywhere.

Bare inspection, then, proves that a concept is essentially the indication of a causal process and its products. Many subsidiary proofs not to be detailed here are given in my "*Philosophy of History*." For example scientific classification: as Darwin says: "Naturalists in their search for a true or natural system of classification have always been unconsciously-guided *not by mere resemblance*, but by the principle of inheritance"²—that is, by the process of production. So in the history of language: linguistic roots almost always signify familiar processes of causation attended with visible results.³

Now contrast this theory with others. In one place, indeed Hegel has a glimpse of the truth; he says that the true universal is not merely some common element in all of a kind; it is their ground, their substance. But he soon sails away on the wings of his metaphor about the organism; the concept proves finally to be but the "totality" or the "articulated whole" of

² "Origin of Species," Chap. XIV.

³ M. Muller, "Science of Thought," 30, 31.

self-contradictory parts. But my view is not a metaphor; it does not oblige us to regard the universe as an animal or a vegetable; it is plain, solid, scientific fact.

Or turn to Lotze who finally decides that the universal cannot claim to be called an idea "in any ordinary sense of that term." Concepts are "only short expressions of logical problems whose solution cannot be compressed into the form of an idea."⁴ And so to save himself from the pit of the crudest Nominalism, he seeks the frail support of "intuition," of "aesthetic values" and "faith."⁵

Cause and Reason.—Here, it will be urged, your thesis certainly fails; cause and reason cannot be identified. Bradley devotes a chapter of his *Logic* to proving their essential difference, but the gist of his whole argument is given in a single illustration he uses. "Two coins," he says, "are proved to have similar conceptions because they each are like to a third. But the cause is not found in this interrelation. The cause is their origin from a common die." But surely that is foolishness. Here are two very different facts, one physical and one psychical, two coins and our belief in their similarity. How could any one in his senses expect that two such different results could have the same causes?

A less absurd argument, however, is this: cause refers to changes or events, but reason to eternal and immutable truths. But that overlooks the fact that these immutable truths are universal judgments and therefore refer to a matter infinitely *variable*. The geometer's theorem, for instance, does not refer solely to the one triangle shown in the diagram but to an infinite host of all possible triangles varying in length of sides, size of angles and position. So that argument fails.

Another argument, much emphasized by Bosanquet, is that reason and consequent, unlike cause and effect, are interconvertible; the equilaterality of a triangle, for instance, is a reason for inferring its equiangularity, and conversely. But

⁴ "Logic," p. 24.

⁵ Jones, "Philosophy of Lotze."

here we have again that great error—already described as the tap-root of modern agnosticism—the failure to distinguish the necessary co-existence or sequence of two *effects* from the *cause* of their co-existence or sequence. The equiangularity and the equilaterality are necessarily co-existent, hence either one may be inferred from the other. But as even Bosanquet concedes “the nature of space is not only the ground but the cause” of that co-existence.

There does not seem then to be the slightest proof of any contrariety between reason and cause. Reason is simply one kind or rather one variety of cause—the cause of normal belief.

The Solution of Hume's Problem.—We have proved then that the essence of all thinking—in its three forms of perception, conception and reason—is a relating of cause and effect. But does not that still leave it possible to regard causation as only, in Hume's phrase—“a feigning of the mind”? I answer emphatically: No! For mark, if the essence of thought is what I have proved it to be, then the cancelling of causality logically involves not merely the extinction of all knowledge, but of all *thinking*. One may perchance be content, as Hume seems to have been, with the former, the denial of all knowledge, or absolute skepticism. But sane thought cannot cancel that the cancelling of which logically involves the collapse and extinction of all thinking—all questions of true or false, even of existence or non-existence. That would be suicide indeed; something like a man's cutting off his own head in order to inspect the brains within.

II.

The Ontological Proof of God's Existence.—By such a proof I understand an argument derived from the very nature of all existence as being either cause or effect. Kant's alleged “refutation” of this ontological proof has been a mighty power for evil in that he did succeed in casting such a cloud of suspicion around it that many good theists—such as Flint, for example—seem disposed to forsake it and put their trust in

stead in Hegel's "organic" metaphor which logically leads only to pantheism. But Kant was wise enough to see that the ontological argument was the basis of all other proofs: if that went down, they went with it.

The gist of Kant's refutation is presented in these words (wherein he follows Hume very closely): "I find myself unable to form the slightest conception of a thing which when annihilated in thought with all its predicates leaves behind it a contradiction."⁶ Possibly that assertion may be true concerning all other objects of thought, it is certainly not true of a Sufficient Cause. For I have proved in the first part of this essay that to annihilate the conception of causality would involve the contradiction of all other conceptions, the complete collapse and extinction of all thinking. Kant goes on to argue that the proof of any objective reality must be based upon principles of possible experience and not upon the principle of analysis or contradiction. But to cancel any sufficient cause is of course to cancel all effects; and therefore, as I have shown, to invalidate not merely some special bit of experience but all possible experience whatsoever.

In fine, Kant's easy triumph over the schoolmen and Descartes was due to their unhappy mode of stating the ontological argument. To prove the existence of their *ens realissimum* would virtually amount to proving the existence of the most existent existence. That was not only preposterous in itself, but it also buried out of sight the real point at issue. That point to be proved was that when man began to think there necessarily rose within him some dim consciousness that for all this vast complex of changes, motions and other effects before him there must be a complete and sufficient cause.

Leaving thus Kant and his refutation behind us, we go on to ask: What else concerning this sufficient cause can be determined from the very nature of being and thought? I answer first, that it must be Infinite: for, whatever is finite or limited demands another to account for its limitation and therefore could be only an insufficient or partial cause. Secondly, it

* "Critique of Pure Reason," 446.

must be One. That indeed is implied in its infinitude; furthermore, if there were many causes, something else would be required for their co-ordination and so each would come short of being an altogether complete and sufficient cause. The necessity of here stating these proofs so compactly, of course, gives an easy opening for cavils. But, trusting myself to the sagacity and fair-mindedness of the reader, I pass on to the most supremely important phase of the ontological argument.

Third, a sufficient cause must be a *self-sacrificing* one. For only thus can an adequate motive be assigned for the creation of the universe. The Infinite has need of nothing: if it did have needs, then its activity in supplying them would spring from something lacking and alien to itself, and so it would no longer be in itself a complete and sufficient cause. Therefore creative activity on the part of the Infinite can be rationally conceived only as a self-sacrificing effort for the sake of others.

I claim no originality for this last insight. On the contrary some more or less dim idea of creation as necessarily an act of self-sacrifice, is one of the oldest treasures of human thought. Traces of it are to be found in the Vedas, and in the Scandinavian Edda; in fact it is the gold in all the dross of primitive sacrifice. Even the skeptical Sankhya philosophy of India declares, "Every intelligent being acts either from self-interest or beneficence. . . ."⁷ A creator who has all that he can desire has no interest in creating anything. The demiurge would be unjust and cruel." Here the principle is taken for granted, but creation is denied on the pessimistic ground that it would not be a beneficent act. Indian poetry, however, took a more optimistic view. Thus Krishna is made to say: "Look at me Arjuna! If I stop from work for one moment the whole universe will die. Yet I have nothing to gain from the universe. I am one Lord."⁸ But why do I work? Because I love the world."

⁷ "Rig-Veda," X., 90, 16. Also, "Brhaddevata," Harvard Or. Series, II., 369.

I have then but restored a conception which has always been recognized—although in dim, imperfect forms—by the human consciousness. If that conception now seems strange or even incredible, it is because modern philosophy—unable to answer Hume—has robbed the conviction of causality of its real meaning and power. The word cause is glibly used, but nothing is meant but a sequence or coexistence of effects. And so modern life has been taught to worship not the cause, but the effects—not the Creator but the created universe.

The Cosmological Argument.—The ontological proof stands by itself, needing the support of no other. The chief value of the cosmological proof is, therefore, I think, to ward off misconceptions that imperil theistic belief. But the most of these seem to spring from that primal fallacy which confounds a mere sequence of effects with their cause; and as we have already dwelt upon that enough we need not reconsider it here. But if any reader is not satisfied let him turn, for instance, to the long and labored argument in Professor Taylor's "*Metaphysics*," that all causation is a delusion, on the ground of its continuity and the indefinite regress.⁹ The answer to it is, of course, that a sufficient cause is something different from the mere sequence of its effects.

Of late, indeed, this antipathy to causation is assuming the most fantastic forms. Professor Royce, for example, declares that "the unhappy slavery of metaphysicians of the past to the conception of causation has been responsible for some of the most fatal of the misfortunes of religion and humanity."¹⁰ Freed from such bondage himself, he finds the world to be a dream and deifies man as a "part" of God.

But Hegel himself, I think, was much nearer the truth than these recent disciples are. His dialectic which they seem generally inclined to thrust aside, really needs but a slight modifying to make it very useful. For its principle simply

⁹ Ragozin, "Vedic India," 382, and Menzies, "Hist. Religions," 68.

¹⁰ "Metaphysics," 271 seq.

¹¹ "The World and the Individual," I., 444.

is that every truth is a synthesis of two elements each of which taken apart from the other is illusive and self-contradictory. Now this principle when restricted to relations of cause and effect is entirely correct. For, as I have proved, every form of thinking is, in its essence a relating of cause and effect: and yet each of these elements when taken apart from the other is unthinkable and absurd; a cause without any effects or an effect without any cause, either of these is nonsense. Let us note now some of the errors which Hegel might have avoided, if he had fully understood his own method.

First, the pantheistic identifying of God and the world. "Without the world God is no God."¹¹ But in saying that, Hegel overlooks the distinction between the two terms of a synthesis—God is the cause of the world. For always cause and effect differ as follows: If the cause is annihilated the predicates vanish; but the cause endures even when its predicates disappear provided that others take their place. Precisely that is the relation between God and the world. The latter might be blotted out and still God would exist; other activities would be possible—self-consciousness and what else, we may not know.

Second, God's personality. The real proof of that lies in the ontological argument already given; for the proved existence of an Infinite Cause acting self-sacrificing for the sake of others, gives the very highest type of personality that can be conceived. And the difficulty due to identifying God and the world has just been considered and cancelled. But in making God the cause of all, do we not deny the activity of finite things, and so their very existence? By no means: they still exist, have their special activities in the causal processes maintained by the Infinite. Hence we are not driven—like Professor Bowne and others—to absurdly ascribe to the finite only a sort of "non-existent existence."¹²

Third, the Problem of Evil. I am not so foolish as to pretend to solve off-hand, in a few lines, an enigma that has

¹¹ Hegel, "Philosophy of Religion," I., 200.

¹² Bowne, "Metaphysics," 101.

baffled all human genius. Still, my method does seem to me to throw a great deal of light upon this darkness. For one of the first principles of scientific method is that it is always hazardous to reason from effects to causes; and yet almost all reasoning upon the problem of evil has been of that character. Thinkers looking out on the entangled, immeasurable complex of existence, have tried to strike a balance between its good and evil, its joy and sorrow; and from these effects to decipher the character of the cause. But that is an impossible task. Always our estimates will vary according to our temperaments and even our moods. But reverse this procedure; from our demonstration of what is involved in the very thought of a sufficient cause, pass to the effects—to a survey of the world even in its deepest gloom. Then the mystery of pain slowly yields to the conviction that Infinite Love is behind it all, and midnight turns into some faint dawn, at least, of day.

The Teleological Proof.—Kant long ago showed that the ordinary argument from design does not fully sustain the theistic conviction. I believe that to make that argument really effective there must be a vast widening out of its scope and tenor. I have prepared the way for this expansion by proving that every concept, every word known to human speech is, in its true and deepest meaning, the assertion of some causal process; and that these processes must be conceived as originated and sustained by an infinite self-sacrificing Cause of all. To deny that, logically involves the extinction of thought.

This understood, the argument from design widens wonderfully. We shall no longer be content to grope about for some few stray indications of utility or contrivance in Nature; we shall find in all the countless causal processes going on everywhere around us the constant revelation of Infinite wisdom and love. It is a sad spectacle, this long wrangle between the scientist and the theologian, one contending for "mechanism," the other for "teleology." Neither remembers that Aristotle, the very man who invented these causal distinctions, emphatically taught that there was no essential difference

between them—that the mechanical or efficient cause and the final cause or end were really but two aspects of the same thing seen from different points of view.¹³

Let me adduce still higher authority for this identifying of mechanism and teleology. Hosts of thinkers have regarded the absolute uniformity of physical processes as a proof that Nature is unmoral, indifferent to right or wrong. But Jesus did not think so. On the contrary he takes this unswerving uniformity of Nature as his chosen symbol and proof of God's love. "He maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust."

Human freedom is another conception indispensable to genuine theism. Recent philosophy seems to hold "teleology" in very high favor, and yet it generally obliterates all real purposes by describing them not as freely chosen but as fatalistically forced upon us by environment, heredity or character. This determinism, however, is too subtle and sinuous a theme to be discussed as the fag-end of an essay already, perhaps, covering too wide a field. To this extent, then, our defense of theism is left incomplete. I am certain however that the true proof of human freedom must start from the fundamental principle here established. Man by showing himself capable of conscious, premeditated self-sacrifice, proves that he is indeed made in the image of God—is, in the limited sphere of his own little life, a sufficient although very finite cause.

In closing let me repeat that what has been demonstrated in these pages has always been dimly discerned by faith. But now there is everywhere a more urgent demand for strict proof, a growing distrust of sentimentalism and empty phrases, of frantic appeals to "intuitions," "consciousness," "the will to believe" and other forms of obscurantism. These new conditions must be met, if theism is to survive. Furthermore, in all ages the noblest faith has ever claimed to rest upon a solid basis of knowledge. To *know* God—"this is life" eternal.

MASPETH, L. I.

¹³ Ritter, "Hist. Ancient Philosophy," III., 141.

VIII.

CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT IN GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA.

BY REV. A. S. WEBER, D.D.

ALTERED RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES.

In connection with the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Rev. Dr. George A. Gordon's pastorate in the Old South Church, Boston,¹ there were delivered several months ago, a number of important addresses dealing with varied aspects of religious thought and life. These addresses have been brought together and published recently in a form that should commend most of them to the attention of the Christian public. The most notable of them is perhaps that on "Changes in Thought in Twenty-five Years" by the Rev. Williston Walker, D.D., professor of church history in the Yale Divinity School. He brings to the discussion of his subject the scholarly mind which is acquainted with what has been taking place in the world of thought during the last quarter of a century, and the discriminating judgment of a trained and impartial historian—an equipment by which he has furnished us in these pages a most illuminating and satisfactory summary of the progress religious thought has meanwhile made under the stimulating impulse and guidance of modern "forces of change."

Whilst writing sympathetically of this progress, Professor Walker is by no means unmindful of the fact that the period in which it was achieved, has been one full of anxiety, per-

¹ Twenty-fifth Anniversary Record of Dr. George A. Gordon's Pastorate over the Old South Church, Boston. The Pilgrim Press.

plexity and pain for many Christians. Periods of transition and theological reconstruction are always painful. "For many," he observes, "it has been one of much more than pain." The removal of what they regarded as belonging to the very foundations, sorely tried their faith and hope, even though they trusted "that the removing of those things that are shaken" was divinely intended "that those things which cannot be shaken may remain." Like other devout scholars of to-day, Dr. Walker finds it impossible not to cherish tenderest sympathies for those passing through such experiences. And what stirs his feelings even more is his consciousness that we have as yet come to no completion of the process of sifting and reconstruction. "We are still in the midst of the onward flow, even if the main characteristics of the newer-theological structure may now be regarded as approaching fixity."

At the same time, however, he regards the process of doctrinal reconstruction necessary on the one hand, and helpful to the faith on the other hand. "Amid all the perplexing changes," he reminds us, "the mighty essentials of Christian discipleship—loyalty to Christ our Lord, filial love toward God our Father, brotherly helpfulness toward our fellowmen, the achievement of Christian character, the blessedness of Christian service—all stand forth in a clearness never before surpassed. And in his opinion this is due in no small measure to the bold and courageous work of those who, feeling the old slipping away, have dared to formulate our faith in altered intellectual statements, and in constructive expression suited to our age. Often suspected and disparaged, sometimes maligned and persecuted, these present-day prophets of the truth have known how to restate the verities of the Gospel which are abiding and eternal, in terms to which the conscience can now assent, and in thought-forms adapted to the requirements of this new age. However widely sundered in doctrinal interpretation from the advocates of traditional conceptions of Christian doctrine, these heralds of the truth as seen in the new light and set forth in new forms, are them-

selves linked, and are linking their followers, in Christian experience with that of the Christian discipleship of all the ages. In this lies the significance of their ministry, in this they find their joy and their reward.

Instead of allowing ourselves the use of more space for general remarks on Dr. Walker's address, let us mention several of the particular points instanced by him to show the contrasts between present and former conceptions and attitudes in regard to matters of faith. "One momentous change," he says, "that has come into the apprehension of the churches in this recent period is the practical obliteration of that line once so sharply drawn between the natural and the supernatural." In connection with this change has come the recognition of God as in and of his world, immanent in all its on-goings and development; not simply as one sovereignly efficient over it, as the creator over the creation he has made. Fostered as this great transformation in thought has been, by the growth of an idealistic philosophy, it is unquestionably attended by perils. Just as the old divine transcendence was in danger of passing into Deism, so Pantheism sometimes lurks near the divine immanence. "But no great point of view," our author correctly declares, "can be free from the possibility of perversion. And be the peril of Pantheism real or no, a wholly new view of the relation of God to his world has silently won its way." This to his mind is the most fundamental alteration that has come into present-day thought. In place of being exalted high above a world separate from him, whose every act he yet arbitrarily controls, revealed in miracle and theophany to ages long past, the new conception regards God as One who is in and of his world, in a true sense its life, manifesting himself in uniform law in what we call nature, revealing his moral purpose through man, who is the best expression of his character, and above all in the holiest of men, our Lord Jesus Christ.

This tendency to a new interpretation of the nature of God and of his relation to the universe, together with the empha-

sis of his immanent self-expression through humanity and the obliteration of the line between the natural and the supernatural, has resulted in profoundly modifying traditional conceptions of the person of Christ. "In traditional orthodoxy," our author notes, "his divinity was practically exalted at the expense of his humanity, however fully his oneness with men was theoretically asserted." In the altered view, wrought by the thought of the last quarter of a century, "Christ is seen to be not the perfect God mysteriously joined with perfect man, but the perfect revelation of God in all those divine attributes which are capable of expression in a human life, because the highest manifestation of a humanity through which God has been forever revealing himself." In seeing Christ we perceive both what God is and what man may be. We see that his office is no less unique, his character no less exalted, the reverence we pay him no less profound, because we have in him humanity's crowning manifestation, which is, just because it is such, our most majestic revelation of the character of God.

Accompanying this changed view of Christ's person, we have as its corollary, a new conception of the nature and place of man. "The older Calvinistic view of man," Professor Walker writes, "as wholly depraved and alienated from God by nature, powerful a century ago, had indeed become attenuated by the beginning of the period which we now consider. None among us would then have asserted, as Jonathan Edwards did, that 'wicked men are useful in their destruction only,' or as was declared in the early days of the American Missionary Board, 'that the heathen were dropping hopelessly into hell.'" Bushnell by his book on *Christian Nurture*, Channing by his assertion of the dignity of human nature, Robertson and Maurice by declaring that all men are the sons of the Father, have made their several contributions for effecting the significant transformation with regard to our view of man. But most of all in this matter we owe, according to Dr. Walker, "to our changed conception of God himself, who

hateth nothing that he hath made, who must reach forth with fatherly pity to all his children, not to a chosen people or an elect few, but to all to whom he has given life and made in his image." This new conception does not oblige us to regard men as needing the grace of God less than the old view, but it believes that it comprehends the divine attitude toward and estimate of men better, and so commends God to a deeper love and sincerer trust.

Quite as significant as this altered conception of the nature of man and of his relation to God, is the change that has been wrought in the view of that salvation which is the purpose of the Gospel. On this point Dr. Walker's observations seem particularly luminous and forceful, and strictly in line with the best and most effective preaching of our day. He is glad to acknowledge that the development of individual character, the cultivation of personal allegiance and loyalty to Christ, must always be a main purpose of the Christian ministry and of the Church, but, as he says, "it is no longer, as it was, the exclusive purpose." The view that it is the sole business of the ministry and the Church to rescue a select few, one here and another there, from our lost humanity and fit them for the bliss of a future heaven, has been enlarged, and now embraces the world as the object of redemption. "The prayer of the Christian is not that he may escape from it as speedily as God wills, but that God's kingdom may come and his will be done 'in earth as it is in heaven.'" The salvation which is the purpose of the glorious Gospel, it is coming to be seen with increasing clearness, must be great enough not merely to fit some men for bliss in heaven; it must effect a transfiguration of man in all of his relations in this life. "It must make this world, what it is not now, a reign of righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Spirit. The duty of the Church to right ancient wrongs, to foster principles of justice in the relations of man with man and class with class, to further endeavors for social betterment, is now recognized as never before."

RIGHTFUL DEMANDS OF THE CHURCH IN DOCTRINAL
RECONSTRUCTION.

Thus far in its history, the process of theological reconstruction above noticed has been carried forward by individual theologians. Neither in their quest after the truth, nor in their attempt to give literary expression to the conclusions reached, have they had ecclesiastical authority back of them. Like many divinely appointed leaders in other ages, they have been "plowing a lonely furrow," and sowing the seed for a harvest in which only they seemed to have confidence. In the nature of things this is as should have been expected. The attitude of the Church, Roman and Protestant alike, has always been one of unchanging doctrinal conservatism. Unless constrained by the findings of individuals of "light and leading," the Church has not deliberately changed any of its earlier doctrinal formulas. In an interesting article published in the *American Journal of Theology*,² on the question—What has the Church a right to demand in theological reconstruction?—Professor Allan Hoben, of the University of Chicago, suggests that such conservatism of the Church is largely necessary and to that extent unblameworthy. "She holds a trusteeship for humanity, which by every law of justice and every prompting of wisdom, forbids whatever seems a doubtful investment. Hence every important change in her cultus must be made by the self-sacrificial leadership of the few. And so it happens that the Church is often found bravely holding positions, which, being no longer strategic or even necessary, unfortunately withhold her forces from participation in the vast and confident advance of modern thought." The present situation of the Church reminds him of the "squatter whom twenty years of western city growth has surrounded with urban conditions making the water from the well in his yard even dangerous and his flickering lantern quite unnecessary. Water from the Great Lakes and light from the great dynamos are to be received even at some cost to laudable sentiment."

² See Vol. XIII., No. 3, July, 1900, page 414.

There are, at the same time, however, certain rights the Church may demand of theological leaders in the reconstruction of doctrinal statements. "Because of the difficulty of his task the theologian is tempted to one or the other of two opposite and equally unfortunate extremes: that of weak concession, on the one hand, or of scholastic unconcern, on the other. An empirical theology must reckon with the Church as being neither a tyrant nor yet an idiot, but as a mighty factor, past and present, in man's religion. Life is incomplete without religion, and religion in its organized forms. It is less than human not to need sanctuary."

Among the demands the Church can rightly make upon any proposed new theological system, or section of a system, according to the writer of the article under notice, the first is that it shall possess religious vitality. "Any proffered restatement which lacks ground for propagandism, enthusiasm, loyalty, and heroic service," he confidently and justly affirms, "is to be suspected." The Yale theologian, whose views have been above referred to, and other supporters of progressive thought whom he may be taken to represent, would readily accede to the validity of the demand for a reconstruction that shall be vital and inspiring, imperial and irresistibly dynamic. And simply because they see these qualities in the new conceptions of Christian truth, do they desire the Church to take cognizance of them, believing that in so doing increased effectiveness will be brought to its task of promoting the interests of the kingdom of God among men.

Another demand, closely akin to the first, that deserves the most cordial recognition, as specified by Mr. Hoben, is that which asks for "a series of theological symbols consonant with modern culture." Here we are brought face to face with one of the principal difficulties of contemporary Christianity. Not a little of the lamentable religious indifference, the unyielding lethargy so generally deplored by the churches, is unquestionably due to the fact that for large masses of men the old thought-symbols, whether found in sermon, hymn, or

prayer, have not only lost their power of appeal, but have become meaningless and unsatisfying, if not absolutely dead and disgusting. And meanwhile the proposed reconstructed theology has not provided the doctrinal maxims, the liturgical aids for prayer and praise, which are needed to make it properly efficacious. "Catchwords, mental passports, tokens, are needed, whereby the average man, who deeply believes in his theological powers, shall be assured that he is hearing the truth. The reconstructed theology must quicken the intellect, the heart, and the imagination. It must invade the emotional life so as to get itself symbolized in good hymns and tunes. These always mark the high tide of conviction and devotion. And the new theology must by some just means create an emotional high tide that will bring in a flood of new religious poetry and at the same time bear away much of what is now stranded riffraff from the former springtides of Christianity." If it must be confessed, as the writer quoted does, that "here the Lord delays his coming," may we not at the same time look with confidence for the appearance of the inspired religious poets that age needs?

The additional demand, insisted upon as right for the Church to make upon reconstructed thought, is that it shall have an adequate social message. This is in precise correspondence with what we found accentuated under the concluding point of Dr. Walker's description of the transformed conceptions of our faith. We heartily believe with Professor Hoben that the Church must be given a religious sanction or imperative which shall compel her to take a more intentional and significant part in the now conscious struggle of the masses for more just conditions of life. The new thought has no greater service to render the Church than to cause her to cry out and spare not, and as God's appointed umpire to pronounce judgment upon social unrighteousness. It will glorify the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ by inspiring and controlling the profound demand for justice and the humanitarian sentiments of the great middle and sub-middle classes of

society. For want of theological leadership speaking with the accent of conviction, the Church's efforts in these social directions are often judiciously postponed. "But just as the Puritan movement was the Church interpreting religious convictions in the field of politics, so that movement which is trembling at the heart of our half-disappointed democracy, that over-due reaction against a preposterous individualism, that finer realization of brotherhood in all the economic and cultural values of life—that is waiting for the leadership of the Church, when with a ringing social message and self-sacrificing love she emerges from her present humiliating probation. The social movement will be the making of the Church, and the Church will be the making of the social movement. She will illumine, temper, correct, sanction, and exalt; it will create the very issues for which the Church is now sinking into indolent obscurity."

JESUS AND THE GOSPEL.

One of the names to which the lingering hopes of British theological conservatism have been attaching much importance, is that of the learned author of a recent book with the above title, the Rev. James Denney, D.D., of Scotland. Reference to his treatise³ on this important subject may not be inappropriately made in the present notes, because of the unexpected recognition and support its pages bring to the fact and legitimacy of such changes in thought as have been above noticed. "Amid the vast unsettlement of opinion, which has been produced by the emancipation of the mind and its exercise on the general tradition of Christianity," one finds him saying in his preface, the attitude to Jesus characteristic of the New Testament "is all that is vital to Christianity"—an attitude which "is not bound up as it is often supposed to be, with this or that intellectual construction of it, or with this or that definition of what it supposes or implies." This con-

³An excellent and extended notice of the book, from the pen of the Rev. Professor William C. Schaeffer, D.D., may be found in the last issue of this REVIEW, pp. 473-475.

tention leaves all the room that could be desired for such a reinterpretation of the person of Christ as we have already found a Church historian of our own country recording as having taken place during the last generation. Equally gratifying and satisfactory, even to more radical champions of progressive theology than Dr. Walker, is the view which Professor Denney expresses, as to what the Church may and may not exact of its members. "The Church must bind its members," he argues, "to the Christian attitude to Christ, but it has no right to bind them to anything besides. It can never overcome its own divisions, it can never appeal with the power of a unanimous testimony to the world, till both these truths are recognized."

Upwards of three hundred pages of our author's book are devoted to an examination of what is the New Testament attitude to Christ, and to the vindication of his claim that the Church must bind its members' faith to that attitude. It is a lengthy and somewhat wearying journey on which his readers are invited to accompany him, in order that he may prove what even before beginning but few thoughtful Christians, however liberal-minded, can have had any disposition to question or deny, namely, that from the beginning of Christianity a supreme place was given to Jesus in men's faith: Christ determined for the religious lives they lived all their relations to both God and men. To him they owed their knowledge of God as Father, the forgiveness of their sins, the new life in the Spirit, the assurance of a blissful immortality. A corresponding faith, a like attitude of soul, determines now a valid Christianity—a conclusion from which but few would feel it necessary to dissent.

To the significant concessions, made to modern claims of intellectual freedom in giving new literary construction to the doctrinal content of such a faith, Dr. Denney returns in the concluding chapter covering about thirty pages, which constitute by far the most valuable portion of the volume. His authorship of the concessions referred to, and the firm empha-

sis with which he states them, gives them added and refreshing impressiveness. After insisting upon it that the Christian is bound to Christ by faith, he goes on to affirm that "we are not bound to any man's or to any church's rendering of what he is or has done. We are not bound to any Christology, or to any doctrine of the work of Christ. No intellectual construction of what Christ's presence and work in the world mean is to be imposed beforehand as the law of faith, or a condition of membership in the Church. It is faith which makes a Christian; and when the Christian attitude of the soul is found, it must be free to raise its own problems and to work out its own solutions. This is the point at which 'broad' churchism is in the right against an evangelical Christianity which has not learned to distinguish between its faith—in which it is unassailable—and inherited forms of doctrine which have been unreflectingly identified with it. Natural as such identification may be, and painful as it may be to separate in thought things which have coalesced in strong and sacred feelings, there is nothing more certain than that the distinction must be recognized if evangelical Christians are to maintain their intellectual integrity, and preach the Gospel in a world which is intellectually free."

One fails to recall any words written by most "advanced theologians," so-called, that go farther in the direction of maintaining intellectual liberty, than do these of our conservative author. A wise teacher of an earlier age gave this counsel to his disciples: "Do not believe in traditions simply because they have been handed down for many generations; nor in anything which is rumored and spoken of by many; or because the written statement of some old sage is produced. Do not believe in that as truth simply because you have been attached to it by habit, on the authority merely of your teachers or elders. But after observation and analysis, and when the thing agrees with reason, and is conducing to the good and benefit of all, then accept it and live up to it." Dr. Denney might have been a faithful disciple of that teacher, since in matters of doctrinal construction he is willing to rely upon no

authority save that of personal consciousness, divinely guided in its upward way, ever learning and ever growing, discovering its mistakes and correcting them, in the new light to which the soul is held open. He recognizes, it is evident, that theology has at last entered, with the other sciences, into the realm of observation and experience; that its authority henceforth will be founded not in the *ipse dixit* of popes or councils, schools or synods, but on the verdicts of competent research; and that the spirit which to-day animates the highest characters in their quest after truth merits men's regard and esteem, not their censure and scorn. "Soundness in *faith*"—which according to the Heidelberg Catechism means a hearty trust in the Lord Jesus Christ—"is that on which Christianity and the Church depend for their very being; but the construction of Christian doctrine is one of the tasks at which the Christian intelligence must freely labor, respecting, no doubt, but never bound by, the efforts or attainments of the past."

The position thus described, Dr. Denney believes, is that practically occupied by the vast majority of the members of the evangelical churches. "They are loyal to Christ, but to a large extent they have lost interest in the traditional theology," simply because it is not their own, not the product of their personal intelligence energized by faith in Christ, nothing than which has either interest or value for them. With Christian organizations, however, whose responsibilities are other than those of individuals, the case is somewhat different. Here the Scotch theologian's views are in agreement with those met with above on the same point in Professor Hoben's paper. "The Church is inevitably more conservative than the individual. It has to guard in some sense what the labors of the past have won, and not allow the historical inheritance to be repudiated or cast away by the juvenile petulance of those who know neither what it is nor what it has cost." But in spite of this necessary and important guardianship, in spite of the duty incumbent on the Church to conserve its intellectual as well as its moral attainments, it is frankly acknowledged by our author, "the pressure put upon the Churches, both from

without and from within, is rapidly becoming irresistible. And if the conclusions we have reached are sound, the principle on which they should act is to bind men to the Christian attitude to Christ, but leave them, thus bound, free to assume and discharge their intellectual and moral responsibilities with a conscience acknowledging no authority but that of the God in whom they believe through him." The words, which Dr. Denney ventures to suggest as embodying the religious truth about Jesus together with his significance for the Christian faith, and as furnishing a symbol expressive of the unity of all believers, are put into a single sentence: "I believe in God through Jesus Christ His only Son, our Lord and Saviour."

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD.

Amid the vast changes of thought to which we have been giving attention, one of the most insistent demands of contemporary thinkers has been for a new statement of the doctrine of God—one cast in the light of modern knowledge, capable of answering the requirements of the conscience and culture of to-day, and adapted to the religious conditions and needs of the time in which we live. Several years ago announcement was made that one of the leading theologians of our country, whose earlier contributions to religious and theological literature had furnished guidance and inspiration to multitudes of his readers, had undertaken the task of restating the traditional form of the supreme theme of theology. The result of the undertaking, to the gratification of an expectant religious public, has at last made its appearance as the latest volume in the "International Theological Library" series.⁴ The author's definite aim, as stated in his own words, has been to present that "view of God for which Christianity stands responsible in the presence of such life and knowledge as surround us now," and it is this aim and the results the pursuit of

⁴"The Christian Doctrine of God," by the Rev. William Newton Clarke, D.D. Pp. 500, price \$2.50 net. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

it has accomplished, that gives appropriateness to the notice of this timely and serviceable volume in the present discussion.

The impression made upon one's mind by many a page of Dr. Clarke's previous writings was that the author stood in close personal touch with divine realities and had authentic tidings to convey from unseen worlds. In the present treatise, pervaded as it is throughout by the spirit of devout piety and adoring reverence, one may say at once, the earlier impression of the man is not only justified, but vastly deepened. He has given the Christian world not simply a work on theology that is great from a literary and academic point of view, but one that is greater and immeasurably more important from the view-point of its practically vital religious character and inspirational power. It is a book which laymen can take up and read with almost as much interest and profit as can be gotten from it by trained scholars and theologians. Attempting to set forth the great doctrine anew, the writer happily avoids from the start of his discussion both the order and method of traditional theological systems. He is thoroughly acquainted with the literature on the subject with which he deals, but there is a striking absence throughout the volume of quotations and cited authorities, his purpose being to allow his contentions to make their appeal and win their way to acceptance, on the single basis of their inherent truthfulness, a truthfulness whose authoritativeness is recognized because one's own religious experience responds to it.

Were the space available it would be interesting to institute a detailed comparison between the points mentioned by Dr. Walker as indicative of progress in recent thought, and the illustration of them as found in Professor Clarke's chapters. The contents and the character of the entire volume could in that way be forcibly brought under notice, but our page limitations forbid the attempt. We can only remark, in a general way, that the secret of Dr. Clarke's commanding strength lies in the constructive ability and the modern outlook he possesses. His conception of the character of God, with the discussion of which rather than his existence he begins, of his redemptive

relation to the world, of his revelation in man, and particularly in our Lord Jesus Christ, of the person of Christ, of the nature of man and his salvation, and of the evidence on which belief in God to-day rests—his conception of all these is fairly well represented by the transformed views we have dwelt upon in the earlier paragraphs of this article. But these views, and the doctrines logically inferred from them, of course, do not lay stress upon what traditional orthodoxy once thought fundamental and essential. We shall presently hear mutterings of protest, no doubt, against the inadequacy of some of Dr. Clarke's conclusions, and of the danger there lies in accepting certain others. In his discussion of the Saviourhood of God, such critics will probably discover that he does not make sufficient account of the ancient theories of the atonement. In his discussion of the unity of God, into which he claims the ancient idea of the divine personality of the Father and the Son and the Spirit is to-day being taken up and absorbed, they will discover an unsatisfactory view of the Holy Trinity, and of the Deity of Christ. And in his statements concerning miracles, that whether they have occurred or not, is not a vital question in religion, because "the certainties that are the food of eternal life, which alone are essential to religion, are certainties in themselves, of which a man can become sure for himself through fellowship with God"—in this likewise some minds will discern a serious and perhaps unpardonable departure from the truth. Meanwhile, however, the sympathetic reader of Dr. Clarke's book will find in it really great thinking consistently and courageously, humbly and reverently pursued, whilst at the same time the vital religious conviction or experience, which must be the starting point and governing principle of all theology that is worth while, is never lost sight of or given up. The book is probably the most important contribution to theological science and religion of the first decade of the twentieth century, and it is bound to render important service to Christian thought and life for many years to come.

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND.

IX.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY.

BY PROF. A. V. HIESTER.

While Plato's "Republic" belongs chronologically to antiquity, and reflects in many ways its Hellenic environment, it is peculiarly cosmopolitan in spirit. It rises above the accidents of time and place and appeals to the common experience of the race. Many of its problems are also modern problems. Some of these problems, too, are solved along lines approved by modern experience. It is because of this cosmopolitan spirit, this prophetic insight, this power of comprehensive vision, that the "Republic" has been the parent and model of so many utopias, medieval and modern.

Medieval utopianism is either a grafting of Christian ideas and sentiments on the social and political speculations of Plato, or it is exclusively concerned with religious interests. Its most important representatives, St. Augustine's "De Civitate Dei" of the fifth century and Sir Thomas More's "Utopia" of the sixteenth, are both of the first class. But neither of these works is distinctively medieval in tone and spirit. Not even chronologically do they fall altogether within the middle age. They rather mark the limits of that period. The one stands at the dividing line between the ancient and medieval periods; the other marks the transition from the middle age to the modern world. The one forms the connecting link between Greek thought and scholastic speculation; the other is the fruit of the Renaissance which emancipated the human mind from scholastic modes of thought and inaugurated the era of modern intellectual freedom and progress. The one still retains much of the spirit of antiquity; the other has already caught something of the vision of the modern world.

St. Augustine possessed the speculative talent of the ancient Greeks though a Latin himself. The natural bent of his mind toward idealism was materially strengthened by the speculative character of Neoplatonism which strongly attracted him. He confesses that the Platonic writings "enkindled in his mind an incredible ardor." At first he studied the Bible from a purely Platonic point of view; and Neoplatonism ultimately became for him the bridge by which he passed from paganism to Christianity. After his conversion he clung for a time to his Platonic Christianity and shaped the doctrines of the Bible in accordance with its principles. He was the only western theologian of his age to be directly and strongly influenced by Neoplatonism; and while he clearly recognized the various points of antagonism between it and Christianity, on such cardinal points of Christian doctrine as God, matter, the relation of God to the word, personal freedom and the nature of evil, he exhibited to the last the unmistakable impress of Neoplatonism.

Neoplatonism stands for two main things: first, the complete dominance and all-pervading character of the religious interest; and, secondly, the principle of the supra-rational which it introduced into philosophy, the principle that there is something beyond reason and beyond reality which is the final goal of all effort and the ultimate ground of all being. The necessary accompaniment of this dominant and all-pervading religious interest, and this denial of the reality of sensible existence, was the conviction of the utter vanity of all earthly things. But Neoplatonism found itself quite unable to describe this supreme good lying beyond experience; and the inevitable consequence was that it gave itself to the undisputed reign of the imagination. It would be hard, indeed, to find a better background for a Christian utopian philosophy than Neoplatonism.

While the "City of God" bears a general resemblance to Plato's "Republic," there are also certain marked differences. Both were suggested by manifestations of social decline, the one

by the degeneracy of Greek politics, the other by the decay of the Roman Empire. On the other hand, St. Augustine has no sympathy with the old Roman life as Plato has with Greek life. He does not lament its going and manifests no desire to call it back. Then again, St. Augustine lacks Plato's power to conceive of a different state of the world from that in which he lives, and which is still in harmony with the universal principles of human nature; and the consequence is that his views are even more idealistic than those of Plato in the sense that they are further removed from the existing social order. The fact that the "City of God" is deeply penetrated with Christian ethics, and the presence of controversial features, are additional differences between it and the "Republic."

The "City of God" occupied thirteen years in writing, that is, from 413 A. D. to 426 A. D. It is divided into twenty-two books and has a three-fold character. It is first of all a Christian apology. Then it is also a philosophy of history. And in the third place it is an utopia. The taking and sacking of Rome by Alaric in 410 A. D. profoundly shocked the whole civilized world. It was believed not only by the heathen but also by a large part of Christendom that the disaster portended the destruction of the world. By heathen writers the catastrophe was attributed to the rise of Christianity and the decay of faith in the old heathen divinities. To meet this attack on Christianity the "City of God" was primarily written. It was easily the foremost apologetic treatise of its age. Its main thesis is that the repeated successes of the barbarians were due, not to the rise of Christianity, but to the corruption of paganism. It shows that the Roman Empire contained within itself, in the moral decay of its citizens, the seeds of its own destruction; and that to arrest this decay the pagan philosophies and religions were hopelessly inadequate. In its efforts to search out and set forth the true causes of Rome's decline the "City of God" was the first comprehensive attempt at a philosophy of history.

From this contemplation of the decline of the Roman Em-

pire and its causes, St. Augustine turns to the splendid vision of a new social order which is destined to arise out of the ruins of the old. In this vision he sees that human history is not identified with the history of any particular earthly power, but that from the first there has existed alongside of the kingdoms of this world another kingdom, the city of God, which because of its superior morality, true doctrine and heavenly origin, is imperishable. With this imperishable kingdom, whose history is recounted from its beginning before the world was, is constantly contrasted that perishable earthly kingdom whose history runs parallel to that of the imperishable city of God from the fall of man to the final judgment, when they are fully and forever separated into heaven and hell. These two kingdoms are mutually antagonistic, their antagonism having its root in the distinction between good and evil angels. But in the present order of the world they touch each other at innumerable points. St. Augustine's philosophy of history is therefore dualistic in character, exhibiting as it does the history of the race under the view of two antagonistic organized forces, whose diverse foundations, different motive forces, parallel histories, and ultimate disposal and separation in the last judgment, are considered at length.

The utopian philosophies which fall within the medieval period proper are unimportant. They belong to an age which had lost all connection with classical civilization and are purely religions in character. There is one other, however, which stands by itself. Dante's "*De Monarchia*," 1314, resembles the other purely medieval utopias in that it shows no acquaintance with Plato. But its prevailing character is not religious, as theirs is, but political. Dante was deeply impressed with the idea that a universal monarchy was indispensable to the well-being of the world, and in the "*De Monarchia*" he dreams of another Roman empire existing alongside of the Church. Neither of these organizations, as he regards them, is superior to the other. Rather are they two parallel, equal, coördinate powers, each of which owes to the other only res-

pect. Both are divine, and what is more, each derives its authority immediately from God.

This conception of the Church and the State as two coördinate, divinely-established powers is a distinct contribution to the history of political thought and practice. It became the ruling principle of the later medieval and early modern periods; and within recent years it has been revived by Bismarck in his theory of the Christian state. It displaced the earlier theory of the supremacy of the Church over the State, which had ruled the world for centuries, and which the Papacy had laid down when, with the growing power and importance of the Roman See, it had laid claim to various temporal powers until it arrogated, and was able to maintain, the right to preserve the peace of nations, decide quarrels between temporal princes, defend the oppressed and enforced its decisions and commands by anathema, and excommunication, and even by force of arms when necessary. One of the stoutest champions of this theory was Thomas Aquinas, who argued that while both the Pope and the Emperor derived their powers from God, the Pope alone derived his directly, the Emperor obtaining his only indirectly, that is, through the Pope's hands. This theory had in turn displaced the principle, which had prevailed in the early history of the Church, and according to which the Church claimed dominion over only the spiritual interests of mankind, leaving to the State—not a divine institution, however, as was later asserted—complete supremacy in temporal affairs.

With the Renaissance, and the return to classical ideals which accompanied it, the social and political speculations of Plato were revived, and with them were mixed Christian ideas and sentiments. The result of this mixture was something akin to the work of Augustine at the other extremity of the middle age, something between the philosophical utopianism of antiquity and the purely religious utopianism of the medieval period.

The "Utopia" of Sir Thomas More, standing at the border

line between medievalism and modernism, is the best example of this coalescence of Hellenism and Christianity. It breathes the same cosmopolitan spirit, and exhibits the same intellectual reach and the same wonderful power to see beyond the limitations and prejudices of its environment, as the "Republic." But again, as in the case of the "City of God," there are also striking differences.

The "Utopia" has been pronounced the only work of literary genius of the age in England. Its author is known to have been a philosopher and scholar, an ornament of the new learning, a statesman of spotless integrity, a man of rare wit and piety, a cultured and accomplished gentleman. The work is written in the form of a romance, and contains many extravagances of thought and sentiment. But mingled with its extravagances are numerous profound and sensible criticisms of the political and industrial conditions of the time. The apparently chimerical character of the work is part of the author's purpose. For under such a despotic regime as that of Henry VIII, whose chancellor More was for a time, and at whose command he eventually lost his head because his rectitude did not permit him either to sanction the divorce of Queen Catharine or to acknowledge Henry as the "Supreme Head of the Church," criticisms of the established order of things, however mild and just, had to be veiled behind the caprices of the imagination. It was doubtless through fear of the royal displeasure that the "Utopia," though written in 1514, was not published until two years later, and then only in Louvain, a city of Belgium, and under the editorship of More's friend Erasmus. A revised edition appeared in 1513 at Basle. Both editions were in Latin. Then in 1524 the work was translated into German, into Italian in 1548, into French in 1550, and into English in 1551.

While the "Utopia" was the fruit of the Renaissance it represents, for the most part, only a particular aspect of that movement. At first the new learning took an exclusively intellectual and religious direction, and its influence was con-

pect. Both are divine, and what is more, each derives its authority immediately from God.

This conception of the Church and the State as two coördinate, divinely-established powers is a distinct contribution to the history of political thought and practice. It became the ruling principle of the later medieval and early modern periods; and within recent years it has been revived by Bismarck in his theory of the Christian state. It displaced the earlier theory of the supremacy of the Church over the State, which had ruled the world for centuries, and which the Papacy had laid down when, with the growing power and importance of the Roman See, it had laid claim to various temporal powers until it arrogated, and was able to maintain, the right to preserve the peace of nations, decide quarrels between temporal princes, defend the oppressed and enforced its decisions and commands by anathema, and excommunication, and even by force of arms when necessary. One of the stoutest champions of this theory was Thomas Aquinas, who argued that while both the Pope and the Emperor derived their powers from God, the Pope alone derived his directly, the Emperor obtaining his only indirectly, that is, through the Pope's hands. This theory had in turn displaced the principle, which had prevailed in the early history of the Church, and according to which the Church claimed dominion over only the spiritual interests of mankind, leaving to the State—not a divine institution, however, as was later asserted—complete supremacy in temporal affairs.

With the Renaissance, and the return to classical ideals which accompanied it, the social and political speculations of Plato were revived, and with them were mixed Christian ideas and sentiments. The result of this mixture was something akin to the work of Augustine at the other extremity of the middle age, something between the philosophical utopianism of antiquity and the purely religious utopianism of the medieval period.

The "Utopia" of Sir Thomas More, standing at the border

line between medievalism and modernism, is the best example of this coalescence of Hellenism and Christianity. It breathes the same cosmopolitan spirit, and exhibits the same intellectual reach and the same wonderful power to see beyond the limitations and prejudices of its environment, as the "Republic." But again, as in the case of the "City of God," there are also striking differences.

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While the "Utopia" was the fruit of the Renaissance it represents, for the most part, only a particular aspect of that movement. At first the new learning took an exclusively intellectual and religious direction, and its influence was con-

finned mainly to scholars and divines. The "Utopia" was the first piece of literature to apply the same freedom of thought to the old forms of society and politics as to matters of education and faith. In his dream of a new social order, based on equality, brotherhood and freedom, More anticipated many important social problems of modern times. This alone would prove his prophetic gifts and keenness of intellect. But he did more than this. He not only anticipated modern problems, but he also proposed solutions for them. Here again he anticipated important social and political discoveries of later times; and in several instances he so far anticipated the future that the practice of the modern world has not yet caught up to him. Whether More expected that his ideas would ever be realized, or whether his object was merely to call attention to certain political and industrial evils, is an open question. But so much is certain, that he saw no immediate prospect of their being realized, for they were hopelessly at variance with the temper of the age. This he recognizes in the closing words of the "Utopia." "There are many things," he says, "in the Commonwealth of Nowhere that I rather wish than hope to see embodied in our own." At the very moment, indeed, that he was pleading for the poor, new exactions and sterner laws were making their lot constantly harder. He advocated religious toleration just as the nations of Europe were entering upon an unparalleled series of religious wars. While he was advocating the principle of popular sovereignty the rule of the Tudors was fast becoming more and more despotic.

Besides the Renaissance the "Utopia" clearly reflects the influence of another movement. Contemporaneously with the revival of classical art and letters, the discoveries and explorations of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had quickened the slumbering intelligence of Europe by bringing it into sudden contact with new lands, new faiths and new races of men. A strange curiosity was aroused everywhere; books relating to the New World, like the travels of Amerigo Vespucci, found a ready market; and gradually the old nar-

rowness of life gave way to a certain cosmopolitanism of thought and sentiment. This widening of the intellectual horizon of men is seen in the "Utopia" in its wide range of speculation on almost every subject of human thought and action.

The immediate setting of the "Utopia" is as follows: While traveling on the Continent More met at Antwerp a traveler and philosopher who had just returned from an extensive journey in strange lands. He had accompanied Vespucci on his last voyage, but leaving that enterprising navigator at the farthest point reached he had pushed on to other strange lands and had finally arrived at the island of Utopia. The laws and customs of this strange island had greatly impressed him and he proceeds to describe them at length to More, in whom he finds an eager and sympathetic listener.

According to the account of this traveler, Hythloday by name, the government of Utopia is a representative democracy consisting of a senate, a general assembly of the people, and a president. The president holds his office for life but is removable on suspicion of a desire to enslave the people. The senate is composed of three representatives from each city of which there are twenty-four of equal size. Both the president and the senators, as well as all other officials, political and ecclesiastical, are chosen by popular election. All this clearly foreshadows the democratic institutions of the nineteenth century, and indicates political thinking of the most advanced sort, the more so when it is remembered that the writing of the "Utopia" antedated the American and French revolutions, and the inauguration of the first experiments in popular representative government, by more than two and a half centuries.

More was a keen observer of the political conditions of his time. He clearly recognized the absolutist tendencies of the Tudor monarchy and their attendant evils. Most naturally, therefore, there is in "Utopia" no room for either an absolute sovereign or a privileged class. The provision that the president is removable from office for malfeasance is a biting

criticism of the doctrine so dear to the hearts of the Tudor monarchs that the king can do no wrong.

In this absence of a privileged class the "Utopia" differs fundamentally from the "Republic." Plato's state was the Greek city-state with which he was so familiar, and was based on the principle of caste. There was first a warrior class from which the philosophers and statesmen came. War and philosophy were its only occupations. Below this leisure class were the "hewers of wood and drawers of water," to whom all industry and trade were relegated, and who could not, except in rare instances, rise to the first class. Plato's state was, therefore, an aristocratic republic founded on science and force. In Utopia, on the other hand, there are no castes. With the exception of the slaves all are equal in political power and privilege. To labor and defend the state are the duty of all alike. Instead of labor being regarded as a badge of inferiority it is the highest title of honor.

Closely connected with the twin principles of popular government and civil liberty is the idea of religious toleration. In nothing perhaps does More depart so completely from the accepted notions of his time as in his views respecting religion. In the first place, he unqualifiedly condemns the whole medieval system of asceticism, maintaining that God designed man to be happy and that the ascetic rejection of human comforts and pleasures, except for the common good, is ingratitude to him. Then More also makes the family rather than the church the center of religion. Hence there are in Utopia few priests and little public worship. There are, however, two religious orders similar to that of St. Francis of Assisi whose members endeavor to purify their souls by engaging in the humblest and least attractive labors. And in the third place, More lays down the principle of religious toleration in accordance with which any one in Utopia is free to hold, as well as to propagate, so long as he confines himself to argument, any religious opinions whatsoever. He maintains that religious belief is largely a matter of environment

and birth, and that a uniformity of belief is not essential to the peace and well-being of a state. Revolutionary as the doctrine of religious toleration must have appeared to his contemporaries, it was logically required by the principles of liberty and equality upon which the government of Utopia was based. Not only was More the first to enunciate the principle of religious toleration, but he did so more than a century before William of Orange proclaimed it, and more than a century and a half before William Penn launched his "holy experiment" in the wilds of Pennsylvania.

In presenting the industrial side of his ideal state More condemns the prevailing economic conditions of his day with unsparing hand. His language at times might easily be mistaken for an extract from the program of modern socialism. The entire social system he regards as "nothing but a conspiracy of the rich against the poor," veiled, indeed, behind the forms of law. "The rich," he says, "devise every means by which they may in the first place secure to themselves what they have amassed by wrong, and then take to their own use and profit, at the lowest possible price, the work and labor of the poor. And as soon as the rich decide on adopting these devices in the name of the public they become law." He exhibits a keen sympathy with the poor. The life of the English laboring classes, as he sees it, is so wretched that "even a beast's life seems enviable." He pleads for larger opportunities for the laboring classes, declaring that the supreme aim of legislation should be to secure their welfare as the true basis of a well-ordered commonwealth. And with the hope of effecting some immediate amelioration of the miseries of the English masses, by arresting the attention of thinking men and quickening their sympathies, he draws a harrowing picture of the luxurious idleness and grinding poverty, the crime and vagabondage, the physical and moral degradation, of his day; which evil he ascribes to the abrogation of peasant proprietorship, the secularization of church property, the conversion of arable lands into pasture, royal monopolies and unjust system

of taxation. No such cry of pity, it has been said, had been heard in England since the days of Piers Ploughman.

Like Plato's state, Utopia is a communistic commonwealth. All industry is under the supervision and direction of the magistrates who distribute the instruments and materials of production to the inhabitants. With the exception of a small class of very learned persons all are required to labor according to their ability, women as well as men. Mental and physical labor are combined in pleasing variety. Variety of occupation is also secured by the requirement that each one must alternate between agriculture and some form of mechanical industry. The machinery of production is rendered amazingly simple by the assumption of a perfect and unchanging simplicity of taste in the consumer. What is produced by the labor of all is shared by all. But there are no luxuries. All show of wealth is forbidden. Only children are permitted to wear precious stones. Gold and silver are regarded as the basest of metals fit only to fetter criminals with or to be fashioned into domestic utensils. Money is unknown. There is no need of it for domestic purposes, and of foreign trade there is none. The houses, which are the common possession of all, are redistributed among the citizens every ten years. All meals are eaten in common in large dining halls, and are accompanied by music to render them attractive. During meal hours, too, the air is scented with the most delicate perfumes. As none are idle so none are overworked. Only six hours of labor a day are required of the able-bodied, which is sufficient to secure to all the necessities and comforts of life. Abundant room is thus afforded for leisure, study, recreation and the enjoyment of the fine arts. This together with a variety of occupation avoids fatigue and adds greatly to the interest and relish of life.

Slavery is a fixed institution in Utopia because it is required by economic considerations. More clearly recognizes that there are some trades so rude and repulsive that they are carried on only from necessity, and that where all are equal

and at the same time freely supplied with the means of subsistence it will be difficult, if not impossible, to get disagreeable tasks done. This is a practical difficulty that must be reckoned with in all communistic systems. More meets it by establishing slavery, and in order to secure a proper supply of slave labor in a country where equality is the ruling principle he makes two suggestions: first, that slaves be purchased by the state from foreign countries; and, secondly, that slavery be made a punishment for crime. The latter is the better way and in accordance with it, as well as from humanitarian considerations, More abolishes capital punishment and substitutes for it a life slavery.

Like Plato, More adopted the communistic principle. But he justified it on different grounds. While Plato in accordance with his philosophical point of view maintained that the renunciation of private property was required by the principle of the moral perfection of society, More bases it on the more practical consideration of the common happiness of men. A further distinction between the two is that More does not, like Plato, extend the communistic principle to wives and children. In this he exhibits a far greater independence of the accepted opinions of his day than the Athenian philosopher does. For Plato could not divest himself of the idea that the wife is the property of the husband; and being property, his communistic principle logically required that she should be treated like any form of property, that is, be enjoyed in common. He had no consciousness of the modern notion that marriage is a contract; and for him monogamy meant nothing more than the exclusive possession on the part of one man of a piece of property which ought to be for the use of all. That More recognized the sanctity of marriage and the fundamental importance of the family in the social economy, is doubtless to be ascribed, at least in large part, to the influence of Christianity.

In the matter of education More is well abreast of the most advanced sentiment of our own day. Every child in Utopia

is given a thorough education at public expense. The significance of this can be understood only when it is remembered that fully one half of the population of England in the time of More was illiterate.

Again in discussing the physical basis of society More writes like one of the twentieth century. He recognizes the close connection between public and private morality and the health which springs from light, air, cleanliness, and a certain degree of economic well-being. Hence in Utopia the streets are broad and clean, and the houses well built, well lighted, and surrounded by spacious gardens.

More was the first to recognize the importance of preventing crime, through better social, political and economic conditions, and making the reformation of the offender the supreme end in punishment. He also advocated the use of more humane penalties and of penalties proportioned to the nature of the crime. If a thief and a murderer are sure of the same penalty, he argues, the law is simply tempting the thief to accomplish his theft by murder. In these suggestions More anticipates practically every important improvement in penal science and practice which has been accomplished within the past century. Here again it is necessary to remember, in order to a proper appreciation of More's intellectual reach and prophetic insight, that at the time the "Utopia" was written probably more than two hundred criminal offences were subject to the death penalty in England, while minor offenses were punished with the utmost cruelty. Apparently the sole end of punishment was to inflict on the offender the greatest possible amount of suffering.

In all this More exhibits a truly modern spirit despite his medieval environment. Notwithstanding his recognition of slavery, he believed in democracy when other men still believed in the "divine right of kings." In his advocacy of political equality, religious toleration, the reduction of the hours of labor to a degree consistent with leisure, recreation and opportunities for mental improvement, compulsory educa-

tion for both sexes, better sanitary conditions, and improved criminal legislation and administration, he made Utopia a model for the most advanced nations of our own day, for he advocated principles and programs that are of the very essence of modern democracy.

If exception be taken to the strict and minute manner in which the daily life of every individual is regulated, to the fact that all must wear a prescribed dress, the fact that all are required to labor the same number of hours or to the same degree of fatigue, the fact that the inhabitants are apportioned between city and country and changed from one to the other according to need, the fact that the population is kept at a prescribed limit by means of emigration and colonization, it must be remembered that all this is required by a communistic organization of society, and does not, therefore, impugn the quality of More's democracy.

Although its originality, prophetic insight and reach of thought stamp it as a work of genius, the Utopia made little impression when first published. One reason for this is that it was written in Latin and for the learned; and even when it was translated into English, about the middle of the sixteenth century, it was still read only by the few, who refused to regard it as a piece of serious literature or as something to be realized even in the remote future. It was universally regarded as nothing more than a more or less ingenious exercise of the fancy. Another reason is that the temper of the time, owing to the religious wars and the spirit of political absolutism which ruled the civilized world, was not favorable to the discussion of political and economic questions. Within the past century, however, after a long period of suspended vitality, the "Utopia" has experienced a remarkable rejuvenescence. For this the new interest which has been awakened in everything pertaining to human society is primarily responsible. It is now widely read, particularly by socialists and other exponents of radical social reforms, who have found in it many arguments and practical suggestions.

LANCASTER, PA.

X.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

SCHWENKFELDER HYMNOLOGY AND THE SOURCES OF THE FIRST SCHWENKFELDER HYMN-BOOK PRINTED IN AMERICA. Allen Anders Seipt, A.M., Ph.D., Member of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania and formerly Instructor in German, Ohio Wesleyan University. Philadelphia, Americana Germanica Press, 1909.

The Schwenkfelders—a small religious denomination of eastern Pennsylvania—have recently manifested considerable literary activity. Not only have they begun the publication of the great *Corpus Schwenkfeldianorum*, which will probably extend through many volumes; but individual members have prepared and published important monographs on historical and doctrinal subjects. That one of our smallest religious communities should undertake such work is at least surprising; for it is evident that more numerous denominations might well shrink from the labor and expense which these enterprises involve. Such work, however, is not without peculiar fascinations for the author and student. It affords the author an opportunity for minute research which would hardly be possible in a more extended field; while the interested reader is gratified by observing that the work is thoroughly done, and that for information on its theme he need seek no further.

It is, of course, understood that the works of this character rarely discuss the religious and civil questions in which the modern world is most directly interested; but we can understand that a community should be convinced that it has inherited a treasure of truth which it must preserve undiminished, and that it has a special testimony to offer to succeeding generations. It is from this point of view that the work is peculiarly valuable, and the toil of the laborers becomes deserving of universal appreciation.

We have long been aware that Dr. Seipt was preparing a monograph on Schwenkfelder hymnology; and now that the book has appeared, it affords us pleasure to bear witness to the thoroughness with which his work has been performed. Hitherto the subject has been greatly neglected, even by the foremost hymnologists of Europe; and it is therefore pleasant to be admitted to a field which has practically remained uncultivated.

Schwenkfeld himself does not appear to have been a poet; and the few specimens of his versification, which have been preserved, do not increase his fame. Among his successors during the European period our author enumerates no less than eighteen

writers of hymns, but gives the palm to Daniel Sudermann who was evidently a sacred poet of no common order. It is interesting to observe that these poetic compositions remained practically untouched by the mysticism that became so characteristic of the German sects of the eighteenth century. The Schwenkfelder hymns are generally churchly, and in their arrangement they follow the order of the Christian year. In tone and spirit they most closely resemble the compositions of the Bohemian Brethren, whose work the Schwenkfelders collected and preserved; and they may, therefore, be said to derive much of their inspiration from a period earlier than the great burst of song that accompanied the Reformation of the sixteenth century.

When the Schwenkfelders emigrated to America, in 1734, they brought with them the faith and cultus of their forefathers. Many of their hymn-books, and other books of devotion, were in manuscript, principally because in Europe tyrannical governments had frequently denied them the privilege of publication. In America they continued for some time to prepare such manuscripts, adding occasionally a few of their original compositions; but in 1762 they proceeded to publish a hymn-book which is justly regarded as one of the finest issues of the press of Christopher Saur, the celebrated Germantown printer. The introduction to this book, which was written by Christopher Schultz, senior, is an excellent essay on hymnology, and is still worthy of study. Schultz was evidently a man of considerable learning and great natural ability; and among his coadjutors as sacred poets were such men as George Weiss, Balthasar Hoffman, and others, who deserve an honorable place in the history of hymnology.

In treating of these themes Dr. Seipt's work is practically exhaustive. He has examined original sources in Europe and America, and has collated them with the utmost care. The external appearance of the book is attractive, and the illustrations are abundant. It is evidently a labor of love, and as such deserves to be highly esteemed. We congratulate the author on the completion of his excellent monograph.

JOS. H. DUBBS.

TESTIMONIUM ANIMÆ, or Greek and Roman before Jesus Christ. A Series of Essays and Sketches dealing with the Spiritual Elements in Classical Civilization. By E. G. Sihler, Ph.D., Professor of the Latin Language and Literature in the New York University. New York, G. E. Stechert & Co. Pages x + 453. Price \$2.25 net.

This book is from the pen of a teacher and scholar who has spent the working years of his life in studying the remains of classical antiquity and in following the classical movement down to modern times. "At the end of it all," he says in his preface, "there has come over my soul a profound melancholy." This

is because so much of the industry of modern professional classicists seems "to be spent in the fond belief (hallowed by long academic tradition) that Classic Literature was something absolute, something precious and transcendent in itself, that the addition of a monograph no matter on how infinitesimal a detail of classic tradition (though destined to be read by two or three specialists alone, perhaps) was an adequate object of life and labor." The archaeologists especially excite his indignation. He is also dissatisfied with the classicism that has issued in an intellectual and æsthetic culture which ignores the transcendent value and deepest needs of the human soul, and which attempts to reduce Christianity to a position of inferiority. Likewise the classicism dominant in European culture during the period of the early Humanists is condemned, the conclusion being that the immorality and generally contemptible character of the Humanists (who, knowing the ancient world but ill, circle about what was debased in classic literature and art) demonstrate the essential interdependence between the Renaissance and the decadence of the Church, and that to the craving for radical betterment which finally led to the Reformation the Humanists contributed less than nothing.

These distressing forms of classicism, the author claims, are due to the stupendous error of ignoring the broad basis of sin and corruption which lie at the base of the history of the classic world. It is utterly wrong, he says, to separate the progress of understanding and art, literature and material civilization, from the moral decadence of that ancient world. Therefore with the "vile and sordid paganism which underlies most of classical civilization" always before his mind, and yet maintaining that Greek and Roman letters abundantly reveal to us the course and range of man's powers and aspirations in our concern for the highest things, he essays a revaluation, entirely on the moral and religious side, of the thought and conduct of the Greeks and Romans before Christ.

His position is that of one who holds to the absolute and divine worth of revealed religion, to belief in a personal God, to the dignity of the immortal soul and to a divine law of conduct. Religion, faith, theology, in connection with pagans are "monstrosities of designation." Religion is not defined, but is apparently nothing less than Christianity, the essence of which "is a reception of transcendental boons coming at a definite point in history." The Christian ideal is accepted as absolute. With it as a standard the author examines the views of the Greeks and Romans concerning the soul, life and death, God and the world, as well as the character of their religion and worship, morality and conduct.

There is no lack of emphasis upon the darker side of classical antiquity. The repulsive features of Greek and Roman life, from

the time of Homer to the time of Seneca, and the impotence of Greek and Roman polytheism to cure these evils are treated in great detail, with a mass of quotations from classic writers, in versions made by the author himself. The Greeks receive especially hard treatment. They pass before the reader immersed in the bliss of the mere surface and steeped in unnatural vice. No theory of morals, no call to goodness for all men. Art embellished but did not elevate Greek worship. Greek men craved no righteousness deeper or higher than that of their own anthropomorphic gods, in whom "the *good* has no share, is no element." The Greek character, it would seem, was rotten at the core.

On the other hand the intrinsic soundness of the Roman character is recognized. Yet the conquests of the Romans were only exploitation on a gigantic scale, a career of force and fraud. The covetousness engendered by growing wealth and power, and the corruption introduced by the Greeks caused the old severity of morals to decline until the climax of wickedness came in the cruelties and bestiality of Nero's reign. Religion, though free from the vicious legends of the Greeks, was concerned chiefly with the outward faring of the state and with conformity to ancestral observances. It had almost no relation to soul and spirit; in acts of worship the mental or moral state was hardly concerned at all.

Yet the author does find spiritual elements in the classic literature, and this *testimonium animæ* he aims to present. For valuations of poets, historians, philosophers and moralists, the book must be read. Some will arouse dissent, as, for instance, the short and contemptuous reference to Virgil. There were thinkers who had profound spirituality, but all were infected to a greater or less degree with the current practical paganism and their higher teachings made no impression upon the spirit of their world. Not only was there no progress in morality towards Christian ideals, but the spiritual pride of the Stoic system forbids the view that in the noblest utterances of Seneca there was a historical point where Stoicism and Christianity met.

With some of the author's judgments the Christian scholar will agree. For instance, he will not dispute the insufficiency of mere intellectual or æsthetic culture, or of mere technical scholarship or antiquarian research, to satisfy the soul and purify the life. He will not deny that there were repulsive features in classic civilization, or the failure of classic paganism to regenerate the world. Yet to most of the implications which the author discovers in these admissions the well informed and fair minded reader will not consent. Likewise he will regret the narrow range of sympathy and the meager conception of the Christian ideal which condemn as "utter futilities" everything which is not of eternal import. Evolution is "the current simian mythology"; admira-

tion of Greek art is "mandatory ecstasy"; to view a matter through Greek eyes is "absurd and mendacious ecstasy." This bent of mind incapacitates the author from recognizing the full measure of worth in anything that can not bear the test of his highest standards. If, tried by the absolute Christian ideal, the religions of Greece and Rome were a failure, yet for a time they worked well, considering the age. This relative success, however, does not appear in a book from which are excluded comparisons with contemporaneous peoples and all the happier features of classic civilization. In consequence it is not illuminating and fails to delineate clearly the essential qualities of two great and gifted nations. This is perhaps not as the author intended, but it is the necessary result of the bias with which the testimony of Greek and Roman life is selected and interpreted. At the same time the author's zeal for righteousness claims the respect even of the reader who can adopt few of his positions and conclusions.

C. N. HELLER.

THE LAWS OF FRIENDSHIP, HUMAN AND DIVINE. By Henry Churchill King, President of Oberlin College. New York, The Macmillan Company. Pages 159. Price \$1.25.

The contents of this volume are the lectures delivered by the author before the students of Haverford College. The author regards religion as friendship. The end of life is to cultivate friendship with God and man. He shows what are the laws of friendship in our human relations, the laws that must be observed in human friendships must guide us in the formation of that friendship with God which is the essence of religion.

In cultivating human friendships there must be integrity, depth and breadth of personality, there must be deep community of interests, mutual self-manifestation and answering trust and mutual self-giving. All these things of course are found in God and in forming friendship with him which is the sum of religion we must cultivate these qualities in ourselves.

As the first part of the book treats of establishing friendship, so the second part treats of deepening it. This part opens with a description of ideal friendships as pictured by Christ in the beatitudes and by Paul in 1 Cor. 13. The final chapter is on "Friendships' Ways," and emphasizes the importance of expressing more fully our friendships, human and divine. In making friendship the essence of religion the author is building upon the foundation laid by the Master in making love the sum of moral obligation, love to God and love to man. No matter what our theological system may be, we can all agree in making love or friendship the end of life. The author writes simply. The book will therefore find readers among people generally as well as

among the more scholarly. The subject is presented briefly and in a winning manner.

W. D. HAPPEL.

DANIEL BOONE, BACKWOODSMAN. By C. H. Forbes Lindsay. Philadelphia and London, J. B. Lippincott, 1908. Pages 320. Price \$1.50.

Being a descendant of the same stock on his maternal side and having been born and brought up in the community in which Daniel Boone grew to manhood, the reviewer's mind from his earliest childhood was filled with traditions concerning the "Kentucky Pioneer." It is with a great deal of satisfaction therefore that he read so graphic a life of Daniel Boone as the one by C. H. Forbes-Lindsay.

At the very beginning of the work the reader is made to feel that he is upon solid ground historically. It is one of a few biographies that are true to fact in regard to the place and time of his birth. Daniel Boone was born in Exeter Township, Berks County, about eight miles southeast of Reading. A portion of the wall of the house in which he was born is preserved in the house erected on the site of the old dwelling. This was recognized by Boone during one of his visits to his native state. The time of his birth, 1734, as given by Mr. Forbes-Lindsay, is at least approximately correct.

The author traces his life from Pennsylvania to North Carolina. He gives an account of his first hunting trip into the wilds of Kentucky. He shows how this led Daniel Boone to become the leader in forming a settlement there which resulted in the founding of Boonesborough which was the center of his activities for a decade, from 1773-1783, the period of the Revolutionary War. He was the leading spirit during this period in the conflicts with the Indians who contested bitterly the possession by the whites of their hunting grounds. At the end of ten years, however, the Indians as armies at least ceased to molest the whites, and Kentucky began to be filled with settlements. Many and thrilling were the adventures of the hero of this book and many times he narrowly escaped with his life. Mr. Forbes-Lindsay tells his story simply and naturally and without any labored effort presents to our view an interesting and attractive character. Daniel Boone was a great man physically. "Five feet ten inches in height, his erect carriage gave him an appearance of great stature. His body encased in deerskin dress of the backwoodsman was splendidly formed, the extraordinarily broad and deep chest giving evidence of great strength. A sculptor might have taken the head with its noble brow and fine features for a model. The long hair was plaited and rolled into a knot. The clear, keen, blue eye had a mild expression, but force was written in the large

aquiline nose and square chin, while the thin compressed lips denoted resolution. It was a face on which courage and composure were strongly stamped. As he swung along with easy stride, his rifle over his shoulder, the movement of the sinewy limbs betrayed strength and agility." He is pictured to us here as being greater still in character. In addition to the qualities mentioned above we find him to be a man of sound judgment, of integrity, of patience and sympathy. He was not a warrior out of love for warfare as the defensive character of the engagements in which he played a part shows.

Strange to say that as an old man he finds himself deprived of his farm by shrewd settlers and is thus without any claim to the country which he settled. He makes his way across the "father of waters" and receives a large grant of land from the Spanish authorities. Here he spends his latter years peacefully and contentedly. This before his death in 1820, at the age of eighty-six, had become a part of the Union.

The significance of a life like that of Daniel Boone is well expressed by Kipling in the following verses on the "Foreloper."

The gull shall whistle in his wake, the blind wave break in fire,
And he shall see old planets pass and alien stars arise,
And give the gale his reckless sail in shadow of new skies,
Strong lust of gear shall drive him out and hunger arm his hand
To wring his food from a desert nude, his foothold from the sand.
His neighbors' smoke shall vex his eyes, their voices break his rest.
He shall go forth till South is North, sullen and dispossessed;
He shall desire loneliness and his desire shall bring
Hard on his heels a thousand wheels, a people and a king.
He shall come back on his own track and by his scarce cool camp,
There shall he meet the roaring street, the derrick and the stamp;
For he must blaze a nation's ways, with hatchet and with brand,
Till on his last-won wilderness an empire's bulwarks stand.

W. D. HAPPEL.

THE FAITH AND WORKS OF CHRISTIAN SCIENCE. By the author of "Confessio Medici." New York, The Macmillan Company. Pages 232. Price \$1.25 net.

This is a serious examination of the theory and practice of Christian Science by a competent critic. The writer makes no haphazard statements, but quotes abundantly with full references as to volumes and pages from Mrs. Eddy and other Christian Science writers, and records both the claims made by Christian Scientists of cures effected, and the failures in treatment and the harmful results of neglect to administer medical and surgical treatment where they were plainly needed.

There is more than a little humor in the chapters which treat of the Philosophy of Christian Science, the relation between Christian Faith and Christian Science, Life and Christian Science, the Reality of Pain, etc. The author tries to get at the sense and

purport of the statements and definitions which are put forward with such an air of profundity by Mrs. Eddy, and shows very effectively how destitute of meaning the metaphysical jargon of Christian Science really is, and how utterly at variance is its religious aspect and modes of worship with genuine Christian faith and the reverent worship of God. Beginning with the historical development of Eddyism out of Quimbyism he traces the establishment of the first schools for Healers and the first churches of the new cult, and accounts for its rapid growth, first, because it is an exceedingly comfortable frame of mind into which men work themselves when they look away from sin and suffering, and persuade themselves that pain and death have no real existence, and, secondly, because this frame of mind is really helpful in curing certain functional disorders, nervous diseases, and forms of hysteria in which the mimicry of organic disease plays a prominent part. Cures of this kind are heralded abroad, as the author shows, *ad nauseam*, and the strength of the cult lies in whatever truth there is in the influence of the mind over the body. On the other hand there is a terrible arraignment of the system in the record given by the author of failures to cure cases where judicious medical and surgical treatment, applied in time, would undoubtedly have availed to afford relief and save valuable lives. The fact that mothers can, with an easy conscience, allow their children to suffer and to die, on the plea that sickness and pain are not real, and that the plainest requirements for the treatment of patients and the safeguarding of others in cases of malignant contagious or infectious diseases have been disregarded so that Mrs. Eddy herself found it necessary to advise compliance with the law where sanitary laws are in force, is adduced with striking effect as in itself sufficient to condemn the whole system.

JOHN S. STAHR.

CHRIST AND THE EASTERN SOUL, THE WITNESS OF THE ORIENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS TO JESUS CHRIST. By Charles Cuthbert Hall, D.D., LL.D., late President of Union Theological Seminary. The University of Chicago Press. Pages 208. Price, postpaid, \$1.37.

This work consists of the Barrows Lectures delivered in India and elsewhere by Dr. Hall in 1906-1907. It will be remembered that the Barrows Lectureship Foundation was established by Mrs. Caroline E. Haskell in 1894, under the permanent control of a designated committee of the University of Chicago. Dr. Hall had the distinguished honor of being twice appointed as Barrows lecturer, first in 1902-1903, and then again in 1906-1907. No doubt the second appointment was made because of the profound impression made by the first course of lectures in India, Ceylon, and Japan, and of the peculiar fitness of Dr. Hall to deal sympathetically with the relation of Christianity to the life and consciousness of the Orient.

In the first lecture the author puts himself *en rapport* with his audience, men of the highest learning and culture in India by speaking most appreciatingly of the characteristics of the Oriental mind. He finds especially four elements which impress upon his mind the sublimity of the Oriental Consciousness. These are: The Contemplative Life; The Presence of the Unseen; Aspiration toward Ultimate Being; The Sanctions of the Past, all of which are discussed in their proper order. In the second chapter the Mystical Element in the Christian Religion is set forth with great power and persuasiveness, and the fact is emphasized that Christian mysticism is more than a vague outgoing of the soul toward the Infinite in that it offers as its outcome something definite and positive, both in faith and morals. Here, as is shown especially in the third lecture, the author points out the difference between the pantheism of the East, to which he makes large concessions, and the system of Christian faith and doctrine. He finds in the former the "Witness of God in the Soul"; but Christianity especially testifies to this presence, first through the still, small Voice, secondly through the Sure Word of Prophecy, and finally through the Christ of God or the Personal Incarnation. He deprecates the fact that Christian theological systems have often been narrow, partisan, and prejudicial; but he insists that "Yet it remains true that he who undertakes to interpret Christianity in the sense in which it was understood by the authors of the New Testament, in the sense in which it became the delight and passion of the Eastern and Western Fathers, in the sense in which it took and held possession of the West, in the sense in which it controls to-day the most religiously effective thinking of the Christian world, both Eastern and Western, must not only take note of the Divinity of Christ, but must exalt that Divinity to the highest place of thought; until it shall stand not for the apotheosis of humanity, not for the deification of a man, but for the projection of the Divine Word out of unfathomable depths of Godhead, into the region of human consciousness, to speak, in the life of a Man, unto the lives of all men."

In the next chapter the author speaks of the Witness of the Soul to God, and shows that materialism, atheism, and doubt can never render permanent satisfaction or peace. It is the mission of pantheism to assert the *being* of God, and it is the mission of Christianity to assert the *moral character* of God, and human life cannot find its true value without the recognition of the infinite and ultimate worth of the personality of the individual. For this reason he thinks that Oriental pantheism requires a supplementation which Christianity alone can offer. Then, after the discussion of the Moral Grandeur of Christianity the author makes an eloquent appeal to the Orient to furnish out of the riches of its heritage the elements which are needed to make the Christianity

of the future. This Christianity, he thinks, will be less ecclesiastical and less institutional than that of the West, but even richer in spiritual contents and soul-satisfying power.

This book is rich in thought and diction and gives abundant evidence of the author's thorough scholarship, breadth of view, and charming personality.

JOHN S. STAHR.

THE SEEMING UNREALITY OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE. By Henry Churchill King, President of Oberlin College. New York, The Macmillan Company. Pages 256. Price \$1.50 net.

To the natural man it is exceedingly easy to regard the present life with its manifold secular interests as embodying the whole significance of human existence. The things we can see and handle are for many men the real things, and the deeper things of the spirit seem remote and unreal, and it would seem that the tendency to take such a view of life increased in proportion as industry prospers and secular duties become more exacting in their demands upon men's time and attention. It is not without reason, therefore, that Dr. King, in the volume before us, undertakes to show first why the spiritual life seems so remote from men's minds, and then to point out how the way into reality may be found.

"The deepest need of man is faith in the reality of the spiritual, faith in a God who can save us from being at constant war with ourselves." And yet: "Though, by hypothesis, God is the one realest of all facts and the most loving of all beings, he does not seem to be thrust upon us as such at all." These two statements are not necessarily contradictory; but the second frequently works out in such a way that the first is lost sight of, and when the unsatisfied heart gropes in the dark, seeking if haply it may find God, it finds a sharp contrast between things corporeal and things spiritual. This, Dr. King thinks, is mainly due to the fact that men fail to understand the real connection between bodily conditions and spiritual life, and forget the unity of life in the midst of its complexity. Knowledge, he says, is never merely passive. To know means to be conversant with, to realize in the form of experience. Now men have constant experience of things in their natural environment, but they frequently ignore spiritual things altogether, or, at least, they do not enter into concrete relation with the deeper things of life. Ignored elements practically drop out of our life; they have for us no real existence; and thus a habit is cultivated which makes the apprehension of spiritual realities exceedingly difficult.

The author next discusses some of the traditional objections urged against the reality of spiritual interests, the difficulty in-

volved in the conception of God, the difference between the scientific and religious problems, and the limitations and fluctuations of our natures, as well as the limitations and fluctuations of the spiritual life, and comes to the conclusion that it is only our consciously best hours that bear witness to the reality of the things of the spirit.

In pointing the way into reality, Dr. King discusses the presumptive evidence. This he finds in the trend of psychological thought, and man's essential need of religion. Next he discusses the theistic argument, and man's personal relation to God. Finally he points out the method of the spiritual life, and shows how the cardinal doctrines of Christianity harmonize with and satisfy every phase of human need and experience.

This volume, as might be expected from its author, gives evidence of careful thought in its preparation, and it will prove helpful to all who seriously grapple with the difficult spiritual problems of contemporary life and experience.

JOHN S. STAHR.

CALVINISM AND AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE. By Thomas Balch, 1876. Reprinted 1909. Philadelphia, Allen, Lane, and Scott.

This pamphlet of eighteen pages, written by a distinguished member of the Philadelphia bar, is very properly reprinted this fourth centenary year of the birth of John Calvin. The author makes a valuable contribution, not so much to religious history as to political science, and shows "that to the social mechanism, instituted by the great reformer, developed and modified by time and the experience of succeeding generations, we owe that form of political organization under which we live, commonly called Constitutional Republicanism." He points out the difference between the political effects of the Lutheran reformation in Germany, and those of Calvin's labors in Geneva, and follows the latter into France, Holland, Scotland, and the United States, tracing in this way the evolution of the civil and religious liberty which is the precious heritage of every American citizen.

JOHN S. STAHR.

